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(Under the direction of Elizabeth Havice and John Pickles) 
 
 
This dissertation examines what goes into making “sustainable” ocean resources. 
Studying oceans and marine resources can challenge terrestrial understandings of space, 
territory, and sovereignty, especially when marine resources are spatially dispersed or abstracted 
from the oceans themselves. Marine resource extraction focused on “sustainability” assumes the 
possibility of achieving balance between environmental protection and capitalist resource 
exploitation. In this context, I examine how specific marine resources – and oceans broadly – are 
produced to suit evolving sustainability objectives. Although these resources are often 
considered pre-existing natural objects awaiting discovery and capture, I argue that they come 
into being as socio-natural entities through active, relational processes.    
I look at two cases of ocean resource-making, showing how resources and sustainability 
are co-produced in technoscientific, institutional, and discursive dimensions. The first case is the 
transformation of microalgae into a range of products like omega-3 supplements, fish feed, and 
biofuels; I trace how algae are optimized through technoscientific and institutional practices to 
become fuel for humans, animals, and machines. Algal product developers leverage imaginaries 
of sustainable futures to attract financial capital and public funds in the present, linking 
speculative investment to spectacular sustainability stories. I argue that complex materialities of 
novel algal products and product systems can lead to regulatory uncertainties, causing friction in 
resource-making processes. The second case examines how discursive practices construct the 
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global ocean through the implementation of United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14, 
which focuses explicitly on the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and marine resources. 
I use discourse analysis to argue that UN discussions on goal implementation both construct the 
global ocean as object of improvement and stabilize the sustainable development apparatus 
through forms of “solidarity work” such as partnership. In both cases, marine resources are co-
produced with conceptions of sustainability, and resource-making becomes a mechanism of 
crisis response. This study shows that oceans and marine life are an important context for 
understanding the malleability and persistence of sustainable development as it moves into and 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION1 
     
Introduction 
This dissertation explores what goes into making “sustainable” ocean resources. As 
technoscientific advancements enhance human capacity to know the oceans through researching 
and exploring their depths, they also call attention to oceans and marine life as a field of new 
extractive possibilities. The depletion of existing ocean resources is a longstanding concern: 
overfishing Atlantic cod (Kurlansky 1997), tuna (Havice 2018; McCormack 2017), and other 
marine species, as well as extensive pollution of marine environments, endanger global food 
sources, livelihoods, species populations, and marine and coastal ecosystems (Dalla Costa and 
Chilese 2014). The human relationship to the sea, as Monica Chilese writes, has changed over 
time from one of mystery and ungovernability, imbued with a power that demands respect, to 
that of a “usable object” awaiting utilitarian appropriation, marked by piecemeal but rapid 
enclosures of vital global commons (ibid.).  
Acknowledging this resource depletion and ecosystem degradation has led to calls to 
reconfigure the human relationship to the sea through the lens of sustainable development. 
Sustainable ocean development positions oceans as a resource frontier ripe for exploration, 
extraction, and conservation in ways that purportedly protect marine environments and resources 
for the use and enjoyment of future generations (United Nations [UN] 1987). Thus, in tandem 
 
1Some of the content of this dissertation was originally published as: “‘Got Algae?’: Putting Marine Life to Work 
for Sustainability.” In Blue Legalities: The Life and Laws of the Sea, edited by Irus Braverman and Elizabeth R. 
Johnson, 275–94. Durham: Duke University Press. (c) 2020, Duke University Press. All rights reserved. Content 
republished by permission. www.dukeupress.edu. 
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with the ocean’s exploitative promise are concerns over the sustainability of such activities and 
the long-term effects of resource exploitation on ocean ecosystems themselves. As awareness 
grows of the oceans’ importance to human life – as a source of food and livelihoods, to 
environmental quality, to global climate change – and in keeping with global sustainable 
development priorities, institutions of ocean governance move to strike an appropriate balance 
between exploitation of ocean resources and environmental sustainability, often assuming that 
such a balance can indeed be achieved through technological progress and effective governance.  
 Against this backdrop of sustainability concerns, my research initially began with the 
question: how are oceans becoming enrolled in sustainable development? As my research 
progressed, I found that many iterations of ocean sustainability were tied to a utilitarian view of 
the oceans as a source of resource potential, as described by Chilese above (dalla Costa and 
Chilese 2014). Sustainability of the oceans is not only about determining appropriate levels of 
existing resource use, but about an ongoing means of resource creation. My inquiry shifted to 
examine these processes of resource-making, looking at how specific ocean resources – and 
oceans broadly – are created to suit evolving sustainability objectives. The research question 
guiding this dissertation is: how are marine resources created for sustainable development? This 
focus on resource-making as an active process moves away from conceptions of resources as 
pre-existing natural entities awaiting discovery and capture. Instead, I show how marine 
resources become such through technoscientific, institutional, and discursive processes. 
 These three approaches to resource-making are necessary to understanding resource-
making as a multi-dimensional, networked, and relational process. By focusing on 
technoscientific practices, I look at the production of knowledges required to make oceans and 
marine life legible for resource-making. Scientific practices require enabling institutional 
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environments: by turning to an analysis of institutional dimensions, I show how public and 
private actors mobilize financial and legal systems to facilitate resource-making. Attention to the 
discursive aspects of resource-making shows how resources are framed as a response to 
environmental and social crises and positioned in relation to creating so-called sustainable 
futures. All three are present in resource-making and each is emphasized in an empirical chapter. 
 Because “ocean resources” is a broad category, I chose two different cases for studying 
their production. The first is a study of resource-making from algae, aquatic organisms that are 
used to make products ranging from biofuels to surfboards to nutritional supplements. Algae are 
a compelling case of resource-making because their ongoing transformation from single-celled 
organisms into resources applies bio- and industrial technologies to improve both environmental 
and human health. I trace some of the technoscientific and institutional mechanisms that 
contribute to resource-making in the US algae sector, showing how these aquatic organisms are 
forwarded as a technical solution to both environmental and human health crises. 
 My second case study looks more broadly at international oceans governance, analyzing 
resource-making at the United Nations through its sustainable development goals. Oceans hold a 
prominent place in the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and this is the first time 
oceans have been a part of its official development program. My research asks how the oceans 
themselves – and their contents and services – are being incorporated into this international 
development agenda. I show that the oceans’ enrollment in this agenda requires their ongoing 
discursive construction as useful and accessible resources.   
The selection of these distinct cases allows me to consider different facets of resource-
making, while also approaching the question of ocean resources from different vantage points. In 
the production of algal biofuels and bioproducts, an organismal resource is leveraged toward 
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national-level sustainability priorities set by both the public and private sectors. For this to 
happen, algae are removed from their aquatic environments and cultivated in the laboratory and 
on terrestrial farms, often in the desert. This separation and abstraction of algae from ocean 
environments prompts questions about their status as “marine” resources and the role of the 
ocean in their production. As I will show, separation and abstraction are necessary preconditions 
for this form of algal resource-making. When algal products are subsequently reintroduced into 
the oceans as transformed objects – for example, as fish feed ingredients – they interact with 
marine environments in new forms and for new purposes.   
The second case pivots to the scale of international governance. Rather than looking at a 
specific marine resource object (such as algae), I use the UN Oceans case to examine how the 
global ocean itself becomes a resource through its construction as an object in need of 
improvement. This, too, occurs through processes of abstraction that frame the ocean in terms of 
utility and prescribe improvement through the mechanisms of sustainable development. I show 
how actors in international governance discursively create and mobilize around the ocean as a 
shared but differentiated object for improvement and utilization, stabilizing the sustainable 
development apparatus in the process. These two seemingly disparate cases, therefore, show how 
trajectories of ocean resource-making operate through concrete practices (technoscientific, 
institutional, and discursive) as well as through abstraction, spatial fragmentation, and scalar 
flexibility.  
Case 1: Algae, the “biological factory” 
A discussion of algae may prompt images of pond scum and dirty fish tanks, or perhaps 
the dangerous algal blooms known as “red tides” that release toxins harmful to marine fauna and 
humans. Algae are a difficult group of organisms to classify. “Algae” is a general term used to 
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describe a diverse group of organisms that do not fit neatly into Linnaean taxonomy. In the 
broadest terms, algae are photosynthetic aquatic organisms. The simplest of these are 
cyanobacteria, also known as blue-green algae, which are single cells with no nucleus that 
contain photosynthetic pigments. Microalgae, such as red algae, green algae, and diatoms, are 
single-celled organisms with a nucleus that contain chloroplasts, organelles containing 
chlorophyll that conduct photosynthesis within the cell. Macroalgae are large, multicellular 
aquatic organisms such as seaweeds and kelps. This dissertation considers work on microalgae, 
which are most suitable to transformation into biofuels and other bioproducts (Chisti 2019).  
 
Figure 1: Pavlova microalgae. Image credit: CSIRO.  
 
 I began the project with a focus on algal biofuels, which ostensibly put algae “to work” as 
efficient photosynthesizers. Microalgae are desirable feedstocks for biofuels because of their 
high productivity relative to terrestrial plant crops. For example, each algal cell in an algal pond 
is photosynthesizing and producing energy, whereas only some parts of larger plants carry out 
that function. Single-celled algae also have shorter life cycles and can be harvested more 
frequently than other crops (Chisti 2019, 4). Such productivity positions the alga as an “efficient 
biological factory” (Sheehan et al. 1998). But generating this productivity actually requires 
extensive scientific intervention, institutional investment, and financial commitments to bring to 
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fruition. As a substitute for petroleum-based fuels, algal biofuels would purportedly reduce 
national petroleum dependence while also reducing carbon emissions relative to burning fossil 
fuels (DOE 2010). Different strains of algae have biological characteristics that make them 
attractive as biofuel feedstocks, such as a high lipid composition and rapid reproductive growth 
potential. Realizing this potential as economic value requires optimizing the processes, 
knowledges, and resources mobilized in biofuel production. Recently revived funding programs 
for algal biofuels development from the US Departments of Energy and Defense and private 
industries suggest that biofuel science and development situate algae in a web of political, 
security, economic, and environmental priorities. 
Most biofuel produced in the US is derived from corn; decisions to divert agricultural 
crops (and productive land) away from food production and toward biofuels have received 
criticism for contributing to rising food prices. The 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act 
establishes a Renewable Fuels Standard limiting the amount of renewable fuels that can be 
sourced from corn-based ethanol (DOE 2010). Algal production systems would also allow algal 
biofuels to sidestep the “food versus fuel” debate by alleviating various economic and 
environmental concerns troubling the biofuels industry. These algae are grown primarily in 
human-made above-ground ponds in areas with maximal sunlight and minimal rainfall. 
Maximizing sunlight increases solar energy inputs for algal photosynthesis, and the chemicals 
and particulate matter in rainfall can disrupt or contaminate algal cultivation systems (producers 
provide and monitor their own water supply). Many of the most optimal conditions for terrestrial 
production of these aquatic species are in desert climates that are unsuitable for most other food 
crops (DOE 2016c).   
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Because algal fuel is still far too expensive to produce on a commercial scale, much of 
the applied research on algal biofuels and bioproducts emphasizes overcoming technical barriers 
to algal biofuel productivity (Ghasemi et al. 2012). In addition to the challenges of optimizing 
algal yields, algal biofuel developers aim to utilize existing petroleum and energy delivery 
infrastructures to maximize cost-efficiency. The development of algal biofuel as a “sustainable” 
alternative therefore involves the reinforcement of and reliance on fossil fuel infrastructures. 
Even more research efforts focus on the development of other algal products: health 
supplements, infant formula, cooking oil, surfboards, flipflops, and pet food may contain a dose 
of algae. These, too, are examples of “sustainable” resources according to many developers and 
proponents. 
My dissertation provides an account of these technologies “in the making” (Hayden 
2003), enrolling genes, human and nonhuman life forms, institutions, laws, and technologies in 
the process of making marine resources for sustainable development. I propose that the creation 
of these marine resources shapes and is shaped by the structures and institutions of sustainable 
development. Therefore, “sustainable” algal resource-making responds to key concerns of the 
sustainable development paradigm: in this case, intertwined crises of climate change, energy 
security, and Malthusian population anxieties.  
Case 2: Making “oceans” a sustainable resource through the UN 2030 Agenda 
My second case departs from algae and looks at resource-making in the context of the 
United Nations sustainable development agenda. Sustainable development, through the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), has 
become the mainstream international development paradigm in the United Nations system. As 
the successor to the Millennium Development Goals, the 2030 Agenda captures a broader range 
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of development and environmental concerns, attempting to bridge these two historically siloed 
areas of action into one comprehensive global development agenda that addresses economic, 
environmental, and social development imperatives concurrently.  
 I chose this particular site for examining ocean resource-making for several reasons. 
First, Sustainable Development Goal 14 on the conservation and sustainable use of ocean 
resources is the first explicit oceans-related development target in UN history. Although oceans 
cover over 70% of the earth’s surface, they were previously largely absent from the UN 
development agenda. This shift signals that oceans are now an important site for sustainable 
development activities organized around the 2030 Agenda’s economic, social, and environmental 
pillars. Second, UN meetings provide an opportunity to examine resource-making from a 
discursive perspective, at a particular point in its making. To this end, I examine how the UN and 
associated actors and institutions approach integrating oceans into inter-state sustainable 
development for the first time through the mechanism of the UN Ocean Conference, a key site of 
oceans sustainable development agenda-setting and SDG 14 implementation. I use discourse 
analysis as an entry point into this inquiry because understanding how oceans are enrolled in 
sustainable development requires attention to how they are problematized as spaces of 
environmental concern and concurrently framed as sources of “development” – environmental, 
social, and economic. Conducting discourse analysis at an agenda-setting international 
conference draws out the particularities of this current moment of implementing a new, oceans-
centered goal. Analyzing discourses at the Ocean Conference is a snapshot of sustainable 




The rise of sustainable development and the 2030 Agenda 
My analysis leads me to argue that resource-making is an active, relational process and 
an important avenue for enrolling oceans into sustainable development. But what is sustainable 
development? Toward what ends are such resources created? The conceptual and practical 
ambiguities of “sustainable development” are foundational to my analysis, for they show how 
both the means and ends of resource creation are a moving target. Ideas about what sustainable 
development is and what it should look like remain prolific and contested (Adams 2009; Brooks 
1992; Hajer 2003; Raco 2005; Redclift 2005); sustainable development – as a response to 
environmental crisis – has become a dominant mainstream development consensus (Hajer 1995).  
Sustainable development encompasses a range of ideas, practices, priorities, and values. 
The oft-cited definition from the report of the World Commission for Environment and 
Development (WCED) – “humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure 
that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs” (UN 1987) – emphasizes continuity between generations and temporal 
scales and proposes seven target areas of action designed to shift social organization and promote 
technologies that encourage economic growth within recognized environmental limits. The 
“three pillars” approach that promoted concurrent economic growth, social inclusion, and 
environmental protection became prominent in the 1990s; the notion that these pillars are 
mutually reinforcing remains central to sustainable development discussions (Dryzek 2013; 
Zaccai 2012). The interpretive flexibility of sustainable development extends beyond official 
definitions and is reflected in a wide range of work on sustainability, from new journals in 
sustainability science and efforts to quantify sustainability targets to the substantial influence of 
sustainable development in policy instruments (Zaccai 2012). As Adams (2009) argues, “it is 
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precisely because of its ability to host divergent ideas that sustainable development has proved so 
useful, and has become so dominant” (23).   
The 1990s saw a marked rise in the number of organizations and projects describing 
themselves as doing “sustainable development.” This includes both development and 
environmental organizations, whose concerns were frequently treated as separate spheres of 
action. The rise in popularity of this term can be traced to several factors. First, greater 
awareness of the global scale of environmental problems prompted attention to global or 
transnational solutions (such as concerns over the “hole” in protective atmospheric ozone 
growing over the poles and increased public awareness of climate change framed at the time as 
the “greenhouse effect”) (Adams 2009, 4). Second, environmental organizations levied strong 
critiques at development and aid agencies, perhaps influencing them to incorporate more 
environmental concerns that, until that point, were largely externalized from their operations. 
Third, in response to more localized yet pervasive environmental crises and the rise of pollution 
in the 1970s, many industrialized nations began to “green” their politics; this “general 
‘greening’” had a demonstrable impact on development agencies (ibid.; Goldman 2005). These 
factors precipitated the incorporation of environmental concerns into development and aid 
agencies. 
Sustainable development also offered a potential alternative to existing development 
paradigms that failed to deliver on their objectives to develop or “modernize” the so-called 
developing nations of the world. With neoliberal development policies leading to rising Third 
World indebtedness and austerities, and the diminishing influence and eventual collapse of the 
Soviet Union and subsequent decline of its state-led development, the time seemed ripe for a new 
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development paradigm to guide development out of a morass of debt and failed projects (Toye 
1993 in Adams 2009, 10). As Adams argues,  
“The idea of sustainable development was welcomed by development thinkers 
and practitioners, because it seemed to provide a way out of the impasse and away 
from past failure, a means of rerouting the lumbering juggernaut of development 
practice without endangering belief in the rightness and feasibility of its continued 
forward movement” (ibid., 15; see also Escobar 1995).  
 
I discuss how this modernization paradigm endures in marine resource-making in chapter 6.  
Rather than dismissing sustainable development as too accommodating to hold any real 
meaning, I ask how sustainability and resources are made together, what claims and agendas 
they seek to incorporate, and with what effects (see also McCormack 2017). For example, even 
though sustainable development initially emerged as a critique of environmentally and socially 
devastating neoliberal developments, it has nonetheless stretched to incorporate neoliberal 
rationalities in ways that: 1) normalize market mechanisms as a preferred field of environmental 
action (McCormack 2017, 50), 2) shape how sustainability is concretely measured (ibid.; 
Davidson 2011), and 3) promote the application of economic reasoning to the management of 
life itself (Reid 2013).   
Mainstream sustainable development discourse has some broad contours that serve as 
useful points of departure for this study of sustainable resource-making. While sustainable 
development is often discussed as a goal or an accomplishment, I show that it is also a discourse, 
or “a shared way of apprehending the world” (Dryzek 2013, 9, 147). As a discourse, sustainable 
development uses instruments such as public policy to try to solve environmental problems 
created by an economic system premised on capitalist growth, which is taken as a given. Its 
notion of limits and survival suggests that the population of the earth is approaching the planet’s 
carrying capacity, especially with growing levels of consumption, advocating for limiting 
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growth. Sustainability includes efforts to reconcile conflicts between economic growth and 
environmental degradation that “render obsolete” any limits that would potentially constrain 
development (ibid., 16). Sustainable development relies heavily on the use of technology and the 
assumption (or hope) that technological advancements can “stretch” resources and even increase 
the carrying capacity of the earth or of particular socio-ecological systems (ibid., 156). While it 
takes as given its situatedness within a global capitalist economy, it incorporates a range of 
political systems as sites of action, emphasizing networked governance and partnerships (ibid., 
157). I explore how these elements also shape marine resource-making to advance 
understandings of how sustainable development of the oceans is continually stretched and 
remade through active resource creation.  
Conceptual Tools for Understanding Marine Resource-making 
I draw from materials from several theoretical orientations to inform my research: co-
production, socio-spatial histories of science, political ecology with a focus on the capitalization 
of nature and neoliberal natures, and a deeper theorization of sustainability as a discourse and 
governance rationale. These conceptual tools help me theorize how oceans and their components 
become objects of resource-making or of environmental governance, informing my theorization 
of the ongoing production of both ocean resources and ocean sustainability. They also facilitate 
working through and highlighting the intersections of the three different resource-making lenses 
of my study: technoscientific, institutional, and discursive.  
Co-production 
As Law (2004) notes, the idea that scientific knowledge production is a social and 
cultural process is becoming more widely accepted. I use the framework of co-production 
(Jasanoff 2004) as a set of questions useful for understanding how scientific knowledge, culture, 
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and power are produced together. Co-production “is shorthand for the proposition that the ways 
in which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the 
ways in which we choose to live in it” (ibid., 2). Understanding ocean resource-making also 
requires understanding what specific scientific claims are being made around its feasibility, its 
social and environmental costs, its future potential, and who is permitted to make such claims 
(Jasanoff 2004; Latour 1993; Shapin and Schaffer 1989). Algal product development is a costly 
and uncertain research endeavor (DOE 2010); incorporating this science into state political 
activity requires a certain kind of functional relationship between the involved scientific polity 
and the wider polity and other governance structures (Jasanoff 2004; Shapin and Schaffer 1989). 
I use this literature on co-production to help me understand the role of technoscientific practices 
in the creation of both resources and sustainability.   
Socio-spatial histories of science 
I engage with social studies of science to understand the relationship between science and 
resource-making and to explore how scientific pursuits are influenced by social and political 
processes. This literature allows me to understand how the scientific practices of algal biofuels 
development are entangled in national and local governance, security priorities, and sustainable 
development discourses. I rely on sociologies of scientific knowledge in order to situate the 
emergence of such knowledge within distinct cultures (Kuhn 1996, Knorr Cetina 1999). 
Scientific practices are also spatial practices that have effects beyond the immediate “doing” of 
science; measurements and analyses reconstruct spaces and ideas, affecting how we come to 
know nature and society. Studies of the spatialities of knowledge production (Livingstone 2003; 
Massey 2004; Pickles 2004) “place” scientific practice (Kirsch 2011) and analyze how sciences 
and technologies operate in larger fields of circulating power, discourses, and capital (Foucault 
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1994; Halewood 2012; Harding 2011; Livingstone 1992; Pickles 2004). Such work is crucial to 
my project of understanding marine resource development in relation to shifting security and 
energy priorities, sustainable development discourses, and the institutional regimes that structure 
research.  
Tracing the genesis of scientific ideas must also account for the geopolitical contexts of 
knowledge production and how policies, infrastructures, and knowledges have perpetuated 
colonial and imperial hegemony (Anderson 2009). Western scientific thought and practice 
developed within and through colonial and imperial expansion (Harding 2011; Livingstone 1992, 
Schiebinger 2004); the colonial and imperial contexts of scientific development can have lasting 
effects not only on the political applications of scientific knowledge, but on the priorities and 
content of present-day scientific inquiry itself (Subramaniam 2014). This perspective is 
important to my project because, even though it initially arose as a critique of neoliberalized 
development, sustainable development as a global program or industry remains an uneven terrain 
that reproduces colonial power relations through development and environmental concern 
(Escobar 1995). Part of my inquiry is to examine the role of ocean resource-making in disrupting 
and/or reproducing such relations in the name of “sustainability” and global biospheric health. 
Marine science and exploration, in particular, have developed in concert with imperial scientific 
exploration, imperial expansion, and geopolitical positioning (Hamblin 2005; Hannigan 2016; 
Reidy and Rozwadowski 2014; Rozwadowski and van Keuren 2004). These histories of ocean 
science show how such legacies impact contemporary scientific practice, technology use, and 
institutional governance in the creation of marine resources. Such histories are informative when 
questioning what “sustainable” resources are designed to sustain. 
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Political ecology and the capitalization of nature 
I draw from works in political ecology to address how power circulates in the social, 
material, and political worlds in which sustainable development occurs. Political ecologists have 
developed differing (and often simultaneously invoked) notions of nature’s value which 
influence debates over its so-called sustainable use. Following nature’s value(s) may also 
indicate where and for whom such value is appropriated and distributed. Marx (1976) provides a 
materialist foundation for this research because capitalism is a central relation within uneven 
development (Smith 2008). The commodification of nature is a key process in the growth and 
spread of capitalism (Mintz 1986), development (Escobar 1995), and sustainable development 
(Goldman 2005). With oceans positioned as a frontier for capitalist exploitation, enabled by 
science and technology, I use work on commodity frontiers for understanding the articulation of 
capitalism’s present forms within the biosciences (Moore 2010a; 2010b; Havice and Zalik 2018). 
Capital has also gained more influence within the agricultural sciences in ways that affect 
research content and research products. Jack Kloppenburg’s (2004) analysis of plant 
biotechnologies interpolates agricultural science into histories of capitalist commodification and 
primitive accumulation. Kaushik Sunder Rajan’s (2006) ethnography of pharmaceutical 
development in the US and India likewise situates biotechnologies within circuits of capital, 
emerging markets, policies, and discourses that shape scientific practice.  
Neoliberal governance has also shaped the development and regulation of nature (Castree 
2008; McCarthy and Prudham 2004), especially within a sustainable development paradigm 
(Reid 2013). Mansfield (2004) describes neoliberalism as a dominant paradigm of oceans 
governance; her work on the privatization of fisheries demonstrates the persistent appeal of the 
tragedy of the commons as a framework for understanding diminishing resources. These 
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analyses of neoliberal trends in development and natural resource governance contribute to 
understanding how algal bioscience is co-produced within financial and regulatory institutions 
governed under a neoliberal logic. For example, Cooper (2008) situates biotechnologies in the 
context of Meadows et al.’s (1972) Limits to Growth and the Club of Rome reports. In her 
reading, limits to growth are an obstacle to be overcome through both neoliberalism and 
biotechnologies, be these limits economic or ecological, spatial or temporal.  
Sustainability as a discourse and a governing rationale 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality is a powerful tool for examining the rationalities 
and objects of governance, and how they come to make sense as such. As Lövbrand et al. (2009) 
put it, “the governmentality concept draws attention to the systematic thinking that renders 
different governing strategies possible” (8). In doing so, it “refuses recognition of ‘ready-made 
objects,’” such as madness (Foucault 2007, 118, qtd. in Nadesan 2008, 10) or, in the case of this 
research, sustainability. In the management of global resources and global environmental 
problems, specific governmental rationalities inform the creation of the particular object(s) to be 
governed, such as the climate (Methmann 2011; Oels 2005), the Earth System (Lövbrand et al. 
2009), and the global ocean (Lehman 2016).  
Foucault traces in his genealogies how arts of government come to manage and harness 
the capacities of life, from a period classical liberalism to neo- and late liberalism. This shifting 
governmentality is dominated by economic rationalities, with “political economy as [a] principle 
of the internal limitation of governmental reason” (Foucault 2008, 1). In other words, political 
economy is the means of determining whether government is functioning rationally and thus not 
excessively. Political economy focuses on effects of governmental practices, but does not 
evaluate their morality or correctness. The important thing here, shared with projects of 
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sustainable resource-making, is utility: new arts of government sought to limit government 
power from within by looking at governmental practices themselves (rather than law), and 
determining “what would it be useful for the government to do or not do?” (ibid., 40). In the 
neoliberal era, political economy becomes an art of government meant to indirectly regulate the 
social through a naturalized market mechanism, extending economic reason into new social 
domains (ibid.) – “to corral all judgement into calculable rationalities” (Bresnihan 2019, 161). 
Scholars of global environmental governance noted changes in governmental rationalities 
that correspond to shifts in environmental discourses (Oels 2005, 193). For example, Oels (2005) 
analyzes a shift in the discourse of climate change governance from green governmentality to 
ecological modernization. Green governmentality is the “biopower that has been extended to the 
entire planet,” where rational government interventions target the condition of both the 
population and the biosphere (Luke 1999, ctd. in Oels 2005, 194-5). A green governmentality 
approach calls for effective global management of environmental concerns. In contrast, 
ecological modernization “reconceptualizes the ecological crises as an opportunity for innovation 
and reinvention of the capitalist system (Hajer 1997, 32, in Oels 2005), proposing market-based 
solutions and using economic rationalities to determine an acceptable level of environmental 
harm according to cost-benefit analysis (ibid., 201). Reid (2013) finds this shift evident within 
sustainable development discourse as well. Sustainable development’s earliest iterations 
criticized development models that prioritized economic growth and industrialization at the 
expense of ecological and human health. Neoliberalism appropriated this original critique and 
incorporated ecological concern into its economic rationale. The result is that economic 
rationalities now strongly inform environmental governance, with economic reason “claiming 
paradoxically to secure life from economy through a promotion of the capacities of life for 
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economy” (108; emphasis added). This perspective on the relationship between discourse and 
rationalities of government shows that the question of what constitutes sustainability in the 
context of oceans and marine resource-making is contested and unsettled. 
Chapter outline 
This dissertation proceeds as follows. In chapter 2, I describe my research methods and 
data analyses. Chapter 3 provides a brief background to my two empirical chapters on algae. I 
outline the co-production of key developments in US algal product development with different 
forms crisis, where scientifically moderated algae are posited as sustainable crisis solutions. The 
three empirical chapters that follow are clustered around the three different lenses through which 
I view of resource-making: technoscientific, institutional, and discursive. I argue that resource-
making entails all three of these elements, but I foreground a specific lens in each chapter.  
In chapter 4, I address the technoscientific dimensions of turning algae into a 
commercializable biofuel, focusing on the US algae development sector. I show how a nexus of 
state-industry relationships mediates the scientific practices that enhance or optimize algae’s 
desired characteristics, turning them into potentially useful components that circulate through 
economies and bodies, becoming fuel for both machines and humans. “Bits of life” describes the 
technologically mediated fragmentations and recombinations of algae at finer and finer scales 
and serves as a tool for thinking through the complicated relationship between organisms and 
their components (Smelik and Lykke 2008).  
In chapter 5, I foreground institutional dimensions of algal resource-making in the US. 
Because algal biofuels are still too expensive to be commercially viable, some algae developers 
have switched to products that are cheaper to produce and offer profit potentials in the short- and 
medium terms, such as food for humans and feed for animals. Algae producers use the flexibility 
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of algal organisms and production systems to navigate institutional opportunities and constraints, 
developing strategies for generating value for promissory resources in-the-making at different 
phases of realization. While transforming algae into “bits of life” provides avenues for the 
multiplication of value from algal resources, these processes also complicate their classification 
and regulation as consumer products.  
In chapter 6, I broaden my focus from algal organisms and examine discursive 
dimensions of marine resource-making through my second case: the implementation of UN 
Sustainable Development Goal 14 on the conservation and sustainable use of ocean resources. I 
use discourse analysis to understand how ocean resources are made discursively through and 
within the UN sustainable development apparatus, requiring attention to how oceans are 
problematized as spaces of environmental concern and concurrently framed as a sources of 
“potential” – environmental, social, and economic. 
By examining marine resource-making through these three dimensions – technoscientific, 
institutional, and discursive – my research shows that these cases of marine resource-making are 
networked, relational processes. In the case of algae, resource-making blurs boundaries between 
organisms, their subcellular components, their environments, and other species. At the 
international level, where oceans have a more prominent place on the global development agenda 
than ever before, UN meeting participants discursively create ocean resources to serve the 
sustainable development agenda. By looking at these different facets of resource-making, I also 
use oceans and marine life as a lens to study the advancement and development of “sustainability 
objectives” generally, as well as specifically in the oceans context, showing how marine 
resources and sustainability are co-produced. Each chapter examines a facet of this co-
production, showing how oceans and marine life become important to a range of sustainably-
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minded projects and objectives even when key sites of activity are terrestrial, spatially dispersed, 





CHAPTER 2: METHODS 
Ocean governance and resource-making can be difficult to study because key sites of 
activity are spatially dispersed. The specific materialities of oceans and marine life themselves 
also complicate efforts to know and act upon them. To study my two cases of ocean resource-
making and bring them together analytically, I use multi-sited ethnographic methods. Multi-sited 
ethnography allows me to examine the diffuse and interconnected relationships between actors 
and institutions in these resource-making sectors, integrating different locations and scales of 
analysis.  
Marcus (1995) develops a theory of multi-sited ethnographic methods, placing them in 
relation to postmodern theories that attempt to explain different forms of fragmentation in the 
world-system associated with globalization. Examples include time-space compression (Harvey 
1990; Massey 1993), rhizomes, and deterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). He argues 
that this fragmentation complicates ethnographic practice, namely the relationship between what 
Marcus calls “the system” and “the lifeworld.” In other words, to understand “the lifeworld” 
(often the context of study at a single ethnographic site), it is necessary to understand how it 
affects and is affected by larger systems.  
I also frame this multi-sited ethnography as a form of institutional ethnography, taken 
more broadly than the study of a specific organization and referring to a networked resource 
sector. For this reason, I use methods that help me to bridge larger flows of capital, discourse, 
knowledge production, and governance with concrete development practices that bring resources 
into being (see Billo and Mountz 2016; Marcus 1995; Philo and Parr 2000). As Philo and Parr 
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(2000) note of institutional ethnographies, such studies need not focus on one discreet location, 
“but rather can be concentrating on a spidery network of dispersed intentions, knowledges, 
resources and powers” (514). This diffuse siting is important because of the diffuse and 
interconnected relationships between organizations and actors involved in marine resource-
making. Incorporating textual analysis, participant observations, and interviews allowed me to 
assemble a body of evidence for taking this sectoral approach; in the algae sector, this focused on 
US Department of Energy-led efforts in algal resource development and their offshoots.  
I drew inspiration from multi-sited and multi-scalar ethnographies of biosciences that link 
scientific practices with institutions, economies, and discourses. Sunder Rajan’s (2006) multi-
sited ethnography of biocapital seeks to understand the emergence of new forms of genomic 
science that are connected to the markets and financial structures that enable them (e.g., the 
pharmaceutical industry). Such a study is not “additive” in terms of adding ethnographic sites to 
a single-sited model, but creates a new “conceptual topology” for understanding the connections 
between global political economy and bioscience (ibid., 31). Duygu Kaşdoğan’s (2017) multi-
sited ethnography of algal potentiality is especially instructive; her ethnography includes 
laboratory studies as a key site of analysis and toggles effectively between different scales of 
algae production: micro-level experimental practices, macro-level bioeconomies, and meta-level 
discourses (29).  
My work on algal resource-making traces a set of scientific practices embedded in and 
enabled by a network of organizations, laws, investments, and discourses; a multi-sited 
ethnography allows me to bridge localized practices and interactions with “general distributions 
of economic, political, cultural, communicational, symbolic and other resources (reaching across 
time and space)” (Philo and Parr 2000, 516). 
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On the one hand, this study resonates with “first world political ecologies” that take 
powerful institutions as objects of study in environmental development practice (Robbins 2002). 
The US algal development sector is a privileged site of resource-making, in part because making 
algal resources requires leveraging significant amounts of time, capital, infrastructure, and 
influence. This follows a trend in late 20th and early 21st century science where emerging 
interdisciplinary configurations of practice respond to the demands and priorities of the military 
and industrial sectors (Hess 2011, 419). Algal developers also shape the sustainability stories of 
their products, which can be put in service of perpetuating US hegemony, as in the case of algal 
jet fuels for the US military (Bigger and Neimark 2017), strengthening transnational corporate 
hegemony by positioning algal biofuels as a tool of corporate social responsibility (“Growing 
Fuel” 2019), supporting the health concerns of consumers who can afford nutraceuticals 
(Abrahamsson et al. 2015), or feeding food insecure populations through US agricultural 
productivity reminiscent of the Green Revolution. The UN Ocean Conference approaches the 
notion of first world political ecology from a different angle: the UN system has a historical 
legacy of being dominated by global North actors and agendas, but the prominence of oceans in 
the UN’s sustainable development agenda is due largely to global South mobilization and 
agenda-setting, especially among Pacific small island developing states (SIDS). In examining 
sites of power in resource-making, I also call attention to moments of contestation and 
negotiation. 
Algae: data collection and methods 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 on algae draw from several sources of data. First, I look at archival 
data and written records produced by algal biofuels researchers and funders. These include 
industry publications produced by firms and lobbying organizations such as reports, magazines, 
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and news stories; reports of government projects supported by the Department of Energy, the 
various National Labs working on algae, and the US Department of Agriculture; government 
policies and regulations related to algae as detailed in the Federal Register and other legal and 
policy documents; and published scientific findings related to algae.  
 Second, I use data from participant observation conducted at a number of strategic, high-
impact algae events. I conducted participant observation using an IRB-approved observation 
protocol. The most significant of these is annual summit of the Algae Biomass Organization, 
self-advertised as the largest gathering of algae professionals in the United States. I conducted 
participant observation and interviews at both the tenth and eleventh summits, held in Phoenix in 
Oct 2016 and in Salt Lake City in 2017, respectively. Participant observation and document 
review at the summit allowed me to map out individual and institutional actors in algal biofuels 
development and to identify and interview key actors. I focused my observations on sessions 
related to the institutional aspects of resource-making, and the role of regulatory agencies and 
finance in the scientific process. These included sessions on food and feed regulations, financing 
algal product development and pitching to funders, and bringing algal products to the market. 
I conducted a site visit and interviews at the National Center for Marine Algae and 
Microbiota in East Boothbay, Maine, which houses one of the largest collections of marine algae 
specimens. As a services-oriented organization, its scientists work to facilitate scientific work 
involving marine algae and other microorganisms. The NCMA is an International Depositary 
Authority (IDA), authorized by the World Intellectual Property Organization to hold biological 
materials during patent procedures. I also conducted participant observation at “Bioeconomy 
2017: Domestic Resources for a Vibrant Future,” sponsored by the US Department of Energy 
Bioenergy Technologies Office (BETO), which coordinates national algal biofuel program 
25 
development efforts. Finally, I attended the 8th International Conference on Algal Biomass, 
Biofuels and Bioproducts 2018 (“Algal BBB”), which included a listening session with BETO 
on advanced algal systems. These strategic high-impact events both bring together large numbers 
of research participants and are important agenda-setting and procedural events for working 
through scientific and political controversies. This dispersed siting reflects the diffuse and 
interconnected relationships between actors and institutions involved in bioproduct production. 
Because the questions posed here address the relationship between scientific practice and 
institutions of governance at different but overlapping scales, this type of event ethnography also 
resembles a network approach that allows me “trace associations” between scientists, their 
objects of study, and institutional structures (Callon 1986; Campbell et al. 2014; Latour 1988; 
Mitchell 2002).  
In my analysis, I focused on specific resource-making dimensions. For the 
technoscientific dimensions discussed in chapter 4, I organized my data as they related to 
specific steps that transform algae into a fuel product. This process includes four different 
“nodes” that reflect key steps of the algal biofuels production chain necessary to produce an 
exploitable energy resource. Parsing out the activities in these nodes shows the specific linkages 
between technoscientific practices that transform and manipulate algal bits of life, the metrics of 
sustainability that inform the resource-making, and how these steps are embedded in larger 
relational networks of production. The nodes are interlinked and interdependent, but each has 
specific objectives for optimizing algae. The four nodes are: 1) algal strain identification and 
optimization; 2) cultivation; 3) harvesting, dewatering, and extraction; and 4) conversion.  
I parsed the data for each node for three concerns I identified as central to advancing 
resource-making at each node. The first concern is the specific technoscientific practices of algal 
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transformation: how are algae transformed into component parts, circulated, and recombined? 
What are the materialities of their production? Second, I examined the data to understand what 
specific sustainability concerns were being addressed at each node. I asked how different actors 
conceptualize sustainability at each particular phase in the production process, and what metrics 
are considered “optimal” in resource-making at each step. Third, I looked more closely at the 
trends in the relationship between public and private actors. This is the “who” of technoscientific 
resource-making processes and points to the networks of relationships required for the 
advancement of the technologies. Looking at science, sustainability, and the relationalities at 
each node is important for constructing an account of co-production. 
My initial focus of research was algal biofuels, but after beginning my research I decided 
to pursue investigation of food and feed products that were gaining more traction at major 
industry events. In my analysis for chapter 5, I shifted my analysis to the governmental and 
financial dimensions of algal resource-making, focusing on these products. I wanted to 
understand the reasons and mechanisms for this shift. I coded my observational and archival data 
for particular challenges or frustrations to  product developers and other stakeholders supportive 
of algal production pathways, adjusting my interview protocols accordingly. I chose two cases 
for further analysis that I understand as institutional dimensions of resource-making. The first is 
the financial challenge of start-up companies to survive the “valley of death,” a period of 
financial precarity when companies are seeking capital to finance new product development but 
are not yet profitable enough to survive. Following in the footsteps of Anna Tsing’s (2005) 
ethnography Friction, I discovered the joining of the speculative investment with the spectacular 
sustainability story and traced how this combination constructs present-day resource-making 
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mechanisms from future possibilities.2 The second challenge is the quandary of regulation, in 
which I constructed an account of the frictions that algae encounter while moving through 
regulatory pathways. 
UN Ocean Conference: data collection and methods 
My analysis of the UN Ocean Conference uses Foucauldian discourse analysis, which 
differs from analyses that focus on semiology (an emphasis on inherent meanings) or manifest 
content analysis (analysis based on quantifying the various linguistic elements in a dataset). 
Instead, it aims to “uncover the cultural and social mechanisms that maintain or rupture 
structures or rules of validity over statements about the world” (Waitt 2016, 289-90). In this vein, 
I use the international meeting venue as a site for exploring how UN actors use discourse to 
make the ocean into sustainable development resources.  
I focus on statements and texts of the Ocean Conference, a strategic, high-impact event 
that brought together large numbers of stakeholders concerned with ocean sustainable 
development; it is one forum to observe international agenda-setting and procedure, where 
different actors work through scientific and political controversies. As Silver et al. (2015) argue, 
such international meetings “offer a sanctioned setting for the (re)configuration of social 
relations and structures and the (re)codification of positions and perspectives,” where “broader 
discourses may evolve, permeate, or be reinforced in ways that influence future funding, 
programs, policies, and activism” (136). Researchers of ocean governance processes use event 
ethnography to study the making and remaking of different discourses relevant to oceans 
governance and their relationship to policy and governance practices (ibid; Campbell et al. 
 
2Analyzing this combination of the speculative and spectacular was also inspired by a three-part session at the 2020 
Annual Meeting of the American Association of Geographers, entitled “Spectacular Resources: Geographies of 
Environmental Spectacles and Speculation,” organized by Jenny Goldstein, David Kneas, and Andrea Marston. 
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2014). There is growing interest among scholars of global environmental governance in 
multilateral meetings as research sites: a previous focus on state actors has shifted to explore 
how non-state and marginalized actors gain influence and affect governance regimes in these 
spaces, how multilateral environmental agreements operate as networked systems, and how 
interpersonal and social dynamics affect negotiations (O’Neal and Haas 2019). Conducting 
“summit” research enabled me to observe a snapshot of the performance of political decision-
making and see marine resource-making controversies emerge, solidify and be contested in real 
time. Qualitative analysis of meetings and summits are documented by social scientists who 
study oceans processes (see also Campbell et al. 2014; Helmreich 2009; Helmreich 2020).  
Chapter 6 focuses on the 2017 Ocean Conference, and I also collected data from the 
proceedings of two additional conferences to provide additional background and context. The 
first, “Legal Order in the World’s Oceans: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,” organized in 
June 2016 by the Center for Oceans Law and Policy at the University of Virginia in cooperation 
with the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea and the UN Office of Legal 
Affairs, gathered legal scholars, government officials, and scientists to examine UNCLOS as a 
tool for addressing challenges in oceans governance, including those not anticipated at the time 
of UNCLOS’s drafting. The conference explored the role of the law in managing the balance 
between conservation and exploitation in sustainable development and the changing role of the 
common heritage principle in governing the seas. Second, I attended the preparatory meeting of 
the UN Ocean Conference held in February 2017. This meeting aimed to gather stakeholder 
input and finalize guidance documents for the Ocean Conference partnership dialogues and Call 
for Action, two of the main proposed Conference outcomes. Finally, the Ocean Conference 
itself, held in June 2017, aimed to further the implementation of SDG 14, primarily through 
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strengthening existing partnerships, creating new ones, and mobilizing support for voluntary 
commitments from stakeholders to promote oceans sustainable development in accordance with 
the 2030 Agenda. I attended all three conferences at UN Headquarters in New York. 
 I observed both the main conference setting and, in the case of the UN preparatory 
meeting and Ocean Conference, selected side events (Appendix). Observations include 
information about the setting, participants, the content of the intervention, interactions between 
various stakeholder groups, and other observations and unanticipated events. For the UN Ocean 
Conference, I transcribed and coded all plenary sessions and partnership dialogues, either from 
my own recordings or from those posted on the UN website. I directly observed two dialogues 
and four plenaries while in attendance. I observed a total of 16 side events; I prioritized 
observing side events in person because they were less formal than the official UN proceedings 
and direct observation was the only way to capture the presentations and discussions. Side 
events, as slightly more informal spaces, contained lively debate, question and answer sessions, 
spontaneous ideas and suggestions in addition to prepared remarks, and partnership opportunities 
outside of formal government policies and commitments proposed during the partnership 
dialogues and plenaries.  
 I also examined official UN and UN partner agency documents on the rationale for and 
planning of the development and implementation of SDG 14. These include documents from Rio 
+20 on the role of oceans and science and technology in sustainable development; UNDESA 
reports on sustainable development of the oceans; UNGA and DOALOS documents on the 
relationship between sustainable development and the Law of the Sea; and summaries of the 
High-Level Political Forums that track progress on the 2030 Agenda and SDG implementation. 
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These documents describe the administrative proceedings leading to the SDG 14 implementation 
plan that, at the time, culminated in the Ocean Conference.  
I transcribed recorded UN Ocean Conference sessions and coded transcripts and field 
notes using NVivo, a computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) useful for 
retrieving text, organizing text and themes, and “theory building” (van Hoven 2010). Qualitative 
analysis is an iterative process, and I began by using memo-writing and coding to organize and 
reduce my data (i.e., to identify the data most important to answering my research question) and 
to draw out key themes related to how resource-making contributes to enrolling oceans into the 
sustainable development apparatus.  
First, I reviewed my transcripts and field notes and wrote memos, which many qualitative 
researchers use “as a sort of intermediate-level mechanism to remind themselves of something, 
to reflect on patterns or connections, to contextualize events, and to forge new links between 
emerging themes” (Cope 2016, 374). I used the memos to begin to track patterns and themes in 
the data and to record possible leads and new thematic connections for further analysis. These 
memos, along with my literature review, informed my two-stage coding process. I first 
developed a bank of descriptive codes. Descriptive coding uses a word or phrase to succinctly 
capture the topics being discussed in the data (i.e., what the passage is about, as opposed to a 
content summary) (Saldaña 2013, 88). I grouped my descriptive codes into four main themes and 
generated subcodes as needed; many passages had overlapping codes.  
The first group of descriptive codes focuses on sustainability outcomes in the discussions, 
either realized, projected, or hoped for. My second group of codes focus on types and functions 
of scientific interventions; these codes describe how people come to “know” oceans resources 
that are available for sustainable development. Thirdly, I identify topics related to solidarity, 
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equity, and responsibility in oceans governance and sustainable development. In the creation and 
management of a global resource with unsettled territorial and procedural governance questions, 
parsing out different dimensions of solidarity and responsibility allows me to track how different 
actors mobilize relational concepts to legitimize their resource-making interventions. My fourth 
group of codes describes the scale of the resource or intervention (global/international, regional, 
national, and local), recognizing that these scales can be fluid and overlapping. I refined my 
descriptive codes throughout the process, adding and subtracting according to my observations.  
To further refine my analysis, I developed a set of analytic codes based on the results of 
descriptive coding and the memos written during the descriptive coding process. The goal of this 
“second cycle” of coding was “to develop a sense of categorical, thematic, conceptual, and/or 
theoretical organization from [my] array of First Cycle [i.e. descriptive] codes” (Saldaña 2013, 
207). In second cycle coding, I developed theoretical codes that “specif[y] the possible 
relationships between categories and [move] the analytic story in a theoretical direction 
(Charmaz 2006, 63)” (ibid., 224). These codes also facilitate links between concrete data and 
abstraction that lead to theory-building (Lund 2014). I coded for sustainability logics, or ideas 
about how “sustainability” works and is achieved; resource character, or what makes a particular 
object, space, or right a “resource;” and forms of power, or different power relations invoked 
either directly or indirectly to influence resource-making and sustainability outcomes. This 







CHAPTER 3: CO-PRODUCING ALGAE AND SUSTAINABILITY IN TIMES OF 
CRISIS 
 
In this chapter, I trace histories of resource-making in order to situate my empirical case 
in a longer history of sustainability concerns tied to crises. I utilize Sheila Jasanoff’s (2004) 
framework of co-production, which “is shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we 
know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which 
we choose to live in it” (2). Like Jasanoff, I am interested in the intersections between the 
productions of scientific knowledge and state practices. The lens of co-production poses a set of 
questions with which to interpret the ways that knowledge claims emerge, how conflicts around 
such claims are resolved, and how knowledge is standardized and enculturated. Using co-
production as an analytical framework examines these lines of research through making 
identities, institutions, discourses, and representations about science, technology, and knowledge, 
and how power shapes and is shaped by the practices and material objects of science and 
technology. 
I outline three key phases of US algae research, connecting the development of algal 
science and technologies to the specific historical and political contexts of their emergence (see 
Shapin 2010). In each of these, algae emerged as a way out of or a way forward through a 
perceived crisis linked to sustainability. First, I examine the algal food research of the 1940s and 
50s that attempted to convert the alga Chlorella’s photosynthetic efficiency into increased food 
production in response to Malthusian population anxieties. Second, I discuss the Department of 
Energy’s Aquatic Species Program (ASP) of the 1970s and 80s, an era in which the US 
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government supported research in alternative fuels to promote energy independence in the wake 
of an oil crisis and explored biofuel options with fewer environmental impacts. Third, I look at 
the most recent wave of publicly and privately funded algal research of the 2010s that has 
significantly expanded algal product and service possibilities in ways that both echo the social 
and environmental concerns of previous generations of research and respond to emerging ideas 
about crisis and sustainability. In each phase of research and development, resource-making 
processes created and transformed algae into bits of life, co-produced with changing ideas and 
practices about the role of the state and private sector in articulating sustainable futures.  
Algae to stave off Malthusian crisis, 1940s-50s 
One of the first scientific research programs on transforming unicellular microalgae for 
sustainability-related applications emerged in the late 1940s, with the launch of several pilot 
projects for cultivating the microalgae Chlorella as an innovative food source. Scientifically 
modulated Chlorella would ostensibly create calories more efficiently than traditional food 
products and thereby help accommodate the nutritional needs of growing post-war populations.3 
Chlorella pyrenoidosa is a green, freshwater algae that attracted attention as a potential human 
food source because of its high protein content, its rapid reproductive rate, and its photosynthetic 
efficiency.4 According to project estimates from a 1948 Carnegie Institution study, Chlorella 
cells reproduce quickly and convert 20% of solar energy into high-protein algal biomass in 
 
3Development of macroalgae, such as kelps and seaweeds, began much earlier. Macroalgae have long been grown 
and used as a food source around the world. The USDA also experimented with producing potash from kelp off the 
coast of California during WWI to replace the supplies of this organic chemical – used in plant fertilizers and the 
production of gunpowder – that it had been importing from Germany. This presented an economic opportunity to 
meet the high demand for potash fertilizer in the US and the growing demand for gunpowder in Great Britain 
(Neushul 1989). 
 
4Although Chlorella pyrenoidosa is not a marine species of algae, this work is included here for its foundational 
importance to US algal research and its contribution to techno-optimistic and even salvific narratives of algae 
development that are relevant to the present study. 
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optimal laboratory conditions, which is 20 times the solar energy captured by most plants 
(Belasco 2006, 203). These early results highlighted Chlorella’s efficiency in capturing sunlight 
and carbon dioxide and pointed toward much higher yields of protein per acre than other crops. 
Journalists and media outlets overhyped scientists’ cautious optimism, practically guaranteeing 
the imminent success of futuristic cuisines (for a list of examples in popular media from this 
period, see Belasco 1997).5 Belasco (1997; 2006) situates this algae research within a longer 
history of population debates and their relevance to the development of “future foods,” noting 
periodic iterations of a longstanding debate. On one side, neo-Malthusians believed that, without 
population interventions, population growth would outpace resource production resulting in 
unfortunate but stabilizing “checks” on population. In contrast, “cornucopians,” who were 
techno-optimists in the tradition of the Marquis de Condorcet, argued that scientific and 
technological advancements could increase agricultural yields so as to avoid the catastrophic 
results predicted by neo-Malthusians. The idea of algal cuisine – in the form of algae burgers, 
meat substitutes, butter, and starches – gained traction during the post-WWII period, one of 
heightened attention to post-war food shortages, “Third World” population growth tied to 
development advances, and inflation. American agricultural research was also linked to the 
country’s geopolitical aims: increasing the agricultural productivity and food supplies in the 
Third World doubled as a strategy to prevent the spread of communism, since it was thought that 
population pressures and famine would sow popular dissatisfaction, driving the poorer classes 
towards supporting communist leaders and causes (Belasco 2006, 41-2; McMichael 2017; 
Perkins 1997). 
 
5For an account of early algal research, see Burlew (1953). 
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Imperatives to increase food outputs required either more land area or greater 
productivity on existing agricultural lands. With most of the arable land in the US already in use, 
stepping up food production would need to come from increasing yields per acre. With 
agricultural modernization well underway but still before the full implementation of the Green 
Revolution, scientists and the public alike turned to technologies to increase the productivity of 
land. Going a step further, some “cornucopians” postulated that humans would eventually phase 
out food consumption in favor of ingesting only the required macronutrients, vitamins, and 
minerals in pill or shake form (Belasco 2006). Resource pressures would force a collective 
abandonment of the pleasures of eating in favor of the science of bodily nourishment.  
In this context, algal foods seemed both feasible and eventually cost effective. Although 
production of algal foods had high start-up costs, these would be recovered through economies 
of scale and projected rising grain prices in response to growing demand from a world 
population seen to be “exploding” (see, for example, Ehrlich 1968). Unfortunately for algae’s 
techno-enthusiasts, the opposite occurred: grain production increased through the 1950s and the 
US continued overproducing and subsidizing grains (McMichael 2017). Algae could not 
compete with low prices of corn and soy and, foreshadowing the closure of algal biofuels 
programs decades later, there was little interest in developing expensive alternative foods when 
grains were so cheap and abundant. Further experimentation also failed to reproduce the 
optimistic results and predictions of early phases of research. Chlorella did not photosynthesize 
sunlight as efficiently as it did artificial light, discouraging for the transition to large-scale 
outdoor cultivation. It was also simultaneously too sensitive and too hardy for cost-effective food 
production: it required controlled growing conditions difficult to achieve in open outdoor 
systems, with cell structures hardy enough to require additional costly processing steps to extract 
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nutrients (Belasco 2006, 211). Algae was sidelined as a potential solution to feeding the world 
and instead became a niche product for wealthy, food-secure segments of the population in the 
form of nutritional supplements.67 Even as of 2016, “more than 90% of all algae production 
globally has been used for nutritional products,” most of that production using Spirulina 
(Benemann 2013; cited in DOE 2016a, 244). 
This transformation of algae into bits of life – in this case, component parts to mass-
produce a new food source – was an attempt to utilize scientific knowledge to create a new 
resource in response to Malthusian anxieties, efforts that were ultimately hindered by the effects 
of government subsidies on corn and soy.  
Algae in the energy crisis, 1970s-90s 
Algae continued to be developed into nutritional supplements in subsequent decades, 
reemerging in population and resource debates in the 21st century. In the interim, algae was 
called upon to respond to a different kind of sustainability crisis: the oil embargo of 1973 that led 
to economic recession, high oil prices, falling commodity prices, and calls for reducing US 
energy dependence on oil from OPEC countries. In response to the crisis, the US Department of 
Energy allocated support to biofuels research programs. The bulk of government funding and 
 
6In addition to developing health products from other algal species like spirulina, algae was also considered as a 
possible astronaut food for NASA (Belasco 2006, 211). 
 
7In Soylent Green (Fleischer 1973), a dystopian film based on Harry Harrison’s science fiction novel Make Room! 
Make Room! (1966) about envisioned consequences of overpopulation, New Yorkers’ diets in 2022 included rations 
of soylent green, a food made from ocean plankton. When algae production fails to keep pace with demand, 
“recycled” human bodies become a soylent green ingredient, as revealed in the film’s shocking final scenes. Forty 
years after the film’s release, a food substitute cheekily called “Soylent” is now available for purchase. Developed 
by a Silicon Valley entrepreneur who resented the burden, time, and hassle of preparing and eating food, Soylent is 
“engineered nutrition” that delivers a balanced nutritional formula to “help bring an end to food voids, hunger, and 
food insecurity” (www.soylent.com, Widdicombe 2014). In 2016, this future food was linked to cases of nausea and 
vomiting that the company later attributed to algal flour produced by the TerraVia algae company (Zaleski 2016). 
The algal component was removed despite protests from TerraVia that its product was safe. Algae-infused Soylent 
thus made a quick foray from dystopian cinema into the real-world marketplace nearly ten years before the film’s 
setting. Engineered meal substitutes that increase efficiency of both production systems and human bodies are still 
linked to the population and resource debates that shaped postwar attempts to produce Chlorella burgers. 
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research for biofuels focused on terrestrial crops, especially corn ethanol. A small subset of these 
DOE funds supported the Aquatic Species Program (ASP), focused on engineering biofuels from 
aquatic species like algae. Biofuels derived from aquatic species sidestepped controversial 
debates over the use of arable croplands for fuels rather than food, criticized for driving up food 
prices; algal biotechnology need not compete for space with food crop production. These 
biofuels would “drop-in” to existing fossil fuels infrastructures (Birch and Calvert 2015, 58). The 
ASP identified areas of the arid Southwestern United States as a prime target for large-scale algal 
products development, where algae could utilize the abundant sunlight without displacing other 
crops (Sheehan et al. 1998). Over its lifetime from 1978 to 1996, the Aquatic Species Program 
cost approximately twenty-five million dollars, just over 5 percent of the 458 million dollars total 
Biofuels Program budget (Sheehan et al. 1998). 
This next generation of algal research coincided with the beginnings of both neoliberal 
economic policies and significant growth in biosciences and technologies. In her genealogy of 
the invention of the US bioeconomy, Melinda Cooper (2008) argues that the rise of 
neoliberalism as a hegemonic economic program was impossible without the concurrent growth 
of investment in biosciences and technologies. Neoliberal economic discourse and policy were 
co-constitutive of the biotechnology boom of the 1980s and beyond, with both enterprises 
concerned with overcoming limits in the face of crises: the oil crisis of the 1970s resulted in a 
petroleum price spike and increasing fears of energy insecurity in the country; the divestment 
from and decline of large swaths of the US manufacturing sector ushered in a post-Fordist era of 
rising economic insecurity and poverty; and mounting evidence of environmental degradation 
called into question the long-term viability of the country’s post-WWII industrial growth 
strategy. Cooper situates biotechnologies in the context of new research on the limits to growth 
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(Meadows et al. 1972), with both neoliberalism and biotechnologies organized around 
overcoming these limits, be they economic or ecological, regulatory, spatial or temporal. The 
science policy of the Reagan era invested in the commercialization of life technologies while 
opposing environmentalism and defunding public health, while the Clinton area ushered in “a 
kind of libertarian, free-market vitalism” in the technology industry (Cooper 2008, 18). 
 As an experimental resource-making research program, the Aquatic Species Program 
focused on producing biodiesel derived from high-lipid algal species, seeking to “optimize” 
algae in three areas: the available algal population; algal metabolism; and the algal production 
system.8 These steps, as with later algae research, involve creating and transforming algal bits of 
life suitable for circulation into different systems. First, the program gathered and categorized 
thousands of species from around the United States and its coastal waters, culling the collection 
down to about 300 species that exhibited the most energetic potential. Desirable species had, in 
addition to high-lipid content, potentially high growth rates and resilience under severe ambient 
conditions. These last two attributes are important for the ability to produce algal biofuels at a 
profitable scale, and to co-locate algae in polluted areas so they may draw carbon dioxide for 
photosynthesis from heavier polluting industries, such as coal.  
The ASP’s second component, altering algae’s metabolism, aimed to increase algae’s 
lipid content, leading to a more productive organism. Part of this research involved the search for 
a “lipid trigger” that would shift algal energy from reproduction (cell division and increasing 
biomass) to productive activities (increasing intracellular lipid content). Removing nutrients 
places the algae under metabolic stress; the organisms cease cell division and channel their 
energetic resources into lipid production, potentially increasing their biodiesel productivity. This 
 
8Rose (2007) describes molecularization and optimization as two of five significant pathways through which 
biotechnical changes occur. 
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process proved difficult to scale up, as the loss in reproductive biomass triggered by the stress 
event drastically reduced the overall lipid production in experiments (Sheehan et al. 1998). 
Finally, optimizing the production system involved situating both marine and freshwater 
algae in large open ponds. The siting of these initial projects was designed to help alleviate 
various economic and environmental concerns troubling the biofuels industry. First, the 
installation of above-ground algal ponds in desert climates confines feedstock production to 
areas unsuitable for other crops. Second, some algal species consume the nutrients found in 
human and animal waste, such as nitrogen, and are being cultivated for waste-water clean-up. 
And third, some species have the ability to sequester CO2 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
(Menetrez 2012). Yet, these potential benefits also present their own challenges. Many of the 
algal species carefully cultivated for fuel production in the lab did poorly in the field, and 
carefully-selected pond populations were quickly overtaken by local species. Relocating algal 
species to land otherwise unsuited to agriculture may require costly inputs with their own 
financial and environmental costs (DOE 2016c). The results of the ASP suggested that 
developing biofuels from algae might become a technologically feasible option, although not 
without significant challenges (DOE 2010). Lower crude oil prices also made continued 
investment in algal fuels less attractive. When the program closed in 1996, the science was years 
away from an economically viable, scalable fuel that could be integrated into existing fuel 
infrastructures. Yet, the program made key scientific gains in optimizing both the algal organism 
and algal bits of life (lipids, in particular) as potential fuel resources. While the ASP occupied a 
small niche within a small energy program, it inspired a subsequent generation of biofuels 
research, prompting the resumption of an influx of federal DOE funds toward algal biofuels, as 




Algae does it all, 2010s and beyond 
When the DOE’s Aquatic Species Program officially closed in 1996, it had made 
significant gains toward generating biodiesel from high-lipid algae that used waste streams from 
coal-fired power plants as carbon sources (Sheehan et al. 1998).9 Despite these gains, the ASP 
did not address key steps vital to the algal biofuel production process such as harvesting algae, 
extracting lipids from the organism, and converting extracted compounds into fuels (NAABB 
2014). In both of the previous “waves” of algal research, resource-making was partial and 
piecemeal, affected by shifting political priorities and economic conditions. In 2009, federal 
stimulus funding kickstarted a wave of renewed interest in algal fuels research to more 
comprehensively address issues outside the scope of the ASP. Two features characterize this 
phase of algal research: an increased role of the private sector in providing both funding and 
research expertise, often in collaboration with the public sector, and an expansion of focus to a 
wide range of algal products and services whose sale might offset the high costs of biofuels 
development. These features are a diversification of resource-making pathways in response to 
both oil prices and government funding priorities. 
This injection of federal research funds attracted significant private sector interest in algal 
products. In the 2010s, the amount of private investment in algal research surpassed federal 
funding, even with substantial contributions from the Departments of Energy, Defense, and 
 
9These gains include identifying key oil-producing strains and making this collection of microalgae available to 
researchers; increasing knowledge of algal physiology and biochemistry, including experiments with “lipid triggers” 
whereby algae produce more oils under stress conditions but slow their reproduction; early experiments with algal 
biotechnology, which has lagged behind other plant biotechnologies, most notably sequencing the gene for the 
enzyme Acetyl CoA Carboxylase (ACCase) that did not fulfill hopes of increasing algal oil production; and 
advances in algal production systems such as larger scale open pond systems (Sheehan et al. 1998). 
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Agriculture and the National Science Foundation (DOE 2016c). Public-private research 
partnerships and consortia buoy ongoing algal research: between 2009 and 2014, the Department 
of Energy supported several Algae Program Research Consortia with the goal to further the 
research objectives of both the public and private sectors through shared investments and 
information (Brown 2001; DOE 2016c). Funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (2009), four such consortia were tasked with overcoming specific scientific and 
technological barriers to algal biofuel production. The largest of these, the National Alliance for 
Advanced Biofuels and Bioproducts (NAABB), produced innovations that would reduce the 
price per gallon of algal biofuels to as low as 7.50 dollars, down from a starting price of around 
240 dollars (DOE 2016c)10. 
While private investments may spur the development of algal biofuels at a commercially 
viable scale, low conventional fuel prices have made alternative biofuels – including those 
derived from algae – less attractive to investors. As with earlier efforts in engineering algal 
foods, shifting trends in world commodity prices once again affect the feasibility of algal 
resource-making. In response to this changing context, some research institutions and firms 
shifted production strategies, channeling larger investments of time and resources into non-fuel 
“coproducts” that can be manufactured as part of biofuels production and refining. This 
refineries model is employed in the petroleum and biofuel industries, where oil refinement is 
coupled with the manufacture of related chemicals and plastics. “Coproducts” refer to these 
secondary, nonfuel products, such as foods, nutritional supplements, and pigments developed 
from algal biomass within and through the biofuels production process.11 The commercialization 
 
10Refers to price per gallon of gasoline equivalent.  
 
11“Coproducts” is a common industry term in refining and is unrelated to Jasanoff’s (2004) framework of “co-
production.” I use both terms in this dissertation. “Coproducts,” without a hyphen, refer to nonfuel commodities 
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and sale of coproducts helps make biofuels research and development more economically viable 
(DOE 2015). According to the US Bioenergy Technologies Office, the overall goal of DOE-
funded algal research remains the development of scalable, sustainable algal biofuels, but 
developers hope to generate sufficient market demand for coproducts that may offset both 
economic and technical barriers to fuel production (DOE 2016c, 124). The resulting algae 
research significantly lowered the costs of algal product production and enabled a heterogeneous 
expansion of the sector into a range of new algal products responding to similar sustainability 
concerns. These efforts to produce an algal biofuel led to a heterogeneity of resource-making 
processes and resulting products. 
This synopsis of algal research and development shows a history of the transformation of 
algae toward various sustainability goals through their fragmentation and optimization. This 
fragmentation allows researchers to optimize and access algae’s biological potentials as building 
blocks for future resources, aimed at transforming biological potentials into economic ones. 
These potentials include algae’s reproductive capacity, or its ability to divide quickly and grow 
its biomass; its purported photosynthetic efficiency, or the rate at which it converts sunlight into 
harvestable materials; and its malleability, or the potential to manipulate algal growth to 
maximize the production of desired products such as lipids, proteins, or other nutrients. The 
technoscientific practices that transform algae into bits of life are necessary for fixing them as 
alienable and malleable resources. 
These specific algal research programs also responded to prevailing sustainability 
concerns of the time: Malthusian concern for a growing world population and a predicted decline 
in available food, especially with growing consumption of resource-intensive meat products; 
 
associated with the refining process. “Co-production” and variants of the verb “co-produce” refer to Jasanoff’s 
concept and I use her hyphenated spelling. 
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concern for energy independence and future energy sustainability in the wake of the oil crisis of 
the 1970s and growing awareness of the environmental impacts of other biofuels; and a 
broadening of the scope of concerns in the 2010s, where algae speaks to fields of energy, waste 
treatment, food sustainability, and health-consciousness. In chapters 4 and 5, I show how this co-
production continues in the algal sector as definitions of both “resource” and “sustainability” 





CHAPTER 4: TECHNOSCIENTIFIC DIMENSIONS: ALGAE AS A FUEL RESOURCE 
  
“Algae: its potential just keeps growing.” So promises a 2019 commercial from 
ExxonMobil that depicts an algae farm that “grows fuel” to power aircraft, ships, and trucks 
while reducing their greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent (“Growing Fuel” 2019). The ad 
positions algae as an unlikely sustainability hero, under the hashtag #UnexpectedEnergy. In this 
chapter and the following, I examine more closely the enrollment of microalgae in sustainability-
framed enterprises. Here, I focus on the technoscientific practices that optimize aquatic life and 
convert it into fuels, noting how algae have overtime also become enrolled in sustainability 
imperatives that do not necessarily align with the energy infrastructure that algal fuels are 
designed to enter. Making marine organisms into a fuel resource also shows how enrolling 
“oceans” in sustainable development can involve separating and abstracting marine life from the 
ocean, assembling new connections between marine life, human life, technologies, and 
environments. 
Of the many algal products under development, this chapter focuses on algal biofuels. 
Deriving energy from algae has been a focus of both US government and private sector research 
and development since the oil crisis of the 1970s; the OPEC oil embargo and resultant high fuel 
prices prompted greater attention to US energy independence as national security and national 
economic priorities. These concerns were channeled into research on algal biofuels that could 
potentially contribute to the consumer fuel supply, developing algal biodiesel and jet fuel to 
ensure the sustainability of US military machinery, and addressing environmental concerns that 
position algal product chains as sustainable alternatives to conventionally produced (i.e., 
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petroleum based) products. Research on making algae into a fuel resource laid a foundation for a 
decades-long proliferation of algal products marketed to respond to a range of sustainability 
concerns, from food security to waste remediation. The technoscientific and institutional 
dimensions of algal resource-making are the subject of chapters 4 and 5, respectively.   
Led in part by US Department of Energy (DOE) efforts to fortify US energy security and 
independence, today, algal biofuels are still many years away from becoming commercially 
viable; as a fuel resource, algae is still in the process of becoming. In this chapter I ask: How 
does unicellular microalgae become a (fuel) resource that is accessible for sustainable 
development? This question has two important dimensions. The first deals with resource-making 
processes themselves, or the specific networks and practices through which algae become 
potentially exploitable. This emphasis on resource-making takes a non-essentialist view of 
resources: more than material objects with essential qualities to be discovered or latent biological 
potentials waiting to be appropriately harnessed (Birch and Tyfield 2012; Cooper 2008; 
Helmreich 2008), algal resources themselves are relationally produced through networks of 
scientific practice embedded in scientific, economic, and political institutions. 
The second dimension of the question examines the influence of sustainability objectives 
in algal resource-making. Sustainability goals are central to algal resource-making processes, 
shaping both the scientific optimization of algae and the representations of ongoing resource 
development that rely on the promise of future success, a future articulated in terms of 
“sustainability.” These goals are related to optimizing the economic and energetic productivity of 
algal fuels, and optimizing performance on environmental indicators such as water use and 
carbon emissions. To understand these issues, I focus on the space of the not-yet-realized. The 
algal biofuels sector operates within the space of the not-yet-realized: the not-yet-realized 
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resource, and not-yet-realized “sustainable” production. The space of the not-yet-realized, 
though uncertain, is still productive. In addition to the concrete mobilization of labor, 
knowledge, finance, and institutional support for the sector, efforts toward resource realization 
also draw from and contribute to research and discourses about what sustainability means and 
what sustainable futures are possible and desirable (Jasanoff and Kim 2015; see also chapter 6). 
I argue that the transformation of algae into a so-called sustainable resource occurs 
through the interplay of three factors. First, a web of state and industry actors shape the direction 
of algal research and development as these actors attempt to utilize algae as a tool for national 
and private interests. Second, this nexus of state-industry relationships mediates the scientific 
practices that enhance or optimize algae’s desired characteristics and derivative components. 
Third, these actors and scientific practices mobilize around a suite of sustainability concerns. 
Algal resource-making joins the malleability of the algal organism with the accommodating 
category of sustainable development, wherein algae become a flexible tool made to respond to a 
range of debated sustainability problems around energy production and use.  
Algae have biological characteristics that make them well-suited for developing into 
sustainable resources: their simple structure and their reproductive and energetic potentials. Of 
the many varieties of algae, most biofuels research focuses on diatoms and green algae, two 
types of microalgae that generate energy through photosynthesis and are found in both marine 
and freshwater environments. It tends to exclude other forms of algae less suited to biofuel 
production, such as cyanobacteria (blue-green algae) and macroalgae (kelps and seaweeds).12 
Sheehan et al. (1998) attribute microalgae’s industrial potential to their biological properties:    
“Microalgae are the most primitive form of plants. While the mechanism of 
photosynthesis in microalgae is similar to that of higher plants, they are generally more 
 
12While this applies to a significant amount of algal biofuels research, researchers also utilize non-photosynthetic 
pathways of energy generation (see DOE 2016c for examples). 
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efficient converters of solar energy because of their simple cellular structure. In addition, 
because the cells grow in aqueous suspension, they have more efficient access to water, 
CO2, and other nutrients. For these reasons, microalgae are capable of producing 30 times 
the amount oil per unit area of land, compared to terrestrial oilseed crops. Put quite 
simply, microalgae are remarkable and efficient biological factories capable of taking a 
waste (zero-energy) form of carbon (CO2) and converting it into a high-density liquid 
form of energy (natural oil)” (Sheehan et al. 1998, 3).  
 
Exploiting the energy of these “efficient biological factories” provides a potential new 
contribution to the renewable fuels sector, one that sidesteps controversies about the conversion 
of food crops into biomass for fuels. However, my analysis challenges the notion of the 
“biological factory,” arguing instead that algal materialities are co-produced in and through 
resource-making processes. 
In this context, algae emerge as a possible bio-technical fix that edges the globe toward 
“sustainability” by applying technological advancements to optimize and enhance nature’s 
existing capacities. The multiple crises to which algae are called to respond also mirror the triple 
facets of mainstream sustainable development discourse, as well as to new iterations of older 
sustainability debates. In particular, some proposed and ongoing algal innovations reflect 
renewed neo-Malthusian concerns about the relationship between population growth and 
resource availability and are resonant of the changes in plant breeding and biotechnology that 
enabled the propagation of the Green Revolution amidst twentieth century population and 
resource debates (Kloppenburg 2004). Finally, algal resource-making reflects increased attention 
to oceans and marine life in sustainable development efforts, and as an underutilized resource for 
potential exploitation (Havice and Zalik 2018). Disentangling resource-making processes shows 
sustainable development provides avenues for “the ocean” to appear in surprising places.  
 To answer the question of how algae become a resource accessible for sustainable 
development, the chapter proceeds as follows. First, I situate this chapter within literatures on 
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resource-making and materialities, introducing “bits of life” (Smelik and Lykke 2008) as a 
device for working through processes that bridge biotechnology with energy and other 
technologies. Then, I delve into the technoscientific processes that contribute to transforming 
algae into a biofuel resource product. I analyze these transformations at four significant nodes of 
the algal biofuels production chain, where I read the scientific processes at each node against a 
set of questions and variables that reflect resource-making processes and sustainability priorities. 
I conclude with a summary of the chapter’s theoretical contributions and a reflection on how 
algal resource-making processes both enable and foreclose ways of enrolling oceanic natures in 
sustainability work. 
Biotechnological resource-making: algal “bits of life” 
Approaching the production of algal biofuels through the lens of resource-making 
advances a relational, networked, and non-essentialist conception of resources (Kama 2019, 2). 
A well-known antecedent of contemporary resource-making work is the functional economic 
theory of resources, which rejects a static conception of (in this case: mineral) resources as pre-
existing exploitable matter awaiting discovery. Under this functional interpretation, “resource” is 
a created category that emerges from human action upon nature, as a result of human ingenuity 
and in accordance with evolving social needs:   
“Resources are highly dynamic functional concepts; they are not, they become, they 
evolve out of the triune interaction of nature, man, and culture, in which nature sets outer 
limits, but man and culture are largely responsible for the portion of physical totality that 
is made available for human use” (Zimmermann 1951, 814–15).  
 
This functional theory influenced later institutionalist perspectives on the economy of resources 
that interpret resources as a set of capabilities for exploitation of the physical matter in question 
(De Gregori 1987). “Resource” as a capability or a characteristic implies relationality between 
society and nature in an ever-changing dynamic, with science and technology the key drivers of 
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new resource creation. To take agriculture as an example, a conventional view of resources as 
static may lead to the conclusion that pre-existing arable land was necessary to the development 
of agriculture. An institutionalist framework flips the direction of causality: “agriculture created 
arable land and not the reverse,” in that agricultural methods and technologies “increased the 
resource character” of land, making it more exploitable for human use (ibid., 1243). Such a 
perspective might posit that DOE-led efforts in algal biofuels enhance the resource character of 
the algal organism, transforming algae’s physical characteristics into exploitable resources in 
response to rising fuel demands.  
 These functional and institutional theories leave legible traces in the techno-optimism of 
both mainstream sustainable development discourse (Dryzek 2013) and the algal development 
sector. These theories also uphold a categorical separation between nature and society, a 
distinction that critical work in resource geographies, capitalist natures, and political ecology 
continues to problematize and blur (Bakker and Bridge 2006, 9). While some resource 
geographies leave this separation intact and analyze the exploitation of material resources in 
terms of specific objectives like efficiency or sustainability (ibid., 6), more critical work attends 
to “the political, economic and cultural processes through which particular configurations of 
socionature become imagined, appropriated and commodified” (Bridge 2010, 821). 
 My analysis of algal resource-making emphasizes the scientific, political, and economic 
processes involved, while also using algae as a case through which to examine the co-production 
of the specific socionatural materialities of algae with resource-making processes. Algae provide 
an interesting case in the fuels sector because of a temptation to frame algal resource-making in 
terms of inherent or latent organismal potential and projected favorable energy returns on 
investment compared to other biofuels – i.e., discovering the efficient biological factory 
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(Sheehan et al. 1998). This view of harnessing “natural” biological capacities elides the 
relational character of the resource and its making, and how algal materialities themselves are 
not merely “natural” but emerge from complex networks of spatially differentiated practices 
(Bakker and Bridge 2006; Helmreich 2008; Helmreich 2009; Kama 2019; Kaşdoğan 2017). 
 There is another reason to consider the role of biotechnology in algal resource-making. 
Marine biotechnology refers to “the practice of investigating, modifying, and/or growing marine 
creatures in order to harvest materials and chemical compounds of potential commercial interest 
for medical, pharmaceutical, and industrial application” (Helmreich 2003, 74).  Biotechnology, 
as an assemblage of practices, extends beyond the field site or laboratory and includes the 
institutions, discourses, and political practices that shape it as it transforms the production of 
agriculture (Kloppenburg 2004), pharmaceuticals and medical technologies (Cooper 2008; Rose 
2007; Sunder Rajan 2006), and marine resources (Helmreich 2009). 
As with conventional biofuels, algal biofuels production integrates biotechnologies into 
energy-sector resource-making, requiring attention to how life is transformed at different scales. 
The optimization and harnessing of macronutrients and other cellular matter for further 
development turns algae’s components into potentially useful “bits of life” (Smelik and Lykke 
2008) that circulate through economies and within human and nonhuman bodies. I use “bits of 
life” as a tool to show how algal resource-making processes, through the use of science and 
(bio)technology, blur boundaries between organisms and their components and between bodies 
and environments.  
The “bits of life” concept emerged from discussions at the intersections of feminist 
science studies and cultural studies on the melding of the biological and the technological in 
culture and discourse. It offers a tool for analyzing the technoscientific redesign and 
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reconfiguration of bodies and environments, as well as the cultural and representational 
significance of these processes (ibid.). I pivot from Smelik and Lykke’s focus on cultural 
analysis and apply the “bits of life” figure to algal cells and the resource-making process.  
First, bits of life describes the technologically mediated fragmentations and 
recombinations of the elements of life at finer and finer scales; it also serves as a tool for 
thinking through the complicated relationship between organisms and their components (Smelik 
and Lykke 2008). Algal bits of life may include the unicellular alga, colonies of algae, genes to 
be expressed, or desired cell components that serve as precursors for future resources. Two 
examples of such cellular components are lipids that become biofuels, and astaxanthin, a red 
compound added to fish feed that enhances the pink color of farmed salmon. With the advent of 
biotechnologies, “almost any vital element can, in principle, be freed from its ties to cell, organ, 
organism, or species, set free to circulate and to be combined with any other, provided certain 
conditions are met” (Rose 2007, 16).  
But “bits of life” refers to more than just separated organismal components. I also use bits 
of life as a relational construct, created from technoscientific processes, imbued with properties 
such as potential, energy, nutrition, or value. These bits of life travel – separated and abstracted 
from the parent body – through the scientific and political processes of resource-making, at times 
carrying their properties with them.13 Used in this way, the creation, circulation, and 
transformation of algal bits of life blurs boundaries between components, organisms, and 
environments as they enter new bodies and become fuel for machines, humans, and animals. As 
a means of exploring the significance of these blurred boundaries, the bits of life figure is a 
 
13Keenan (2014) advances a theory of property as “a spatially contingent relation of belonging” between subject and 
object or between a part and a whole (6-7). Applied to “bits of life,” the properties of algal components are held up 
by the spaces and infrastructures in which they circulate. 
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legacy of Donna Haraway’s cyborg: circulating bits of life create new and sometimes anxious 
intimacies between bodies and environments (Haraway 1991; Lykke 2008, 13–14). It is by 
becoming bits of life that these aquatic algal organisms are removed from their environments, 
abstracted from their specific ocean contexts, and enter a terrestrially-based alternative fuel 
production economy. This demonstrates one pathway through which marine life becomes 
important to sustainability-minded projects and objectives, even when key sites of resource-
making are spatially dispersed or physically separated from the oceans themselves.  
Methods  
This analysis traces resource-making processes through four different “nodes” that reflect 
key steps of the algal biofuels production chain necessary to produce an exploitable energy 
resource. Parsing out the activities in these nodes shows the specific linkages between 
technoscientific practices that transform and manipulate algal bits of life, the metrics of 
sustainability that inform the resource-making, and how these steps are embedded in larger 
relational networks of production. The nodes are interlinked and interdependent, but each has 
specific objectives for optimizing algae. The National Alliance for Advanced Biofuels and 
Bioproducts (NAABB) Consortium identified these four nodes as discrete but interlinked 
production steps; both NAABB and the DOE’s Bioenergy Technologies Office utilize these 
categories in explaining key steps and ongoing areas of research in algal biofuels production 
(ABO 2017; DOE 2016c; NAABB 2014). The four nodes are: 1) algal strain identification and 
optimization; 2) cultivation; 3) harvesting, dewatering, and extraction; and 4) conversion. My 
analysis for each node includes the three interlinked mechanisms highlighted in the introduction: 
technoscientific practices, state and industry relations, and conceptions of sustainability. I 






TABLE 1: Key elements of algal resource-making 
 Node 1:  
Strain selection and 
optimization 









How are algal bits 




 Selecting existing 
strains: choosing 
species that produce 
more lipids  high 
throughput screening 
 Engineering new 
strains to increase 
biomass, lipid yields, 
and develop other 
desirable 
characteristics.  
 Cultivation strategies are 
linked to algal biology 
and end-product 
specifications.  
 Consider algae’s energy 
source: photosynthesis, or 
a provided carbon source 
from another feedstock 
  “industrial” vs 
“agricultural” cultivation 
methods 
 Large energy cost to 
forms of harvesting 
and dewatering 
 Extraction of desired 
components (e.g. 
lipids, proteins, carbs) 
is influenced by 
upstream processes.  










 Taking algal bits 
of life from fuel 
precursor to a fuel 
that is “fit for 
purpose” 
 Multiple possible 
conversion 
pathways that 
must be integrated 

















at each step? 
 Engineering the most 
efficient system 
“building blocks”, 
linked to subsequent 
energy-intensive steps. 
 Strain selection and 
engineering as a form 
of optimization 
machine. 
 Sustainability factors 
built into system costs 
through monetization 
 Siting should maximize 
advantages for cultivation 
 Land-use considerations 
 Water quality and 
availability 
 Wastewater remediation 
potentials  
 Geographies of 
production, facilities 
siting, and co-location 
are important here. 
 High energetic and 
financial costs 




 Cost factors 
linked to 
decisions made at 








state & industry 
 Key funding from 
DOE, ASP 
 Role of culture 
collections and 
creation of knowledge 
commons and 
databases 
 Availability of 
publicly funded algae 
and gene repositories 
that also support 
private culture 
collections 
 Cost-reduction: strain 
selection linked to 
biorefineries model 
and DOE research 
priorities. 
 Regulation and genetic 
technologies 
 Key centers of research 
and PPPs are instrumental 
at this step: ATP3, 
AzCATI 
 PPPs also facilitated 
cultivation improvements 
 Strong presence of 
private demonstration 
facilities piloting for 
scale-up 
 
 Vertical integration 
puts extra emphasis 
on in-house 
sustainability, but also 
extra costs and risks 
 Public investment and 
PPP research on 
energy return on 
investment 
 Three harvesting 
methods piloted at 
NAABB 
 
 Challenges of 
producing an 
algal product that 















1. Technoscientific bits of life 
I identify and describe key scientific developments crucial to algal resource-making at 
each node, explaining the purpose of these developments and their connection to other nodes on 
the biofuels production chain. I ask: how do science and technology work to create, move, or 
transform algal bits of life in service of making an exploitable fuel at each node?  
2. Sustainability: metrics and optimization 
Making the case for algae as worthy of ongoing labor and investment involves showing 
the potential for positive or improved sustainability outcomes in multiple dimensions, using 
measurable, science-backed indicators. Scientists work to “optimize” algae’s performance at 
each node in the algal resource-making process. Optimization works concurrently toward two 
objectives: realizing the point of successful exploitation (i.e., increasing algae’s “resourceness” 
(Kama 2019)), and improving various dimensions of sustainability, including efficiency. This 
optimization also occurs at different scales: from the improvement of algal bits of life 
themselves, to the scientific assays that manipulate them, to the production systems in which bits 
of life circulate. 
Metrics allow state and private industry actors to negotiate and define resource-making 
goals and objectives, and sustainability goals are themselves defined through the use of such 
metrics. These measures are for understanding how and why technologies are assembled in each 
node, helping to reveal what marks “success” at each step, and how this leads to future research 
directions and ways of thinking. Creating metrics makes also algal bits of life concrete and 





3. Relationalities of resource-making 
This section looks more specifically at different actors in the algal biofuels sector, 
especially the  relationship between public and private sector actors in each node of resource-
making. With increasing involvement of the private sector in algal products development, I look 
at the changing network of interests that shape how algal bits of life advance in the resource-
making process, noting shifting contributions in labor, funding, and purported benefits. 
Analysis 
Node of optimization #1: Strain selection and optimization 
The first node of optimization is algal strain selection and characterization. Making algae 
into a fuel resource begins with changes to the organism itself, maximizing its desired 
characteristics at the cellular or genetic level. Research in algal biology, when oriented toward 
this resource-making, aims to develop “super-performing algal biofuel production strains” that 
would increase the yields of both algal biomass and of the individual algal cell’s lipid content 
(lipid components are later extracted and converted into fuels and fuel precursors) (NAABB 
2014, 8).  
This strain optimization is where researchers first create algal bits of life through two 
main mechanisms of action. The first is existing strain selection: finding and choosing the 
species of algae most suited to biofuel production, i.e., those that naturally produce (or can be 
made to produce) more biomass and more lipids. The second is engineering new strains of algae 
to increase their biomass, lipid yields, and develop other desirable characteristics. What 




Bioprospecting for the most promising algal strains was a key component of the Aquatic 
Species Program (1978-1996), and the NAABB consortium continued the work of identifying 
wild algal species with naturally high lipid content and high rates of productivity, the latter 
leading to greater biomass yields. Isolating optimal algal species involves high throughput 
screening, a system of assays that allows scientists to test many different strains for key 
characteristics, in this case rates of (photo)autotrophic growth (the ability of algal cells to 
produce energy through photosynthesis) and the accumulation of important compounds such as 
triacyl glycerides (TAGs), a key lipid component. High throughput screening, heavily utilized in 
biotechnology and pharmacological research, facilitates the identification of desired 
characteristics at a rate much faster than would be possible with traditional cell cultivation (see 
also Kloppenburg 2004; Stevens and Richardson 2015; Sunder Rajan 2006). 
NAABB researchers tested strains that grew well autotrophically and accumulated TAGs 
with different growth media to determine the best nutrient mixtures for optimal lipid and/or 
biomass yields. The strains under examination were compared to a benchmark strain, 
Nannochloropsis salina, a marine algal species that “over-produces” lipids under certain stress 
conditions. New strains that exceeded the biomass productivity of the established N. salina 
benchmark were catalogued and stored for subsequent large-scale cultivation (NAABB 2014, 9).  
While the scale of these developments is microscopic, the potential implications of 
success reverberate up the value chain and production process if optimized algal strains are 
selected for large-scale cultivation. When selecting and modifying algal strains, the DOE has 
recommended selecting between two different model systems: strains whose study will yield 
valuable information on algal growth or the production of fuel precursor compounds, and strains 
that may be amenable to large scale production (DOE 2016c, 15). Identifying large-scale 
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growers then allows scientists to move production to the lab for further modification for other 
desired characteristics. 
In addition to identifying existing strains, researchers at this node engineer new ones with 
characteristics that make them suitable for large scale cultivation and biofuels production. Algal 
research funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009), including NAABB, 
had greater access to biotechnologies either not yet widely available or cost prohibitive during 
the years of the Aquatic Species Program, such as genome sequencing. Thus, in addition to 
bioprospecting, NAABB forwarded work on sequencing algal genomes and engineering algae to 
enhance their yields and performance. In particular, NAABB engineered a strain of algae with 
improved light-harvesting antennae complexes, which moderate the photosynthesis of light into 
energy. The improvements made to the light-harvesting complex resulted in algal strains with 
improved simultaneous biomass and lipid production. However, at the time of its final report, the 
regulations prohibited growing genetically engineered algae in open testing facilities or open 
ponds (EPA 2015; NAABB 2014; Unkefer et al. 2017). 
A key goal of strain optimization and characterization is to create more efficient and 
productive bits of life that will become the biological foundation for a more sustainable and 
profitable fuel production system. These are experiments in making life productive toward 
particular ends: creating organisms most amenable to existing systems of fuel delivery. The more 
specific goals of optimizing algal bits of life include: increasing biomass yield, increasing the 
lipid yield of individual cells, creating cellular resistance to parasites, and increasing the 
efficiency of algal consumption of “waste” compounds. What is considered optimal for bits of 
life depends on the strengths and limitations of the production system; this links algal strain 
optimization to the larger political, scientific, and economic infrastructures for drop-in biofuels. 
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(I explore such linkages in nodes 2-4). For example, algae that can grow in different levels of 
salinity or algae that resist predation from other microorganisms such as rotifers are more suited 
to large-scale, open-air cultivation because hardier strains are less susceptible to contamination 
and can hopefully maintain high biomass yields in a wider range of ambient conditions. 
 This understanding of algal strain development risks naturalizing biotechnology as a kind 
of optimization machine, or a way to continually improve the performance of the algal organism 
toward the system’s defined goals. Such processes are resonant of a social form surrounding 
marine bioprospecting that anthropologist Stefan Helmreich (2009) characterizes as “blue-green 
capitalism, where blue stands for speculative sky-high promise and green for a belief in 
biological fecundity” (107). Helmreich’s ethnography of marine biotechnology focuses on a 
different type of algae – cyanobacteria, or blue-green algae – in an emerging industry premised 
on biodiversity’s inherent potential and even inherent value through the assumption that it 
contains accumulated organismal labor-power (ibid.). In the case of algal biofuels, making better 
algae means making the biological factory ever more efficient, reducing the temporal and spatial 
(or “natural”) barriers to optimize productivity (Kloppenburg 2004). These processes rely on 
biotechnologies to maximize this fecundity and to harness the generative plasticity of algal cells: 
“contemporary biology has become expert at stopping, starting, suspending, and accelerating 
cellular processes, wedging these dynamics into processes that look like a molecular version of 
industrial agribusiness” (Helmreich 2009, 126, citing Landecker 2007). 
 A resource-making perspective, like Helmreich’s ethnography, moves away from this 
naturalizing logic, taking note of how the creation, application, and circulation of algal bits of 
life occur through the mobilization of labor and networks of public and private resources. Put 
another way: “biotech geese cannot lay golden eggs without daily tending” (Helmreich 2008, 
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474). Creating “ideal” algae per these objectives is a first step in rendering these organisms 
accessible to the drop-in fuels economy, enrolling them in sustainability-oriented resource-
making while simultaneously making them fit for purpose for petroleum fuels infrastructures. 
This is the conceptual distinction between “algae” and algal “bits of life:” algae as the working 
factory reflects a teleological optimism characteristic of mainstream sustainability discourses, 
whereas bits of life only become so through the assemblage of institutions and policies that 
create this abstracted article of potential value, imbued with malleable properties that reflect 
social priorities and possibilities of the moment (see also Kaşdoğan 2017).  
 Screening and classifying algae and its components makes them visible for potential 
resource-making for the first time. More than an exercise in finding and identifying “efficient 
biological factories” in nature, this initial step creates bits of life as a new socio-natural object, 
imbued with properties that are premised on the realization of future energetic and sustainability 
potentials. 
Node of optimization #2: Cultivation 
The second node of algal development focuses on cultivation, or growing algae. This 
node involves optimizing the conditions for growing algae to the desired specifications for 
resource-making. These are the systems designed toward multiplying algal bits of life at a scale 
appropriate for realizing their exploitation as a fuel resource.  
Moving algae “from flask to farm” involves relocating and scaling up laboratory 
processes and testing how bits of life perform in new environments (DOE 2016b). The 
cultivation system depends on the type of algae strain selected (node 1) and the desired end-
product (e.g., ethanol, biogas, biodiesel, jet fuel, etc.). Although certain strains of algae are 
touted as efficient photosynthesizers (Sheehan et al. 1998), not all cultivation methods rely on 
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algae converting sunlight into biomass (i.e., photoautotrophic cultivation). Some systems are 
designed for heterotrophic cultivation, where algae are grown in the absence of sunlight and 
increase their biomass using energy from an added carbon “food” source. Mixotrophic 
cultivation uses both strategies. The US Department of Energy describes heterotrophic 
cultivation as “more of an industrial operation,” with photoautotrophic cultivation more similar 
to agricultural production (DOE 2016c, 145). This distinction, which seems somewhat imprecise 
in an era of industrialized agriculture, reflects where and how cultivation is placed in the 
production chain. In the case of “industrial” heterotrophic production, algal cultivation occurs 
further “downstream,” in that the algae’s food comes from other plant crops or from carbon 
waste streams. Using sugars derived from other crops to feed algae diverges from the original 
Aquatic Species Program mandate to develop biofuels that would not interfere or compete with 
agricultural food and feed production. In photoautotrophic algal cultivation, algal biomass is 
produced, through photosynthesis, upstream at the “point of origin” for biomass creation; this 
algal biomass then supplies fuel-making processes further downstream (ibid., 145). 
Turning algae into a fuel resource is a process of ongoing experimentation, both and the 
lab and on the cultivation “farm.” How are such agricultural experiments conducted, and by 
whom? What does algal cultivation actually look like? During my fieldwork, I visited the site of 
a partnership project focused on optimizing algal cultivation: the Algae Testbed Public Private 
Partnership (ATP3), coordinated by the Arizona Center for Algae Technology and Innovation 
(AzCATI) at Arizona State University. This public private partnership, established in 2010 with 
federal stimulus funds, aims to give a wider range of actors access to experimental algae testing 
facilities and provide opportunities for scientific collaboration for research, testing, and 
commercialization of algal technologies (McGowen et al. 2017). While AzCATI led the project, 
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ATP3 has additional collaborative testbed facilities at two public universities (Cal Poly San Luis 
Obispo and Georgia Tech) and two companies (cellana in Hawai’i and Florida Algae, LLC).  
The ATP3 testing site at AzCATI makes available facilities for photoautotrophic 
cultivation in closed and open systems. Closed systems – in this case, photobioreactors – 
sandwich aqueous algae between clear panes or tubes to maximize the surface area of light 
exposure, with controls to monitor and adjust conditions such as temperature, nutrients, rate of 
evaporation, and the rate that the algal solution circulates through the system (figure 2). Closed 
systems purportedly allow for more control over growth conditions and contamination 
prevention. They are particularly useful for testing the performance of new algal strains and 
methods before introducing them into open-air outdoor systems (DOE 2016c, 64). However, 
cultivation in photobioreactors can require large amounts of capital and infrastructure relative to 
open ponds, providing a cost barrier to achieving larger biomass yields. Open ponds tend to have 
lower capital costs and are thus more attractive for large-scale cultivation (DOE 2016c, 65), but 
conditions are more difficult to control, and algae are more likely to become contaminated by 






























Figure 2: Photobioreactors. Photobioreactors in an 
indoor inoculum production clean room at Arizona State 
University’s Arizona Center for Algae Technology and 
Innovation (AzCATI) in Mesa, AZ. 




The testing facilities straddle public and private priorities; ATP3 aims both to become a 
public resource for universities and the national laboratories, as well as to provide means to 
reduce business risk in developing algal technologies by subsidizing the costs of technology and 
product testing (McGowen et al. 2017). Building a network of public-private partnerships 
bolsters the development of foundational technologies in different nodes of optimization. 
Partnerships such as ATP3 make research results available and searchable to the algal research 
community. In addition, private sector funding and research and development has also produced 
significant advancements in optimizing algal cultivation, especially at the scale of process 
development. Process development refers to the translational steps and methods for scaling up a 
particular research product, usually for commercial production, which might include 
standardizing protocols and adjusting methods to accommodate any special needs for increasing 
the scale of production (ABO 2017). Several companies have demonstration facilities for 
bringing algal cultivation from the lab to a large-scale cultivation system. Research conducted at 
company demonstration facilities has yielded important findings on barriers to scaling up 
cultivation, a significant cost barrier for algal biofuel production. For example, Sapphire Energy, 
which produces a “green crude” oil from algae at its USDA-funded facilities in New Mexico, 
noted that knowledge gaps in algal biology were a significant barrier to large-scale algal 
cultivation (DOE 2016c, 66). cellana, an algal fuels feedstock company based in Hawai’i and a 
member of ATP3, identified key barriers to scaling up algal production that included both costs 
of inputs and in particular a low energy return on investment (EROI).14 EROI is a measure of 
how much it costs to produce a certain amount of energy; a low EROI for algal cultivation often 
 
14EROI refers to energy provided by a particular source measured against the energy expended in producing it. High 
EROI energy sources yield a larger amount of energy relative to the inputs needed to extract it (IEA 2017). 
 
65 
co-occurs with high capital costs and large nutrient requirements (such as carbon, nitrogen, and 
phosphorus) for feeding algae (Beal et al. 2015; DOE 2016c, 66).  
The cost of scaling up cultivation is one of the largest barriers to “successful” algal fuel 
resource-making. The Department of Energy’s Bioenergy Technologies Office (BETO), as a 
primary funder of algal biofuel technology development projects and thus a key driver of small- 
to medium-scale projects, has charted potential resource-making pathways, modeling possible 
scenarios for algae’s fuel potential to be realized. The DOE charted a conservative estimate of 
algae’s resource-making potential in its Billion Ton Report (DOE 2016a), an assessment of the 
nation’s current and potential biomass resources. The report’s first iteration in 2005 posited the 
availability of one billion tons of biomass feedstocks from agricultural lands and forests, but did 
not include algae. In the 2016 report, the DOE estimated how much algal biomass might be 
available for future use as fuels: “The analysis of potential supply moves toward DOE’s goal of 
modeling a sustainable supply of 1 million metric tonnes (1.1 million tons) of ash-free dry 
weight (AFDW) cultivated algal biomass by 2017 and 20 million metric tonnes (22 million tons) 
by 2022” (DOE 2016a, 246). This report models key financial and sustainability indicators for 
resource-making while noting that “the potential biomass reported has not been produced” and 
relies on the existence of markets for such products. 
Algal cultivation differs from terrestrial biomass feedstocks like corn and soy in several 
dimensions. The first is the growth medium. Instead of growing in soil and taking carbon dioxide 
from the ambient air, algae are grown in aqueous media that require specific nutrient 
concentrations and the addition of carbon dioxide from an external source. “Co-locating” algal 
cultivation sites with power plants that generate waste sources of CO2 is one method for reducing 
costs, as the algae farm could take CO2 directly from the adjacent polluting firm – such as natural 
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gas, coal, and ethanol plants – and convert this waste product into biomass at a low cost. Co-
locating is much cheaper than attempting to transport CO2 to distant algal cultivation facilities. 
The co-location scenario is an example of how geographical and infrastructural considerations 
shape the technoscientific practices of resource-making, as downstream infrastructure can impact 
bits of life upstream.  
The DOE also estimated optimal sites for co-location. The site’s climate is a primary 
factor, especially for cultivation systems that require sunlight. Sun exposure and temperature and 
weather variations affect the production of both outdoor and indoor photoautotrophic cultivation, 
with algal productivity in open pond raceway systems particularly vulnerable to weather 
fluctuations. Insolation affects the design of cultivation systems and is a key determinant of the 
surface area of the system exposed to sunlight. Research supports that the most reliable and 
consistent production sites in the US are at lower latitudes with less seasonal variation and more 
consistent year-round sun exposure and temperature (Pate et al. 2011; Pate 2013; Quinn et al. 
2012; Vasudevan et al. 2012; ctd. in DOE 2016c, 147), as well as longer growing seasons 
associated with lower altitudes. Many areas with optimal sunlight and temperature are arid with 
low water availability for cultivation (Wigmosta et al. 2011; DOE 2016c, 150). If algal biofuels 
production reaches large commercial scales, it may require nearly three times the water currently 
used in irrigated agriculture, primarily due to high evaporative water loss in open algal ponds 
(ibid., 152). Algal strains are grown to specification, and plentiful rainwater helpful to terrestrial 
crops might contaminate an algal crop.  
For industry players, all of these issues are sustainability issues because they are cost 
issues. The cultivation systems are set up in different ways to get people thinking about 
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sustainability. According to a member of the government sector with knowledge of algae 
production:  
“I think that's the biggest challenge right now is making whatever product we're 
producing from algae cost-competitive, and that requires these companies to make 
decisions about how they're going to produce, how they're going to cultivate the algae. To 
the degree that the environmental implications are monetized, it forces the algae 
producers to make decisions that are more aligned with sustainable practices, and that is, 
I think it is more internalized in the algae community by design than it is in the 
commodity crop and terrestrial agriculture community. I mean, water and energy are the 
key examples here. Water, to produce algae, is something that is intrinsically a big issue 
and you can't, you typically aren't growing algae in places where there is an excess of 
water…  Algae producers don't want water falling from the sky to get into their 
cultivation systems. So they are very much more focused on how much water they are 
using and the need to move the water around – so the energy associated with that, there 
are dollar signs attached to that. So I think that the way the cultivation systems are 
currently set up are kind of forcing the focus on sustainability in a way that is not the case 
with terrestrial feedstock production.” 
 
In comparing algal cultivation to that of terrestrial biomass, the consideration of certain 
environmental sustainability indicators are built into production decisions because they are 
linked to the mandate for lower production costs and therefore lower the market price of the 
biofuel. Growing optimized algal bits of life in the most suitable ambient conditions internalizes 
some of these system inputs that must be purchased (e.g. buying and transporting water instead 
of relying on rainwater).  
Node of optimization #3: Harvesting, dewatering, extraction 
The third node of optimization in the algal biofuels value chain is a series of processing 
steps that take algae from cultivation sites and prepare them for conversion into a fuel product. 
These steps include harvesting the algae, dewatering and drying, and extraction of desired algal 
components that serve as precursors for fuels that can be delivered to a biorefinery for further 
processing. This is a key series of steps in making algal bits of life compatible with existing fuel 
systems. As with strain selection and cultivation at the previous nodes, harvesting, dewatering, 
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and extraction techniques are tailored to the desired end-product. Proponents of algal biofuels 
justify ongoing research and investment based on future sustainability gains, with biofuels 
promising to reduce greenhouse gas emissions relative to fossil fuels. However, taking algal bits 
of life from the farm (cultivation) back into the flask (transformed into components appropriate 
for fuel production) involves energy-intensive steps with potential significant greenhouse gas 
emissions themselves. In this section, I describe the steps of harvesting, dewatering, and 
extraction with an eye toward sustainability metrics. Industry actors use two key assessment 
tools: life cycle assessments and techno-economic analyses. Both of these tools apply to the 
algae resource-making process as a whole (i.e., over the entire life cycle of the product); I 
highlight them at this node of optimization to show how both scientific and institutional practices 
of algal resource-making are co-produced with sustainability metrics, which are tethered to 
production costs. 
Since algae are aquatic organisms and cultivated in solutions along with different 
nutrients, they must be removed from their growth environment and brought to concentrations 
most appropriate for the next steps of fuel production. The energetic and financial costs of 
harvesting and dewatering steps take into account the geographies of algal production and the 
siting of facilities, including the energy source required to sufficiently dry the algae, where and 
how the algal slurries are transported for downstream processing, and what waste disposal 
measures must be considered during these steps and their associated costs. 
 Some harvesting systems use chemical flocculation agents to chemically induce algal 
cells to clump into “flocs” and settle out of the media suspension. Others use electrocoagulation 
devices that change the charge on the cell’s surface, causing the cells to clump together. Some 
research suggests a promising role for bioflocculation, where another organism such as a 
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bacterium is introduced that would encourage algal cells to aggregate and come out of solution. 
Whereas most terrestrial crops used for biomass are harvested annually or at most a few times 
per year, algae requires more frequent harvesting, which could be monthly, weekly, or even 
daily. The harvested biomass also has a much shorter shelf-life than terrestrial feedstocks, and 
must be used within days of harvesting if not completely dried, whereas terrestrial biomass can 
be stored for months (DOE 2016a, 248).   
Terrestrial feedstocks may be over 40% solids at the time of harvesting, whereas a 
harvested slurry of microalgae contains mostly water and may be less than 1% solids (DOE 
2016c, 90). Even the more effective dewatering mechanisms do not completely dry the algae, 
and additional drying steps are required to achieve a high concentration of algal biomass for 
subsequent extraction and conversion steps. Generating heat for drying algae adds significant 
energy requirements and cost to the harvesting phase. Solar drying is low cost, but requires low 
humidity levels and is subject to weather and seasonal fluctuations in sunlight; prolonged sun 
exposure in the drying phase can also degrade important algal compounds. Freeze drying is 
prohibitively expensive. Spray drying, or repeatedly applying bursts of hot gas to the slurry to 
cause evaporation, is frequently used in the food and pharmaceutical industries and is also used 
for microalgae.  
 Once algae are harvested and dewatered, the appropriate components must be separated 
from the biomass for conversion into biofuels or other bioproducts.15 These cellular components 
include lipids, proteins, and carbohydrates. Lipids are the most researched component for 
extraction for their use in biofuels, but the invention and commercialization of bioproducts from 
other components has led many researchers and firms to decenter lipids research and focus on 
 
15One exception is utilizing a “whole algae pathway” that does not include extraction phase (DOE 2016c). 
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maximizing value from multiple components (DOE 2016c, 89; see Davis et al. 2014). Extraction 
methods for algal biomass are not as well studied or as well developed as those for established 
terrestrial biomass sources, and methods for extracting precursors for high value, low volume 
production are somewhat limited and require improvements in efficiency and cost effectiveness 
in order to implement them at larger scales to push high volumes of commodities (ibid.).  
Measuring efficiency and cost-effectiveness is an integral part of algal biofuels 
development; providing data and estimates for these measures is a necessary prerequisite for 
securing funding, public or private, for operations or developing additional technologies. These 
tools are used by both public and private developers to demonstrate how their systems perform 
environmentally and economically. Most of these estimates come in the form of life-cycle 
assessment and techno-economic analysis. Life-cycle assessment is a tool for modeling the 
environmental impacts and energy and/or resource use of industrial activities and provides a 
method for comparing the potential environmental and cost outcomes between different 
production systems, such as different algal production methods or different fuel feedstocks. LCA 
utilizes a “cradle-to-grave” approach, meaning that all activities related to production, use, and 
disposal are accounted for:   
“In principle, all decisions that affect or are meant to improve the environmental 
performance of a product/service should be scrutinized in terms of their life cycle 
implications. For the environmental perspective, a product's life cycle can be represented 
as a circular movement that ties together resource extraction, production, distribution, 
consumption and disposal. In other words, all the phases of organized matter and energy 
that are in some way related to the making and use of a product can also be linked to an 
impact on the environment” (OECD 1995, qtd in NREL n.d.(b)).  
 
Life cycle assessments began in the 1960s amid growing concerns over resource use and 
population growth, further fueled by modeling studies such as those in The Limits to Growth 
(Meadows et al. 1972). The methodologies evolved over time and adhere to a set of international 
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standards developed in the wake of concerns over use of the LCA to inappropriately justify 
marketing claims (EPA 2006). Meaningfully comparing the results of different LCAs (e.g., the 
LCAs for two algal production systems) requires that the assessments have defined system 
boundaries (scope of activities) that show the differences resulting from choosing each product 
(DOE 2016c, 171.). 
In determining the potential long-term feasibility of algal systems, LCA is coupled with 
techno-economic analysis (TEA), a modeling exercise that “determine[s] the potential economic 
viability of process technologies in the research and development stage” (NREL n.d.(a)). TEAs 
examine production costs, product quality, and scale-up of different configurations of 
technology, based on the technology’s performance and production targets to evaluate potential 
for economic success within different timescales. Researchers performing TEAs also contribute 
to process development research by offering targets and quantifying potential economic impacts 
of research on the algal biofuels value chain, with an eye toward commercialization and 
sustainability metrics (ibid.).  
 In algal biofuels development, cost is the primary factor in the sustainability analysis of 
new technologies, where sustainability can also refer to the life of the technology itself. Unlike 
terrestrial feedstocks, these harvesting, dewatering, and extraction steps often occur at the same 
site of cultivation due to the need for frequent harvesting and the short shelf-life of harvested 
algae. In other words, algae biomass production is much more vertically integrated than 
terrestrial biomass, with more production steps taking place within a single firm.  
 This vertical integration forces an internal consideration of sustainability concerns and a 
firm’s sustainability performance, insofar as they are linked to lowering the cost of production 
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and therefore making production and scale-up more economically feasible. When asked about 
sustainability indicators in production systems, one interviewee reflected that:   
“[Costs are] more distributed on the terrestrial side, like who is actually expending the 
energy or consuming the water is more distributed. Whereas on the algae, most – I don't 
want to say most – many algae production facilities have, they have the production, the 
cultivation, the harvesting, the handling, the dewatering, and the upgrading, and the pre-
treating, all in one site.” 
 
A consequence of this vertical integration is that algae producers can more easily monitor 
sustainability indicators such as energy use, water use, and nutrient use and waste, and also 
potentially recycle wastewater and nutrients back into the system. With terrestrial feedstocks, 
different companies may be responsible for growing, harvesting, and transporting it to a refinery 
for processing, which also distributes the energy and transportation costs to different firms. 
Many algae producers, even at a smaller size, assume more control of these sustainability 
measures because poor performance adds to production costs. They also assume more financial 
risks. These metrics are industry-set and crucial to resource-making because firms are unlikely to 
produce at competitive prices or attract public or private funding when certain metrics are not 
met.  
 This relationship between sustainability metrics and algal production systems provides an 
interesting contrast to conventional fuels and even other biofuels. More of the inputs that might 
be treated as economic externalities or free gifts of nature are already internalized into the cost of 
the algal production system. Water is an important example, since rainwater that nourishes 
traditional feedstocks could contaminate outdoor algal systems. This direct tie between 
sustainability metrics and economic cost creates a valuation for sustainable practices. Systems 
that are more vertically integrated have even more incentive to reduce production costs through 
improved sustainability indicators. This is a stark contrast to petroleum-based fuel production, 
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where environmental protection and remediation can add to a firm’s production costs, whether 
through government policy (e.g., the polluter pays principle) or corporate sustainability 
measures. The requirements of these bits of life, and the systems that animate them, perhaps 
reflect a more accurate valuation of economic cost than resources valued without the 
externalities of production.   
Node of optimization #4: Conversion 
The fourth node of optimization is conversion of the fuel (or other bioproduct) precursor 
into a liquid fuel that is “fit for purpose,” meaning that it meets purchaser requirements in a full 
range of properties that include its energy density, ignition characteristics, and its safety and 
stability for storage and transport (DOE 2016c, 103). The conversion technologies that transform 
biomass into fit-for-purpose products are highly dependent on upstream processes and must be 
tailored to the characteristics of the algal strain and cultivation and harvesting methods. Thus, 
while science and technology optimize production steps at different “nodes” in the value chain, 
each node is interdependent with and reliant on the others to produce a technologically and 
economically feasible end-product for sale. If algal biorefineries are to successfully compete 
with products from petroleum refineries, they must strive to convert all elements of the algal 
biomass (not just fuel precursors) into products and services for the market (i.e., coproducts), or 
use or recycle such components within the production process. 
 The conversion of algae into biofuels can take place through a number of pathways. First, 
some algae directly secrete combustible fuel compounds such as ethanol, hydrogen, and 
methane, alleviating the need for expensive harvesting, dewatering, and extraction steps to 
remove the relevant compounds from within algal cells. These algae are grown in closed systems 
designed for high biomass yields in a controlled environment. Depending on the strain, the algae 
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are cultivated either through heterotrophic fermentation (fed a carbon source in a closed system 
without sunlight) or in an enclosed photoautotrophic system where the desired fuel compound is 
an emitted waste product from the algae’s photosynthetic energy production. Only certain fuels – 
alcohols, alkanes, and hydrogen – can be produced through this type of process with algae (DOE 
2016c).  
 The second conversion method produces fuel from whole algae, again bypassing the 
extraction steps. Five key technologies are under development for converting whole algae into 
fuels. Pyrolysis involves rapidly decomposing algae with heat. The resulting liquid or vapor fuel 
is less stable and requires additional upgrading steps to be suitable as a transportation fuel. The 
second method is gasification, in which the algal biomass is heated to above 700 degrees C to 
produce synthesis gas (syngas), a mixture of hydrogen, carbon dioxide, and carbon monoxide. 
Syngas is an intermediate in the production of other fuel products. In anaerobic digestion, 
microorganisms break down algal biomass in the absence of oxygen to produce biogas (e.g. 
methane). Costs may be low, but value is also low and the risk of methane emissions is high and 
must be carefully monitored. Hydrothermal processing mimics the high temperature and pressure 
conditions in the geological processes that produce fossil fuels (DOE 2016c, 107). In algal 
research, hydrothermal liquefaction of biomass produces an algal biocrude that can then be 
upgrade to a variety of transportation fuels (ibid.). In supercritical processing, a solvent is heated 
and pressurized to the point where it has no distinct liquid and gas phases, taking on some of the 
properties of both a liquid (such as dissolving solutes) and a gas (such as diffusing) (Supercritial 
Fluids n.d.). This makes them useful tools for separating and extracting desired compounds. 
Supercritical extraction has a number of advantages in processing algal biomass: supercritical 
fluids are selective solvents, meaning that the resulting extracts are relatively pure and free of 
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contaminants. They also remove the need for separate dewatering and solvent-extraction steps. 
Biodiesel produced using supercritical methanol or ethanol can combine extraction and 
conversion steps, as the supercritical fluid separates algal oils from the whole algae and catalyzes 
the transesterification process that produces raw biodiesel (Van Gerpen et al. 2004). Both 
supercritical and hydrothermal processing yield raw products for upgrading into transportation 
fuels (DOE 2016c, 105). 
 The third conversion method uses extracted algal biomass components: separated lipids, 
proteins, and carbohydrates. Earlier phases of algal research that focused on biofuels emphasized 
extraction of the lipid fraction of algae; this scope has since expanded to include conversion 
processes of proteins and carbohydrates in order to utilize more of the algal biomass for possible 
commercial products, which also may help finance ongoing research and development in 
biofuels (see Laurens et al. 2015a).  
The conversion of extracted algal oils takes place through a variety of pathways that must 
be well-coordinated with both upstream cultivation and harvesting practices and downstream 
fuel specifications. Designing algal systems also takes into account existing technologies in 
petroleum refineries, where conversion processes focus on separation and/or modification of 
different components of crude oil. For renewable fuels made from plant biomass to be 
competitive replacements for fossil fuels, they currently must meet the same specifications and 
utilize existing energy infrastructures. Petro-fuels have high energy and a low oxygen content, 
whereas plant feedstocks have a relatively high oxygen content; conversion of plant oils must 
focus on reducing oxygen and increasing energy (ibid., 115), ideally using processes already 
developed in petroleum refining. However, it is difficult to produce an algal feedstock that is 
suitable for existing refineries conversion processes because the chemical catalysts used in 
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petroleum refining are optimized for a different set of chemical conditions. Converting biological 
materials requires catalysts that better tolerate the potential contaminants in bio-feedstocks and 
reduce the oxygen content of the product without sacrificing carbon molecules that provide 
energy (ibid.).  
 As with cultivation, algal producers consider the distances required to distribute fuel. 
Favorable conditions for algal growth may not necessarily coincide with proximity to existing 
fossil fuel infrastructures, with Texas and most of the Gulf of Mexico states as an exception. 
However, very little petroleum infrastructure, such as refineries, crude oil pipelines, and crude 
oil rail terminals, exists in Arizona or in the Southeastern Atlantic states, both of which are 
identified as climatically optimal growth regions for photoautotrophic algae (EIA n.d.; DOE 
2016c, 136). Of possible algal fuel products, jet fuel blends, algal gasoline, and algal biodiesel 
will likely be most easily integrated into existing distribution systems with few modifications.16 
Bioethanol poses additional distribution concerns; it is not a “fungible fuel” that can be swapped 
in for petroleum-based fuels because it is an oxygenated fuel. Because of its structure, ethanol is 
soluble in water, dissolves liquid water, and can dissolve water vapor from the surrounding air if 
left exposed. Too much water in a gasoline-ethanol mix can lead to a phase separation, when 
water molecules pull ethanol out of the fuel mix and the denser water-ethanol layer settles to the 
bottom of the tank, underneath the gasoline layer. A phase-separated fuel can affect its octane 
rating, cause engine damage, and cause pipeline and tank damage that is environmentally and 
financially costly (Korotney 1995). As with biofuels derived from terrestrial feedstocks, algal 
biofuels may require the creation of new infrastructure. Most ethanol blends in the United States 
are transported by truck, but these costs will increase with higher ethanol content fuels, as higher 
 
16More research is needed to determine if algal biocrude produced via hydrothermal liquefaction can enter existing 
crude pipelines (DOE 2016c, 137). 
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ethanol content reduces the fuel density and higher liquid volumes are required to meet the same 
energy needs (DOE 2016c, 137). The distributive costs of algal bioethanol may mirror those of 
corn and soy bioethanol and many cost factors will depend on the legislative context and 
infrastructures tied to corn and soy fuel production, such as any changes in the Renewable Fuel 
Standard, support for and development of flex-fuel engines, or other supports and subsidies for 
bioethanol tied to government support for large-scale corn and soy agricultural production 
(ibid.). 
 The conversion process involves making algal bits of life fit for purpose as a fuel, which 
means meeting certain technical specifications. It also requires considering the fitness of algal 
fuels for the infrastructure required to successfully transport and distribute them. Here, despite 
sustainability considerations at other nodes in the production chain, algal resource-making 
encounters the massive conventional fuel and existing biofuel infrastructures developed for oil 
and corn/soy, respectively. It must compete with cheaper options to make use of these 
infrastructures, reinforcing the path-dependency of reliance on existing fuels. 
Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the production of algal biofuels as a set of resource-making 
processes, uncovering different pathways through which a sustainable resource might 
materialize. For this particular resource in-the-making, its commercial viability is unrealized and 
uncertain, built on the premise of optimizing and capitalizing on algae’s biological properties and 
using bio- and industrial technologies to create the efficient biological factories of the future. But 
examining algal biofuel production by looking at the production and circulation of bits of life 
shows how algal materialities are co-produced in and through these resource-making processes, 
contra narratives of innate organismal potential. Technological developments aspire to fix algae 
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in ways designed to make human systems more secure and more resilient to potential crisis. For 
decades, researchers have sought to harness this efficiency into the production of various food 
and fuel products in response to different forms of crisis, where “sustainability” is posited as a 
solution. 
Making algae into a fuel resource involves creating new socio-natural objects – bits of 
life – that fragment and recombine, circulating in new environments and manipulated to express 
desired properties and then making them ‘fit’ into societal needs. Working through four different 
nodes of optimization of algal systems shows how DOE-supported projects create a scaffold for 
the improvement of bits of life, with the ultimate goal of reducing the costs of production to 
realize a commercially viable fuel. Remaking marine life on land and consuming it as fuel for 
machines and bodies entangles algal bits of life in a bioeconomy regulated both by present 
production and speculative possibility. Some proponents of algal technologies position the sector 
as a break from previous failed efforts at sustainable production. As one interviewee noted:  
“I think that the algae community is much better [than terrestrial biomass producers] at 
explaining their value as relates to sustainable development because… it doesn't have the 
intractability, the burden of a century of commodity crop driven agriculture behind it. 
You know, it's more, it has the reputation of the more innovative, just a cutting edge 
industry. So I think that all of the learnings from commercial agriculture is both a 
blessing and a curse, because you're bringing with it all of the negative sustainability 
baggage around corn and soybean production in the US. And also timber production and 
just all of that. And algae doesn't have any of that.” 
 
The structure of algal fuel production systems suggests a closer tie between economic costs and 
key industry metrics of ecological sustainability, such as water and energy use, leading to a more 
sustainably produced biofuel. This requires the ongoing monetization of environmental costs and 
benefits. This integration of different nodes of production internalizes more environmental costs, 
but then must also somehow integrate with existing transportation infrastructure in a fossil fuel 
economy that externalizes many of those costs.  
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In Fuel: A Speculative Dictionary, Karen Pinkus (2016) deconstructs and destabilizes the 
myth of “future fuels,” including the social imaginaries of greener fuels that will purportedly 
contribute to ecologically livable futures. Fuel is a material substance, a yet-to-be-consumed 
source of potentiality; Pinkus aims to decouple this potentiality from energy systems that have 
solidified around specific power, capital, and labor relations, hopefully making the potential of 
“fuel” available for different uses in other imaginaries (3). While the algae sector attempts to 
forge new pathways in resource-making that untether energy consumption from fossil fuel use, it 
does so while treading familiar ground. Pinkus reminds us: “[t]hat ‘future fuels’ are perpetually 
deferred only strengthens the links between hydrocarbons and the present economy” (ibid., 5). 
Indeed, the making marine life into a future fuel resource necessarily relies on fossil fuel 
infrastructures for its realization. 
Although algal biofuels are not-yet-realized as a commercial resource, their “fuel” 
potential is actualized through other channels. Algae bits of life can become energy for capitalist 
industry (biofuels) as well as for animal and human bodies. As shown in the next chapter, the 
technological and economic barriers that prevent the large-scale integration of algal biofuels into 
existing energy systems correlate to a rechanneling of these efforts into other products, marketed 
to respond to concerns about sustainability. These additional commodities both multiply and 






CHAPTER 5: INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS: FLEXIBILITY AND FRICTION IN 
ALGAL RESOURCE-MAKING 
 
Algal “fuel” has a dual potential: as energy for capitalist industry (biofuels) and as fuel 
for animal and human bodies. This chapter examines complementary pathways of algal resource-
making that lead to algae food and feed products. Because algal biofuels are still too expensive 
to compete with other fuels on the market (e.g., fossil fuels or corn ethanol), many algae 
companies and investors are shifting their attention to or are entering the market to make other 
consumer products with shorter term profit potential. Algae producers face a trade-off in the 
current product landscape: do they invest in developing long term, large-scale lipid production to 
meet biofuels production and sustainability goals, or focus on shorter term gains by making 
products with more immediate commercialization potential (DOE 2016c, 124)? This choice is 
made possible by leveraging two types of flexibility in algal resource-making: the flexibility of 
the algal organism itself, and that of algal production systems. In this chapter, I show how 
developers in the US algae sector leverage this flexibility in response to changing political and 
economic conditions in ways that differ from other biomass producers. 
While algal biofuels remain a long-term goal for the US Department of Energy (DOE), 
the final product is years away from commercial viability: commercial algal biofuels are a 
resource still in-the-making. Even in the context of this uncertain future, the algal development 
sector continues to attract investment and interest. The earmarking of government stimulus funds 
in 2009 for algal research and development kickstarted a new wave of interest in algal 
technologies. Algal biofuels received scant federal attention after the closure of the Aquatic 
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Species Program in 1996; this renewal of federal support attracted significant private sector 
interest. Since 2010, the amount of private investment in algal projects has surpassed federal 
funding, even with substantial contributions from the Departments of Energy, Defense, and 
Agriculture and the National Science Foundation (DOE 2016c).  
Channeling algal production into food and feed resources positions algae even more 
broadly as a sustainability “solution” in several ways than does algal biofuel alone. First, algal 
proteins would support the nutritional needs of a growing world population. Second, omega-3 
fatty acids derived from algae would supplement the diets of health-conscious consumers. Third, 
algae would offer a substitute for large pelagic fishes as a source of proteins and omega-3s, 
easing the burden on overfished stocks. In these scenarios, pathways of algal resource-making 
are justified by their projected usefulness to different sustainability scenarios, but are often 
detached from an analysis of the politics of resource distribution in sustainable development.  
In this chapter I focus on the institutional dimensions of the resource-making process. 
These dimensions are also core to the sector as a whole and help to show how algal resource-
making draws on the malleability both of algae and of sustainable development. I examine these 
algal food and feed resources through two institutional dimensions. First, I look at the role of 
finance capital and rent as avenues for value creation for resources at different states of 
realization. Drawing from work on the biotech sector, I show how resources in-the-making rely 
on speculation and spectacular sustainability stories to generate value and investment interest, 
even without producing a saleable commodity. Second, I examine the classification and 
regulation of algal commodities. The transformation of algal “bits of life” into a resource product 
can raise questions about what these new resources are and whether they are safe to consume; 
these abstracted fragments often exceed the classificatory and regulatory regimes in which they 
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circulate. Here, laws and regulations governing novel algal resources are co-produced with the 
science of algal resource-making. As Johnson and Braverman (2020) argue, “scientific 
knowledge is typically considered as preceding the law and as providing the foundation for legal 
inscription. But, of course, scientific and legal practices are deeply entangled” (5-6). I show how 
uncertainties in classifying and regulating algal resources can stymie the path to desired resource 
exploitation. I conclude by reflecting on what the flexibility in these resource-making pathways – 
both in terms of product creation and in responding to complications – tells us about science and 
institutions in enrolling oceans and marine life in sustainable development. 
Fueling machines and bodies 
While the primary goal of the US DOE’s Bioenergy Technologies Office remains the 
development of scalable, sustainable algal biofuels, many developers hope to create and sell 
other products for profits that might offset economic barriers to fuel production (DOE 2016b, 
124). One mechanism for this is a biorefineries model of production. According to the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) Task 42 on biorefineries: 
“[b]iorefining is the sustainable processing of biomass into a spectrum of marketable 
products and energy” (IEA n.d.). Modeled after petroleum refining, biorefining 
“embraces a wide range of technologies able to separate biomass resources (wood, 
grasses, corn. . .) into their building blocks (carbohydrates, proteins, triglycerides. . .) 
which can be converted to value added products, biofuels and chemicals” (Cherubini 
2010, 1414).  
 
Biorefineries need not be confined to one geographic site, but can form a networked system 
where different nodes of the production process take place at different sites. A biorefineries 
model of algal production would focus on algal biofuels, but also utilize other algal components 




 Many of the technoscientific developments described in the previous chapter work to 
optimize algal production and drive costs down. Depending on the product under development, 
they may be applicable to making algal coproducts. Promoting a biorefinery concept is a long-
range DOE strategy for improving the economic prospects of algal biofuels (DOE 2016c). In the 
interim, work on other bioproducts stimulates public and especially private R&D. More recently, 
food and feed products are ascendant in the sector. One member of the industry noted that in 
2014, 
“the primary focus in terms of market applications for algae was biofuels… There were 
certainly some, plenty of interesting work going on in other applications, but biofuels. 
Now [in 2018], biofuels has really faded into the background. It’s consistent with what 
I’m seeing across all of the industrial biotechnology sector, but it gets even more 
pronounced in algae, I think because not only are algae interesting platforms for 
producing a variety of products, but also have nutritional attributes as well as 
environmental service functions that people I think have begun to recognize…” 
 
TerraVia Holdings, Inc. provides an illustrative example of this shift from fuel to feed; its 
AlgaPrime DHA17 product has been incorporated into commercial fish feed. Originally founded 
as the biofuels company Solazyme in 2003, the firm shifted away from fuels production to food 
and consumer products, rebranding itself TerraVia and reassigning algal biofuel production to a 
subsidiary firm (Fehrenbacher 2016).18 Contracts for the feed were purchased in 2017 by 
Norway’s Lerøy Seafood Group, the world’s second largest producer of Atlantic salmon. Citing 
drops in farmed salmon’s omega-3 levels due to changes in fish-farming practices (Sprague et al. 
2016), Lerøy positioned the use of algal feed as a sustainability initiative to protect smaller fish 
stocks and increase the quality and health benefits of its own farmed fish (Undercurrent News 
 
17Docosahexaenoic acid, or DHA, is one of the two polyunsaturated fatty acids most commonly manufactured for 
human consumption. The other is eicosapentaenoic acid (EPA). See Yaakob et al. (2014). 
 
18TerraVia filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and in September 2017 was acquired by Corbion, a biotechnology 
company that develops ingredients for foods and biochemicals (Corbion 2017). 
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2017). In the Pacific, AlgaPrime DHA has also contributed to feeding Chilean firm 
Ventisqueros’s Silverside Premium Pacific salmon (FIS 2017). AlgaPrime DHA varieties also 
feed shrimp, terrestrial livestock, and pets and were one of several of TerraVia’s algae-based 
coproduct initiatives. Instead of future fuels, TerraVia produced future food in the form of 
cooking oils, protein and lipid powders, as well as a line of cosmetic oils. These algal products 
point toward ways of eating heavily mediated by technoscience, facilitated by the infrastructures 
that support a terrestrial food system and industry already transformed by biotechnology. They 
are also innovative ways of making algae edible. Organisms put to work through biotechnologies 
are “commodities that facilitate our own daily reproduction” (Johnson 2017, 282) and also 
contribute to reproducing desires for health, wealth, and sustainable futures. 
The range of algal coproducts and their markets continues to expand and can be roughly 
grouped into the following categories: food and animal feed, polyunsaturated fatty acids, 
antioxidants, coloring agents, fertilizers, and other products. The market for algal food products 
is estimated to surpass $5.3 billion by 2025 (Fior Markets 2020). Although the sector has 
departed from the imagined algae burgers of the modernist mid-twentieth century, microalgal 
food products continue to occupy a niche as healthful supplements, most notably spirulina 
(Benemann 2013). Other products are slowly developing and entering the market, especially in 
response to special food needs, such as an algal flour unlikely to trigger an allergic response and 
algal cooking oils suitable for high heat food preparation.  
 Microalgae can also supplement the feed of farmed marine animals, such as shrimp, fish, 
and mollusks, with an estimated market of $700 million per year for algal aquaculture feed. The 
characteristics of algal biomass affect its suitability as feed, including its protein and nutrient 
content. The National Alliance for Advanced Biofuels and Bioproducts (NAABB) consortium 
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estimated that the value of using whole algae feed for aquaculture was approximately $400 per 
ton; using lipid extracted algae (in which the lipids have been removed for biofuels, leaving 
proteins and carbohydrates) halved this value ( DOE 2016c, 124; NAABB 2014). Algae is also 
entering the terrestrial animal feed marketplace and has been tested on poultry, cows, hogs, 
horses, dogs, and cats (ibid.). From 1990-2015, US agencies spent over USD 300 million on 
aquaculture grants for microalgae (Love et al. 2017). 
In the manufacture of omega-3 supplements for human and animal consumption, the 
technological and economic barriers that prevent the large-scale integration of algal biofuels into 
existing energy systems lead to a rechanneling of efforts to other high-value products (ABO 
2017). The potential of algae as a future machinic fuel is rechanneled into technoscientific 
initiatives focused on other facets of sustainability: meeting protein needs of a rapidly growing 
population and inserting healthful omega-3 fatty acids into different points of the food system. 
Studying algal technologies using the “bits of life” figure captures their material and semiotic 
valences: moving from laboratory to algae farm and then to product shelves, algal bits of life 
prompt a reexamination of our relationship to energy sources, animals, and food as they seek to 
ameliorate (or not) ecological and population anxieties framed around sustainability and climate 
crisis (Smelik and Lykke 2008). Rendering nonhuman life valuable involves harnessing “both 
the meaning and matter of life” (Shukin 2009, 20). 
Creating bits of life also opens the door for flexibility in algal resource-making pathways. 
This includes the flexibility to divert production inputs into different products – such as animal 
feed instead of biofuel precursors – and to leverage different socio-technical imaginaries of 
sustainability (Jasanoff and Kim 2015). This variety of resource-making pathways is unavailable 
to most other biomass producers. For example, switchgrass and miscanthus cannot be easily 
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repurposed from fuel to a nutritional product. In the case of corn and soy, which do form the 
foundation for a staggering array of food products and additives, there is much less vertical 
integration of different nodes of the production process. This division of labor shapes the 
conditions of this flexibility: corn biomass, for example, could be channeled to a variety of 
industrial uses, but the individual corn grower participates in these decisions through market 
mechanisms. Vertically integrated algae producers, in contrast, have more opportunity to adjust 
their cultivation and harvesting systems to make different products. Government incentive 
structures influence how the private sector leverages this flexibility. As one government 
representative noted:  
“[biofuels are] an industry priority as long as there is the right incentives. I mean there 
are so many companies that have weathered the storm of not being able to produce a cost 
competitive fuel by shifting their focus to products and chemicals or, [another] 
technology… And the hope is that they will, while they're waiting for there to be better 
incentives for fuels, they will be able to develop and scale-up their technologies using 
government dollars so that they will have the data that they need to spur more 
investments when there's a more conducive environment for that, for the fuel product. 
And if the fuel products doesn't come, then they will likely develop, you know, protein 
sources. That's a great thing about algae, there are many things you can make from it.” 
 
The commercialization and sale of coproducts can serve as a placeholder for ongoing biofuels 
research and development, which is of interest to the DOE, or to forward innovations in the 
sector to aid resource-making of both fuels and coproducts. According to one informant, firms 
wishing to access DOE funds must prove the technology’s relevance to future biofuels 
production. Even when biofuels are not foregrounded, the cost-reducing technological 
innovations at different nodes of production contribute to the ongoing resource-making of 
biofuels through the DOE’s incentive structure. This flexibility and the ability to channel efforts 
through different resource-making pathways sustains interest in algal technologies and 
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demonstrates the importance of public underwriting of the developments of private 
biotechnology firms. 
Flexibilities and frictions of resource-making 
In the previous chapter, I noted that the DOE’s goal of a commercially viable biofuel is 
still out of reach because the costs of production are too high to sell the fuel at competitive 
prices. This raises questions of how the algal technology sector continues to generate interest and 
investment when this important target – a target attached to attractive federal funding and 
incentives – is uncertain, meaning that sales and profits of the finished commodity are 
indefinitely deferred. In this regard, algal resource-making has some interesting parallels with 
“unconventional” fossil fuels like shale gas extracted through hydraulic fracturing. Kama (2019) 
argues that unconventionals occupy a liminal resource category characterized by both retentions 
and anticipations. Even when unconventionals remain physically inaccessible or politically 
contested, a politics of anticipation leverages examples of previous successful shale gas 
exploitation to construct still unrealized resources “as an already existing index of a future 
energy economy to come” (11; emphasis original). This combination of retentions and 
anticipations shows how not-yet-realized resources bring certain futures into being in the present 
(ibid., 12).  
Both algae and unconventionals generate interest and investment in the present by 
invoking resource futures. Like other unconventional fuels, algae may comprise a similarly 
liminal resource category in that algal technologies and products occupy a fragmented 
development space, meaning that potential algal resources are diverse in kind, diverse in use, and 
at various stages of “resource-ness” or commercial realization. Two examples: the ongoing 
development of algal drop-in biofuels retains its reliance on existing fuel infrastructures while 
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anticipating new forms of agricultural production, where technoscientific practices create new 
forms of “arable land” where none had previously existed (De Gregori 1987). Co-locating algal 
production with carbon waste streams anticipates carbon-neutral algal systems while retaining a 
larger systemic reliance on coal-powered plants and fossil fuel waste streams (Kaşdoğan 2020). 
But this also marks a key difference between algae and unconventional fossil fuels: algal 
resource-making draws upon a material and discursive flexibility not available to 
unconventionals due to differences in the materialities of these systems. As more algae firms 
move into food and feed production, this flexibility offers new and parallel pathways for algal 
technologies to generate profits – both present and future – while leveraging different 
sustainability imaginaries. I argue that this flexibility operates through two intersecting channels: 
the flexibility of the algal organism itself (operationalized as algal bits of life) and the flexibility 
of algal production systems in which algal bits of life are embedded.  
The first valence of flexibility concerns the algal organism, leveraged through 
technoscientific interventions that create bits of life, available to circulate and recombine in 
systems that make products ranging from pet food to surf boards. Product developers can design 
systems around creating ever more efficient and responsive bits of life, maximizing the potential 
of algae to produce lipids for fuel precursors, omega-3 fatty acids, proteins, carbohydrates, or 
other characteristics and components, depending on the desired product. This is malleability at 
the cellular level, enabled through the technoscientific advancements and institutional 
environments described in the previous chapter. Cellular plasticity and proliferating bits of life 
lend themselves to discursive and physical flexibility, whereby firms promote algae as a solution 
to a wide range of sustainability problems and create a discourse of future solutions that justify 
present-day financial investments from both the public and private sectors. 
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This brings me to the second form of flexibility in the algal sector: that of algal 
production systems. The algae sector as a whole is fragmented and spatially dispersed, 
comprised of firms of various sizes, public-private research consortia, government research 
organizations, industry groups, and non-profits spread over a wide geographical area and 
operating both independently and in partnership. Some vertically integrated producers can shift 
production from fuel products to other coproducts when the incentives for fuels development are 
insufficient. Not all firms and systems can take advantage of this flexibility, and many focus 
entirely on products outside of the fuel sector and may be able to utilize some technologies and 
innovations developed as a result of fuels research, either through open access or by purchasing 
access.  
These flexible structures add insight to studies of how the materialities of resources bring 
them into the realm of economic calculation.19 In the case of fossil fuels, the materialities and 
geographies of coal and oil extraction and distribution shaped emerging notions of a limitless 
‘economy’ and led to new processes and procedures for valuing money (Mitchell 2013). The 
case of drop-in biofuels highlights how land use changes, land valuation, and the siting of 
production facilities and other infrastructures “cannot be so easily ‘dropped-in’ to a carbon 
economy” based on extracting carbon from subterranean sources (Birch and Calvert 2015, 66). 
 
19The term economization “denote[s] the processes that constitute the behaviours, organizations, institutions and, 
more generally, the objects in a particular society which are tentatively and often controversially qualified, by 
scholars and/or lay people, as ‘economic’.  The construction of action(-ization) into the word implies that the 
economy is an achievement rather than a starting point or a pre-existing reality that can simply be revealed and acted 
upon” (Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 370). This term is used to study a wide range of processes, including the creation 
of fuel resources (Kama 2019). Studying economizing processes shows how these institutions and actors co-create 
new markets and institutional arrangements for novel resources like algae and algal technologies, leveraging 
sustainability concerns in the process of resource-making. These are processes that place resources – be they present 
or future resources – “internal to the frame of economic calculation” (Kama 2019, 347). Çalışkan and Callon (2009) 
point to institutional and technical arrangements as agents of economization, highlighting work in economic 
sociology that dissolves epistemological boundaries between society and economy and advances theories of 
economy as dis/embedded in social institutions (Polanyi 1957). Things themselves are also agents of economization, 
as their very materialities affect processes of economic valuation.  
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The potentials of algal bits of life also encounter frictions that complicate the resource-
making process and expose the limits of current sustainability aspirations. Bakker and Bridge 
(forthcoming) note that resource geographies invoke materialities not only to demonstrate 
relational ontologies and co-production of natural and social phenomena, but to show “points of 
friction – i.e. a recognition of difference as generative potential” in accounts of resources. The 
metaphor of friction has disrupted the idea of globalization as a smooth space of connections and 
flows, showing how “the awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection 
across difference” facilitate, impede, divert, and disrupt such flows (Tsing 2005, 4-6). Tracing 
how materialities produce generative friction adds much-needed texture to slick sustainability 
stories and adds a note of caution against ascribing inherent properties or potentials to “laboring” 
organisms like algae. Resource-making becomes a socio-technical feat (Çalışkan and Callon 
2009), where algae, bits of life, production systems, and institutions leverage flexibility and 
friction as sets of opportunities and risks. 
Flexibility and frictions of finance 
The flexibilities and frictions of microalgae and algal production systems position algae 
at an intersection of biotechnology, agriculture, and energy industries, where speculation is 
necessary to make algal “nature” legible to economic calculation. Mobilizing today’s labor and 
capital based on the promise of future value occurs in dual registers: the speculative and the 
spectacular (Tsing 2005; Sunder Rajan 2006). In his “grammar” of biocapital – the promissory 
discourses that bind life sciences with capitalism – Sunder Rajan (2006), like Tsing (2005), uses 
the word conjuring to emphasize that summoning the present from anticipatory discourses is a 
process; in the language of this study, it is an active part of resource making. There is a tension 
in conjuring the present from an imagined future:  
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“to generate value in the present to make a certain kind of future possible, a vision of that 
future has to be sold, even if it is a vision that will never be realized. Excess, expenditure, 
exuberance, risk, and gambling can be generative because they can create that which is 
unanticipated, perhaps even unimagined. But this can only be so if the temporal order of 
production is inverted, away from the present building toward the future and instead 
toward the future always being called in to account for the present” (ibid. 2006, 115-6).  
 
I show how algal developers join the speculative with the spectacular.  
The Speculative Register: surviving the valley of death 
The speculative register is about speculation, or generating financial capital. As 
financialization plays an increasingly prominent role in neoliberal economies (see Marazzi 
2010), nature and natural resources become new sites for capitalist expansion (Ouma et al. 
2018). Speculative investments rooted in projections of future value occur in many sectors where 
“nature” is made legible to value calculations. Creating projections of resource potential helps 
firms secure needed finance capital. In Canada’s tar sands, for example, oil companies position 
unconventional fossil fuels as already secured future reserves to replace dwindling conventional 
fuels. These firms help design the very environmental reviews and national regulations under 
which they are subject, easing the pathway toward regulatory approvals that global financial 
investors require (Zalik 2015a). In the ocean context, firms seeking to undertake deep seabed 
mining utilize both estimations of future resource availability and historically granted assets 
(such as patented technologies) to attract speculative investments (Zalik 2019). These examples 
highlight that when profits are linked to projections, firms still also rely on existing, tangible 
assets and assessments (Weszkalnys 2015). Resource-making is a continual process of 
becoming: “to produce merchandise from things that are not yet completely economized,20 one 
has to use what exists, edge one’s way in, articulate” (Callon 2007, 327, qtd in Kama 2019, 16). I 
 
20Or recognized as within the realm of economic calculation 
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explore some of these articulations, sketching how firms leverage algal flexibility to generate 
value with or without the presence of commodities. 
I focus on algae firms seeking capital for research on development, not on big oil firms 
that already have plentiful in-house funds to spend on internal algae R&D. These smaller firms 
are sites of technological innovation, utilize federal research grants for algal development, and 
demonstrate facets of flexibilities and frictions in algal development space. It is important to note 
that larger corporations like Exxon Mobil and Total are also working on algae, especially on 
biofuels; they are part of this story in that they are technology developers and also potential 
buyers of algal patents and technologies developed by smaller firms. According to one industry 
informant: 
“the benefit of the larger players is they have the ability to sustain investments like the 
federal government [can sustain investments] over a longer period, and invest in long 
term solutions. At the same time, I think you always have new ideas and new individuals 
coming into the space bringing innovation and you can see for example in the cellulosic 
biofuel space you had big names and innovators alike that really moved that technology 
to commercial scale and I expect we’ll continue to see the same thing in algae biofuels.”  
 
Smaller algae firms (or “innovators” as per the quote above) have largely moved away from 
biofuels to focus on other products or on developing cost-saving production methods that can be 
applied in a flexible algae market. This interviewee positions smaller firms run by scientist-
entrepreneurs as “innovators,” with larger corporations as long-term sustainers. As smaller firms, 
they face different financial constraints than large corporations and struggle to transition out of 
“start-up” mode: often (though not always) venture capital financed, high risk, small, innovative, 
and managerially supple,” in contrast to larger firms that have greater financial stability and a 
more firmly established corporate structure (Sunder Rajan 2006, 239). Such firms might be led 
by visionary scientist-entrepreneurs who interweave scientific fact and pitches to investors with 
great facility (ibid.), a skill that I frequently observed in the field. 
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 In interviews and observations, I noted frequent mentions of and concerns about algae 
developers traversing the “valley of death.” Broadly, the valley of death is “the gap between 
discovery and commercialization” when startup companies incur the high costs of product or 
service development before they are able to generate enough returns to cover operating costs 
(Markham 2002, 120; see also Rencher 2012).21 Failure to bridge the valley of death can result in 
a startup firm’s capital flows drying out and the firm going out of business, in keeping with the 
evocative image of the desert. High costs and the uncertainty of eventual success make the valley 
of death economically precarious (Osawa and Miyazaki 2006).  
The valley of death suggests a dangerous gap between basic and applied research, 
requiring a bridge – in the form of a large financial input – to traverse the chasm. However, 
Auerswald and Branscomb (2003) liken this space not to a dry, barren valley but to “a Darwinian 
sea,” teeming with life and animated by the struggles of the fittest to survive in a habitat of 
scarce capital and human resources and ever-changing conditions. The challenges to firms of 
surviving the Darwinian sea, they argue, are not limited to securing financing but also include 
enabling infrastructures and the alignment of motivations and practices on each "shore." Algae 
find a ready home within both metaphors as marine primary producers transposed to desert farms 
and enrolled in new forms of cellular agriculture. 
 Firms attempt to navigate valleys of death in changing circumstances. During my field 
work, I observed that participants in the algae products sector noted the unique flexibilities of 
algal production and how they produced opportunities for attracting promissory investments, but 
 
21One analysis of pharmaceutical startups defines the valley of death more specifically and in terms of intellectual 
property as a company asset, the peril beginning “the moment a provisional patent is filed for a discovery by a 
university” and lasting until “the intellectual property identified in that patent has become a realized invention an 
animal-tested molecule that can be submitted to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for approval of testing 
in humans” (Dessain and Fishman 2017, 5). While this definition is specific to biotech firms developing 
pharmaceutical molecules, there are similar contours to the valley of death in the algae sector.  
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were also sources of friction and uncertainty. According to one industry professional, startup 
firms can no longer sell a vision solely based on algal biofuels, but must rely on coproducts or 
byproducts to attract investment. Many industrial algal biotech companies that focused on fuels 
and had initial public offerings in 2010-11 (i.e., they became publicly traded soon after the 
financial crisis) have since gone bankrupt. Algae offers the flexibility for companies to pivot 
away from fuels, but these companies now face investor skepticism after the failure of previous 
fuel efforts.  
I asked one industry informant how producers are able to shift focus between fuels and 
food products. They highlighted the flexibility of algal organisms and systems: 
“At the end of the day, it’s [microalgae production] sort of a common production 
platform and while there may be slight differences in how you optimize the 
system depending on what you’re producing, you’re continuing to invest in 
optimizing the systems regardless of what you’re making, you’re headed down 
the path that we need to go to get to cost competitive biofuels, and I think that’s, 
again, DOE does a good job of recognizing that.” 
 
Notably, this interviewee frames the US algal production sector as a national project moving 
toward the telos of sustainable algal biofuels. Technoscientific advancements in the four main 
“nodes” of microalgae production (described in the previous chapter) contribute to the collective 
knowledge base for making algal systems cheaper, more sustainable, and more productive. 
Flexible shifting to different products still draws from existing technologies developed through 
public funding and public-private partnerships, or through system advancements patented and 
sold by private firms. There is a sense of collective forward advancement that echoes sustainable 
development’s techno-optimism.  
This interviewee’s point that the “DOE does a good job of recognizing” the need for 
ongoing support to develop coproducts highlights government’s role in supporting this flexibility 
so long as it contributes to the end-goal of biofuels, and in mitigating risks for investors. To 
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lower an investor’s risk, the firm must, for example, demonstrate the product’s effectiveness, the 
ability to produce at a scale that would deliver return on investment (i.e., generate value), and the 
product’s safety and regulatory clearance. Algal production can encounter multiple valleys of 
death as a firm seeks financing to demonstrate viability at different scales: the pilot scale, for 
verifying technical performance and generating initial financial projections; the demonstration 
scale, an intermediate step for showing the efficacy and costs of approaching commercial 
production; and the pioneer scale, capable of continuous commercial production (see also Energy 
and Water Development Appropriations 2015, 83-4).  
 Global Algae Innovations (GAI), based in Hawai’i, is one company that advertises a 
patented algae harvesting technology, the Zobi™ harvester. According to GAI, this harvester 
filters algae from open-air cultivation ponds to produce a slurry that is 15-20% algae, achieving a 
higher concentration of algae with fewer costs and less energy expenditure compared to other 
harvesting methods. The Zobi™ is adaptable to a wide range of algal species and production 
systems, and is part of Global Algae Innovations’ technology available to be sold to other algae 
producers (Hazlebeck 2017). The success of the Zobi™ harvester also lies in its ability to create 
the present out of not-yet-realized future possibilities. It is a successful commodity, made 
possible by its potential role in future algal commodity success.  
 A resource-making success in the algae sector might involve a finished algal commodity, 
such as AlgaPrime DHA fish feed, or a supportive technology like the Zobi™ harvester. 
However, firms also cross the valley of death by creating a successful asset, rather than a 
commodity. As Kean Birch (2017) argues: “Commodification is important, certainly, but it is a 
sideshow to the implications of assets to an understanding of value and valuation” in 
bioeconomy sectors (463); the real mechanisms of valuation are the creation and sale of assets, 
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not commodities. Privatizing and collecting rent on knowledge through intellectual property 
rights and licensing can generate more value for a firm than actual commodity sales; sometimes 
the investment model itself involves selling the firm to recuperate investments before the product 
enters the market and the value of the commodity might be realized (ibid.).  
Understanding value in a sector based on the promise of future realization requires 
looking beyond not-yet-realized commodities to bioeconomy firms themselves, both in terms of 
their assets and their ability to leverage algal flexibility into creating future potential in the 
present. The flexibility to switch to other algal products can be a mechanism for attracting 
investors, increasing a firm’s likelihood of successfully crossing the biotech firm valley of death. 
Investors look for “liquidity events” that generate faster returns on investment for venture capital 
firm shareholders. The flexibility of algae product diversification potentially offers multiple 
liquidity events that can come in the form of selling technologies and intellectual property, 
taking the company public, buy-out, or successful commercialization (in the longer term) (see 
also May 2017). 
One industry leader emphasized that companies must “change the story” of algae’s 
potential to rekindle investor interest. Changing the story requires leveraging the flexibility of 
algal bits of life and constructing futures that show how valuable algae will be. It is to these 
stories that I now turn. 
The Spectacular Register: omega-3s and proteins 
Making algal development projects attractive to speculative capital requires invoking the 
spectacular, both as novel spectacle and as storytelling about the future. Spectacle and 
performance are discursive strategies to attract finance capital to resource-making endeavors. As 
Tsing (2005) writes, “[i]n speculative enterprises, profit must be imagined before it can be 
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extracted; the possibility of economic performance must be conjured like a spirit to draw an 
audience of potential investors” (57). She theorizes spectacular accumulation to demonstrate how 
capital flows are not uniform, smooth, or inevitable, as might be predicted in reductive 
imaginaries of globalization, but heterogeneous in time and space (ibid., 76). 
Speculative investment is tied to spectacular storytelling in the algae sector. In this 
section, I focus on two stories of how algae can be made flexible to fulfill health and nutritional 
needs. Bits of life are an important element of these food stories and are crucial for “changing the 
story” of algae to make the case for its future value. Tales of the future circulation of two 
macronutrients derived from algae – omega-3 fatty acids and proteins – also show how firms can 
flexibly position algae in response to sustainability concerns my mobilizing the spectacular. 
Omega-3 fatty acid production exemplifies algae’s capacity to become different types of 
fuel in response to shifting political and economic conditions. Algal products contribute to a 
growing global market for functional foods and nutraceuticals, or foods and supplements 
containing compounds that may provide additional health benefits, such as fighting inflammation 
(Wells et al. 2017). Diets high in omega-3 fatty acids, in particular, are linked to lower risks of 
cardiovascular and other diseases, while omega-6 fatty acids are labeled “pro-inflammatory” 
because they have lower oxidative stability and are therefore more likely to release inflammatory 
free radicals into the body (Yaakob et al. 2014; Gatrell et al. 2015). Many western diets contain 
an unfavorable balance of omega-3 to omega-6 fatty acids (Gatrell et al. 2015), providing a 
market opportunity for nutraceutical development of healthful omega-3s (Yaakob et al. 2014).  
The most common natural source of omega-3s is fish or fish oil, though there are 
concerns about heavy metals toxicity in fish oils extracted from large pelagic species (Yaakob et 
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al. 2014). Notwithstanding, its use among American adults increased from 4.8 percent to 7.8 
percent between 2007 and 2012 (Clarke et al. 2015).   
Globally, the aquaculture industry captures the largest share of fish oil consumption at 
about 70 percent, but direct human consumption of fish oil is expected to increase by almost 80 
percent between 2015 and 2025 (Finco et al. 2017). Projected increases in global demand have 
raised concerns about the sustainability of already-depleted fish stocks and the potential exposure 
to consumers of bioaccumulative toxins like mercury. Such concerns spur investments in the 
industrial development of omega-3s from alternative sources like microalgae (Finco et al. 2017). 
The estimated value of the global omega-3 market in 2019 was $2.49 billion, which includes 
both fish and algal oils (Grand View Research 2020). 
In this context, algae can be positioned as a sustainable fish substitute in response to an 
ocean in crisis. Such crises are well documented: fish, and the oceans themselves, are on the 
decline, and many fisheries have collapsed or are on the verge of collapse. A conjuring of algae’s 
potential value has several mutually reinforcing components whereby algae are positioned as a 
vehicle for restoring health within a broken ocean-based food system. First, putting algae 
products into fish feed leads to healthier fish on humans’ dinner plates. Industrially developed 
algal products, such as algal DHA, are marketed as a healthy alternative to the current 
ingredients of aquaculture feed. Algal DHA would add beneficial omega-3s to fish feed and 
replace some of the inflammatory omega-6s from sources like processed vegetable oils found in 
existing commercial feeds. Second, algal additives can improve the color and appearance of 
farmed fish. Adding algal astaxanthin to salmon feed makes their flesh appear a darker, richer 
pink. Third, algal DHA and proteins can replace some of the fishmeal, fish oil, and other animal 
products in aquaculture feed. Reducing these animal products can help minimize the 
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bioaccumulative toxins (e.g., mercury) in fish meat, especially in large, carnivorous pelagic 
fishes. Feeding big fish with algae instead of with small fish increases the availability of these 
species (such as sardines and anchovies) for direct human consumption instead of aquaculture 
feed. In the aquaculture sector, algae are spectacular as vectors of health, through which algal 
bits of life fortify fish, humans, and marine ecosystems. In a contrast to narratives that focus on 
fish as a source of food and food security, here security is bolstered by technologically mediated 
algae, conjured as a crisis-averting alternative.  
As a counterpoint, Elspeth Probyn challenges mainstream sustainability discourses and 
develops an ethics of eating with the ocean that is “about scalar intricacy and metabolic 
intimacies, not moral positioning” (Probyn 2016, 130). Her exposition of omega-3s as vibrant 
matter that can affect mood and cognitive functions (Bennett 2010) requires also understanding 
how these bits of life exist in relation to their life cycles and production cycles. In other words, 
knowing where omega-3s come from is just as important as knowing what they might or might 
not do in the body (Abrahamsson et al. 2015; Probyn 2016, 136). Since most omega-3 
supplements intended for human stomachs come from fish oil, and dietary supplements are more 
available to populations with higher incomes, demand for fish and fish oil supplements in 
wealthier markets puts pressures on already depleted fish stocks in global South countries, 
affecting the food security and daily protein supplies in communities where many of these small 
fishes are caught (Abrahamsson et al. 2015; Brunner et al. 2009; Probyn 2016). Probyn offers 
one suggestion for a more hopeful way of eating with the ocean, citing an initiative to substitute 
algae for smaller fish in aquaculture feed, noting the importance of smaller fishes to ocean health 
(154–56). However, the geographies of this reconfigured algae-fish-human entanglement, and 
products like AlgaPrime DHA, suggest that its “metabolic intimacies” cast a wide net that 
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gathers a range of biotechnical, institutional, and regulatory processes that even echo some of the 
terrestrial plant biotechnologies of the Green Revolution.  
These stories of creating “sustainable” omega-3s to optimize human health without 
causing undo harm to fish stocks are one form of value-generating story. Contrast these concerns 
for optimizing health – often with a focus on wealthier global North markets – with the 
positioning of algae as an alternative protein source for a global population whose demand for 
the macronutrient is, according to this story, outstripping supply. One informant expressed 
optimism for algae’s potential to double US agricultural outputs when it becomes cost-
competitive with other crops, positing that algae could then help meet “global” protein demands 
expected to double in the coming decades.22 Protein presents another product option for algae 
firms to position themselves as responding to rising global food demands. These algal bits of life 
glide across a smooth globalized terrain. In echoes of the Green Revolution, this story positions 
US algae growers as agricultural producers tasked with feeding the world, using technology to 
meet an undifferentiated global nutrient demand, seemingly disembedded from the intricacies of 
existing food systems. 
In these stories of algal potential, algal bits of life – as macronutrients – take on different 
sustainability problems. Algae becomes a vector of health for both fish and humans. Bits of life 
take on healthful properties but circulate differently and tell different stories. The omega-3 story 
focuses on health optimization (for those who can afford it) and preserving dwindling fish 
stocks. The protein story emphasizes survival at the level of the global population, through the 
salvific productivity of US agriculture. The circulation of algal macronutrients connects future 
 
22This informant explained that twice the protein would be required to fulfill global protein needs. The Food and 
Agriculture Organization predicts that protein-rich foods will become less available worldwide. This shortage is 
exacerbated by COVID-19 (FAO 2020).  
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fuels premised on speculative financial investments with value realized through edible 
coproducts, enmeshing multiple narratives of sustainability: sustaining declining fish stocks, 
protecting ocean health, providing nutrients for humans, and contributing to the development of 
climate change–mitigating fuels. Food and fuels become linked in these forms of value 
generation; the danger of reaching peak oil is connected to the specter of overpopulation and 
shortages of specific macronutrients relative to world population size, fragmenting food into bits 
of life with the potential for deceptively smooth global circulation. Especially within an 
imaginary of globally circulating proteins, this flexibility is now poised to encounter the very 
real frictions of food production and distribution.  
Flexibility and friction in regulation 
Regulation is an important phase in the economization of algal products, especially those 
intended for human or animal consumption. In order for algae to be realized as a resource – in 
this case, to successfully enter the market as a commodity for sale – it must be approved by the 
appropriate US regulatory agencies. Algal product producers must navigate a complex regulatory 
terrain that involves several agencies: the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of 
Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The Algae Biomass Organization 
devotes sessions to navigating these regulatory approvals at its annual summit; such clearance 
can take years to obtain for new products. Uncertainties around approval can also discourage 
risk-averse investors.  
Each of the regulatory agencies has specific mandates that cover different types of 
products and processes. Determining what an algal bit of life is or has become is necessary for 
assigning it to the appropriate agency to regulate its safety. As algal bits of life are transformed 
into fuels, food, feed, and other chemicals, they can enter a space of classificatory – and thus 
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regulatory – ambiguity. This makes the classification of algal bits of life—both what they are and 
what they do— a crucial step of resource-making.  
With many parts of the algae industrial sector in their nascent stages, industry actors have 
been actively involved in driving the regulatory process and determining what regulations will be 
needed when such technologies can finally scale up to profitable levels. According to an industry 
attorney, biotech regulations must balance “two vital but competing interests. We must preserve 
the financial incentives for scientific advancement while at the same time protecting the public 
from the hazards posed by dangerous technologies. This much is obvious” (Godfrey 2015, 77). 
Perhaps equally obvious are the potential for conflicting priorities within a regulatory sector that 
considers profitability concurrently with public safety. 
In examining the ethics of technological innovation, Sheila Jasanoff (2016) poses the 
question of how society determines and assigns responsibility for risks involving new 
technologies. Of course, a common method to mitigate safety risks is to legislate this 
responsibility and assign its enforcement to various governance institutions, even if, at times, this 
approach appears as “organized irresponsibility” (Beck 1992, quoted in Jasanoff 2016, 35). The 
means and ends of technologies are no longer clearly linked in linear fashion (Beck 1992, 32). 
With the flexibility of algal production, the technological means to produce algal biofuel have 
been diverted to new ends (coproducts) that involve additional regulations. While it may seem 
that regulatory approval is one of the final stages of commodification that allows the product to 
enter the market, regulatory hurdles present potential barriers to advancing algae as resource at 
each “node” of the production process discussed in the previous chapter.23  
 
23While microalgae production can be heterotrophic (algae grown in closed systems that do not rely on sunlight and 
photosynthesis for growth and multiplication), I focus here on photoautotrophic cultivation for its relationship to 
terrestrial agriculture and potential for scale-up. Heterotrophic and photoautotrophic systems face similar sets of 
regulations, adjusted to the particularities of the production system. 
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Regulations fall into three broad categories (see Laurens et al. 2015b). The first are those 
relating to algae strain production (node 1) and the inputs and outputs of algae farms. The second 
is cultivation and production processes (nodes 2-4). The third includes regulation of the quality 
of algal products themselves, be they fuels or other products. Strain selection is subject to 
oversight from, among others, the National Institutes of Health and Health and Human Services, 
which have guidelines for working with recombinant DNA; the Environmental Protection 
Agency; and the US Department of Agriculture, for the use of GMOs and any research of plant 
pests in open systems. Cultivation systems may require clearance from the EPA, through TERA 
(TSCA Environmental Release Application), MCAN (Microbial Commercial Activity Notice), 
or FIFRA (pesticide regulations); the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which has 
oversight of the environmental impacts of federally-funded projects; or other agencies and tools 
depending on the end-product. At the scale of commercialization, firms need federal, state, or 
local permits for things like air and water intake, emissions, and waste discharges, and to follow 
state biotechnology and aquaculture statutes (ibid.).  
This regulatory framework governs the actual processes of producing biomass, and 
additional oversight covers bio-commodities through a suite of product-specific regulations 
related to their end use, again emanating from different regulatory agencies. Here, I bracket fuel 
regulations (see Laurens et al. 2015b) and focus on ingestible products to highlight resource-
making complications of this regulatory landscape.   
Algal products intended for direct human consumption fall under the purview of the 
FDA, along with foods (except meat and poultry), dietary supplements, and bottled water. The 
USDA oversees the quality and safety of meat and poultry, egg production and grading, produce 
grading, and organic certification. Notably, seafood and eggs in the shell also fall under FDA 
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responsibility (Johnson 2016). These distinctions are relevant for algal product development 
because of the growing market for algal supplement in animal feed, which is indirectly 
consumed by humans higher up the food chain. Each product would need to clear regulations 
that are applicable to all production nodes, as well as assuring the safety of the final product. 
This fragmented regulatory context has its origins in an early tension in the USDA that 
mirrors tensions in the current biotech regulatory context. The Department of Agriculture has 
always sought to promote the growth and development of US domestic agriculture. At the time 
of its founding in 1862, there was no federal regulation of food safety in the United States; as the 
need for regulation became evident, these activities were housed within the USDA. The first law 
regulating adulterated domestic food was passed in 1886; it levied a tax on margarine and 
regulated imitation butter and cheese, measures designed to protect domestic dairy farmers and 
products. The US food regulation system from its earliest days paired food purity concerns with 
economic protectionism (Merrill and Francer 2000, 78), foreshadowing the present-day  
concerns for achieving a balance between profitable biotech innovation and public safety 
(Godfrey 2015). A growing number of adulterated foods in the marketplace prompted the 
creation of the USDA’s “chemical division,” which later became the USDA Bureau of 
Chemistry, created both to monitor the safety of these adulterated foods and to protect existing 
agricultural producers.  
 Congress further cemented dual regulatory tracks with the Pure Food and Drugs Act, 
focused on adulterated foods and implemented by the Bureau of Chemistry; and the Meat 
Inspection Act, focused on conditions in meat packing plants, in part attributed to Teddy 
Roosevelt’s discovery of Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle (1906), implemented by the Bureau of 
Animal Industry (Johnson 2016; Merrill and Francer 2000). During this time, the Bureau of 
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Chemistry conducted research on the production of new agricultural chemicals while overseeing 
regulations. This conflict led to the creation of the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration in 
1927. “Insecticides” were later dropped, and the FDA separated from the USDA in 1940 (Merrill 
and Francer 2000). Over the years, different agencies gained responsibility for different aspects 
of regulatory safety (e.g., the EPA over pesticide use), further fragmenting the regulatory 
landscape.  
What the US Department of Energy (2015) acknowledges as a “complicated regulatory 
landscape” confronting algal bioproducts is first and foremost an exercise of classification—
what is this product, and what is its intended use? I have made the argument that the flexibility of 
algal bits of life enables their transformation into a wide range of resources, but regulation 
demands their fixity. The potential offered by algal flexibility must be fixed in place to close the 
loop of resource-making, an example of rendering algae “passive” through the scientific process. 
Algae are not inherently stable, fixed objects: “For a scientific fact to emerge, scientists must 
successfully pacify natural objects, reducing them from wild unknowns to things with fixed 
qualities” (Çalışkan and Callon 2010, 6). Fixing these qualities, as attributes that can be 
identified and regulated, stabilizes algal bits of life as a resource.  
In the mid-1980s, when the DOE’s Aquatic Species Program was in full swing and 
biotechnologies began occupying a more prominent place in the US national economy (Cooper 
2008), the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) issued federal 
regulations of biotech products. The Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of 
Biotechnology (1986) established laws to regulate products based on their intended use; they 
were not regulated based on their production processes. These regulations were designed in 
anticipation of future biotechnical innovation, articulating a desire to balance health and safety 
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protections with enough leeway to facilitate ongoing innovation and, subsequently, economic 
dividends (EPA, FDA, and USDA 2017, 4). The Coordinated Framework was updated in 1992 
and again in 2017, after it became evident that biotech advancements and new products exceeded 
the bounds of the existing framework. However, the number and complexity of regulatory 
agencies and statutes have led to impediments in the sector, particularly questions of agency 
jurisdiction and public access to information about product safety (EPA, FDA, and USDA 2017, 
5). For example, an algal biofuel coproduct produced might be regulated through either the 
chemical or food industries, with different laws and regulations in force (DOE 2015, 14). 
“Modernizing” the regulations would, according to the OSTP, improve “economic growth, 
innovation, and competitiveness” by removing some of these perceived innovation barriers. 
This regulatory modernization process is meant to define responsibilities, even if few 
concrete legal changes were made (EPA, FDA, and USDA 2017). The document provides case 
studies of hypothetical scenarios so that biotech firms can view a sample regulatory road map. 
Take the following case: “A unicellular alga is genetically engineered with a plant pest 
component to produce industrial oils for conversion into biofuels with the extracted algal 
biomass used for fish food” (EPA, FDA, and USDA 2017). Because the algae are genetically 
engineered, they are regulated under the Environmental Protection Agency’s Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA). Because they include genes from a plant pest component, they are 
regulated by the US Department of Agriculture, while Food and Drug Administration regulations 
govern the animal feed co-products. Moving genetically modified material from the laboratory to 
open pond cultivation involves its own set of regulations to keep modified organisms properly 
contained (EPA, FDA, and USDA 2017, 50–51). The EPA is also developing the separate 
Biotechnology Algae Project for genetically engineered microalgae and associated products 
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under TSCA, designed to serve as a tool to clarify confusion around submissions in anticipation 
of “technology ramp[ing] up to its expected level” (EPA 2015). Rendering algae as bits of life 
enables its circulation through bioeconomies of fuel, food, and feed while complicating the 
regulatory processes that govern it.  
An organic milk product provides an example of regulatory slippage, where algal bits of 
life become difficult to fix in place as resources. Horizon, an organic dairy foods company, sells 
six varieties of organic milk fortified with the polyunsaturated omega-3 fatty acid DHA, 
advertising that it “may help support brain, heart and eye health” (Horizon n.d.). Some of this 
DHA was derived from Schizochytrium, a rapidly multiplying species of algae that produces 
enhanced amounts of DHA under controlled conditions (Whoriskey 2017). If you’ve “got milk” 
fortified with DHA, you’ve likely “got algae” as well.24  
Products fortified with omega-3 fatty acids derived from algae are attractive to health-
conscious consumers wary of the heavy metal contaminants in omega-3 supplements extracted 
from large pelagic fishes. But consumer advocates objected to the addition of DHA algal oils—
produced in industrial facilities by algae fed with corn syrup—to an organic food product 
(Whoriskey 2017). Under the USDA National Organic Program25 regulations, organic products 
may be fortified with synthetic additives that are classified as “essential nutrients” by the FDA. 
Omega-3 fatty acids like DHA are excluded from this group of approved essential nutrients but 
are still permitted by the USDA as additives to organic milk due to an interpretive error or an 
“inaccurate cross reference” to these FDA regulations (Federal Register 2012). By May 2020, 
 
24Riffing off the popular “got milk?” advertising campaign produced for the California Milk Processor Board in 
1993, the Bigelow Laboratory for Ocean Sciences in Maine, which includes the National Center for Marine Algae 
and Microbiota (NCMA), produced their own “got algae?” promotional materials. 
 
25The US Department of Agriculture’s National Organic Program develops national standards for and regulates 
classification of organically produced agricultural products and their components (USDA n.d.). 
 
108 
the USDA had yet to revise the regulation after a period of public comment, recommending that 
the additives in question—DHA algal oil, among others—remain permitted as organic in order to 
avoid negatively impacting the organic industries, predicting that the de-listing of DHA algal oil 
and other additives would harm sales of organic products (Federal Register 2012; Whoriskey 
2017). Marketed as a healthy and sustainable alternative to fish oils, this industrially produced 
algal oil slips between agencies and regulatory regimes, simultaneously enhancing milk and 
contaminating it.  
In this example, algal bits of life do not fit neatly into existing systems of product 
regulation: their industrial cultivation disqualifies them from an organic certification, but their 
initial mistaken classification as an “essential nutrient” under the organics program allows them 
to stay put within an organic product. As a food additive, this algal DHA is under FDA 
jurisdiction, but the USDA oversees organic certification. Biotech regulations are structured so 
as not to stymie technological development, but the resources produced by these advancements 
can meet the frictions of a fragmented regulatory regime.  
Both scientific and institutional practices work to transform algae into “bits of life” that 
are instrumental to algal biofuels resource-making. These bits of life are also socio-natural 
constructs, abstracted from marine life and ocean habitats. In addition to facilitating their co-
production with biofuels systems, this fragmentation and abstraction of bits of life open alternate 
pathways for the multiplication of value and of algae in algal resource-making, including their 
transformation into food, feed, and nutritional products. The different products derived from 
algae position it as “flexible” organism for algae product producers. Such flexibility allows for 
the selection and cultivation of algae’s optimal biological characteristics, like Schizochytrium’s 
rapid reproduction rate and high lipid content, channeled into the development of products 
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designed to promote sustainable consumption. Algal bits of life can become fuel for both humans 
and machines, circulating through production systems and within human and nonhuman bodies, 
blurring such distinctions as organic/synthetic.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I showed how the state and firms use flexibility, both in the algal 
organism and in algal production systems, to expand algae’s resource-making potential. This 
flexibility applies to the financial and regulatory dimensions of resource-making, which are 
necessary to successfully bring algal products to market. Working with bits of life affords firms 
added flexibility for generating value, but also means that they encounter frictions in research 
and development that disrupt the smooth sustainability stories of algal products as future fuels 
and foods.  
 This account of flexibilities and frictions deepens this relational analysis of resource-
making, showing how algal materialities are important for understanding the processes of 
economization that bring these resources into being. Algal materialities offer multiple avenues 
for value generation through different sustainability-oriented products; but these touted potentials 
run into frictions of generating finance, driving down costs, and classifying and regulating algae 
during its transformation into novel resources. The spectacular narratives of algae butt against 
the institutional constraints of production. 
These institutional dimensions of algal resource-making show how scientific and legal 
practices are co-produced, with science and the law responding to each other to bring these 
resources to market. The regulatory laws governing algal bits of life are socio-scientific; the 
science that creates these novel resources is likewise socio-legal and depends on an enabling 
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assemblage of institutions (Johnson and Braverman 2020). Tracing these processes reveals their 
geographic particularities, through linkages to sites of production and market outlets.   
Through the co-production of science and legal and financial institutions, ocean resources 
are enrolled into sustainable development through abstraction and spatial dispersion. As algal 
bits of life are transformed into co-products for sustainable living, they traverse a complex and 
multi-scalar geography of production and consumption. Algae gathered from marine, brackish, 
and freshwater habitats are cultivated in labs located at dedicated marine centers or industrial 
start-up companies. As bits of life, algae are modified and optimized in the lab to maximize their 
most valuable components, then moved outdoors for larger scale cultivation. Harvested algae are 
dewatered and industrially processed and packaged before returning to the seas as meal and fed 
to farmed fish. Humans catch, transport, and ingest these fish in efforts to make sustainable, 
healthy personal choices. The circulation of algal bits of life connects future fuels premised on 
speculative financial investments with value realized through coproducts, constructing the 
present through spectacular stories of future sustainability: sustaining declining fish stocks, 
protecting ocean health, providing nutrients for (relatively privileged) humans or protein to for 
an undifferentiated “global” population, and contributing to the development of climate change-
mitigating fuels.  
These resource-making processes aspire to fix algae in ways designed to make human 
systems more secure and more resilient to potential crisis. Such technofixes hold in tension both 
desired possibilities and disaster risks (Jasanoff and Kim 2015). But, as with so many sustainable 
development initiatives, they rely on techno-optimism and leave unquestioned the very systems 
that created the crises themselves. It is to this resilience of the business of development that I 




CHAPTER 6: DISCURSIVE DIMENSIONS: RESOURCE-MAKING AT THE UNITED 
NATIONS OCEAN CONFERENCE 
 
The previous two chapters demonstrate that marine resource-making is not merely 
locating and extracting pre-existing natural objects for human use. Making novel algal resources 
for sustainable development involves the creation of new socionatural entities at different scales, 
leveraged to reinforce particular ideas of sustainability. This creation occurs first through 
technoscientific processes linked to value chains that transform algal “bits of life” into – among 
other things – fuel for machines, animals, and humans and marketed to sustainability-conscious 
consumers. Second, the institutional processes of financial capitalization and government 
regulation attempt to classify and derive value from algal “bits of life”. These interlinked 
processes also rely on specific sustainability narratives that bolster arguments for algae’s utility 
and added value in response to environmental crises.   
In this chapter, I approach resource-making through a discursive lens, showing how 
oceans, marine life, and their components become resources through their incorporation into the 
United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. I shift the scale and focus of my 
analysis in this chapter away from a specific resource sector to global ocean governance, 
focusing on a sustainable development apparatus that is incorporating marine environments and 
organisms in new ways. Sustainable development, through the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), has become the mainstream 
international development paradigm in the United Nations system. For the first time, oceans 
assume a prominent position in the 2030 Agenda as the object of a stand-alone development 
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goal: SDG 14, “to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and marine resources for 
sustainable development,” includes ten development targets that reflect growing recognition of 
the oceans’ importance to the health of the biosphere, to human wellbeing as a source of food 
and livelihoods, to cultural heritage, to economic growth and development through resource 
extraction, and to ensuring more equitable access to the many ecosystem services and resources 
that oceans provide (UN 2015b).  
I am interested in how the UN and associated actors and institutions approach integrating 
oceans into global sustainable development through the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. I use 
discourse analysis as an entry point into this question, because understanding how oceans are 
enrolled in sustainable development requires attention to how they are problematized as spaces 
of environmental concern and concurrently framed both as resources and as sources of 
“potential” – environmental, social, and economic. My research questions for this chapter are: 
How do Ocean Conference participants discursively create the global ocean and ocean 
resources as objects of sustainable development through SDG 14? How do such discursive 
performances contribute to understanding of the relationship between humans and the sea 
within this era of sustainable development, and understanding of a “sustainable ocean”? 
As an official program of the United Nations, the 2030 Agenda influences the dominant 
contours of mainstream development discourse and practice worldwide; the spread of the blue 
economy concept26 from UN preparations for the Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio 
 
26Many development actors seek to access ocean resources and benefits through the blue economy, a concept first 
proposed by small island developing states (SIDS) to incorporate and privilege marine-based industries, livelihoods, 
and the development concerns of SIDS into ongoing “green economy” debates focused on bridging economic 
growth and environmental sustainability (UN-DESA n.d.). The blue economy, as a conceptual vehicle for oceans 
sustainable development, includes a growing set of global environmental governance discourses that often frame 
oceans as sites of natural capital and extractive opportunities, emphasizing the potential value that could be realized 
in the marine sectors (Silver et al. 2015). The blue economy concept is closely tied to sustainable development 
discourses and can include a wide range of practices, policies, and frameworks that propose decoupling marine 
economic development from environmental degradation and promote economic growth in marine sectors while 
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+20) to European Commission policy platforms and global industry summits is one example of 
this influence (Ecorys Consortium 2012, World Ocean Summit Executive Summary 2015). The 
UN kick-started SDG 14 discussions and actions by convening the Ocean Conference, an 
international, multi-stakeholder meeting held June 5-9, 2017, to support and set the direction of 
SDG 14 implementation. I chose the Ocean Conference as an important moment of discursive 
resource-making because it shows the negotiation of the ocean’s incorporation into sustainable 
development in the context of a new, oceans-centered goal. I argue that my discourse analysis 
shows that these meeting performances contribute to the ongoing construction and stabilization 
of sustainable development in the oceans. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I more briefly introduce the Ocean 
Conference’s purpose and structure by examining how oceans have grown in importance at UN-
level discussions, especially at Rio +20. Then, I discuss discourse analysis as both a theoretical 
and methodological tool, applying Michel Foucault’s concept of apparatus (dispositif) to 
contemporary international sustainable development. I describe my research methods and data 
sources, noting how I read statements of the Ocean Conference through the apparatus to generate 
three points of analysis. First, I look at narratives of responsibility, solidarity, and equity in 
oceans sustainable development. These forms of what I refer to as “solidarity work” make claims 
about the “who” of marine resource-making, revealing how the sustainable development 
apparatus is de- and re-stabilized through long-standing debates over (in)equity and the 
distribution of benefits and harms in environmental governance. Second, I examine the role of 
partnership in incorporating, legitimizing, and stabilizing sustainable development. Third, I look 
 
attending to sustainable development’s three main pillars (see also Patil et al. 2016; UN-DESA n.d.). Both optimistic 
and anticipatory, the blue economy frames the oceans as a ripe development frontier (Silver et al. 2015; Winder and 
Le Heron 2017). 
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at how scientific partnerships and the science/policy interface inform resource-making and 
reorient around the sustainable development apparatus. Finally, I conclude by discussing how 
this discursive analysis of marine resource-making through sustainable development shows the 
depoliticizing and stabilizing power of the apparatus, sustaining “sustainable development” 
itself.  
The 2030 Agenda and the Ocean Conference 
As the successor to the Millennium Development Goals, the 2030 Agenda captures a 
broader range of developmental and environmental concerns than the previous UN development 
program, attempting to bridge these two historically siloed areas of action into one 
comprehensive global development agenda that addresses economic, environmental, and social 
development imperatives concurrently. In this section, I briefly trace the processes that 
foregrounded the oceans within the UN development agenda, meriting their own standalone goal 
for the first time. This process reflects a changing understanding of the importance of the oceans 
within the sustainable development apparatus. Although the SDGs are designed to be 
complementary and mutually reinforcing to each other, I focus here on the development and 
implementation of SDG 14 specifically, as the first oceans-specific UN development target. (For 
a careful accounting of the processes and steps leading to the adoption of the SDGs, see Dodds et 
al. 2014). 
 The oceans were a prominent development topic at the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development in 2012, or Rio +20 (Dodds et al. 2014, 62); some referred to Rio+20 
as “the oceans summit,” reflecting the unprecedented foregrounding of oceans and seas at the 
summit and side events (Campbell et al. 2013). In keeping with the commitments expressed in 
“The Future We Want” at the conclusion of Rio +20, the UN General Assembly resolved to 
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convene a conference in support of the implementation of SDG 14 (UN 2016c). The Ocean 
Conference, hosted by the governments of Fiji and Sweden, was held at UN Headquarters in 
New York on June 5-9, 2017, to coincide with World Oceans Day on June 8. The purpose of the 
UN Ocean Conference was to “Identify ways and means to support the implementation of 
Sustainable Development Goal 14” (UN 2016c). The key goals for the meeting were to: 
strengthen existing partnerships that would enhance this implementation, support the formation 
of new partnerships, incorporate a wide range of stakeholders to assess implementation 
challenges and opportunities, share implementation experiences at different scales, and 
contribute inputs to the UN’s high-level political forum on sustainable development that oversees 
the follow-up and review of Agenda 2030 (UN 2016b). 
Theorizing discourses of sustainable development 
Analyzing environmental discourses can uncover why certain interpretations of 
environmental problems become dominant at the expense of others (Hajer 2003, 44). What 
shared understandings of concern become authoritative, and how does that occur? 
Representations of these problems include social interactions and the emergence of shared 
agreement on significant debates and meanings. Discourse analysis requires a twofold 
examination: as content, or what is said; and as context, which includes the actors making and 
receiving this content and the institutional or social dimensions of the interaction. Combining 
content and context, Hajer (2003) defines discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, 
and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of 
practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (44). Discourses 
need not be completely coherent, and may include a wide range of ideas and representations 
(ibid). This makes a discourse analysis particularly useful for studying the integration of a new 
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development space (oceans) into a dominant sustainable development paradigm that coheres 
around several key features, but must also stretch to accommodate a new context. In crafting the 
questions and methods of this chapter, I draw inspiration from the work of a multi-disciplinary 
group of scholars tracking ocean governance issues, as outlined below. In this section, I begin by 
positioning this chapter in relation to some of their recent research on discourses and narratives 
used in oceans governance. Then, I discuss how my approach – utilizing Foucault’s concept of 
the apparatus – contributes to this body of work. 
 Silver et al. (2015) ask how various actors deployed the “blue economy” concept when 
discussing oceans and sustainable development at Rio +20. They conducted a discourse analysis 
of the proceedings of Rio+20, arguing that meeting participants brought the “blue economy” into 
the Rio +20 agenda through four discourses that characterize human-ocean relations: oceans as 
natural capital, oceans as good business, oceans as vital to Pacific SIDS, and oceans as small-
scale fisheries livelihoods. Their work shows both how discourse shapes governance practices, 
and how different actors can strategically use an important new term like “blue economy” to 
bolster their position in international governance fora (153). Gray et al. (2014) analyze how 
actors at the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Tenth Conference of the Parties develop a 
range of “scalar narratives” to advance their marine conservation agendas within the CBD 
framework, which stakeholders use to make claims about how to create and manage marine 
protected areas (MPAs) for conservation. They find that MPAs become a boundary object: a 
policy instrument that is plastic enough to accommodate contrasting scalar narratives of 
environmental governance and potentially useful for facilitating the consensus required to 
advance progress towards inter-state/global CBD goals. On the flip side, this flexibility can lead 
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to deferrals in addressing conflicts and cementing MPAs as the primary marine conservation 
tool, overshadowing other options (79-80).  
 Gruby and Campbell (2013) use data collected from this same conference (the 10th COP 
at CBD) to examine the discursive construction of regions, showing how Pacific SIDS “enact” a 
unified Pacific region to forward political and conservation agendas. Here, enactment is a 
process “through which a particular version of the Pacific Region was strategically brought into 
existence” in this particular setting (2047). This performance of the region is an act of 
authoritative meaning-making through discursive statements; making meaning and defining 
areas of concern in global environmental governance, while contingent, is an iterative process 
that can lead to the solidification of political facts and guide policy decisions (Hajer 2009, 6). 
Gruby and Campbell argue that Pacific SIDS, along with certain NGOs and other organizations, 
reframe the Pacific as a “sea of islands” with a shared way of life and similar conservation and 
biodiversity goals (2013, 2047). This regional enactment creates a vast, networked, eco-social 
space and repositions SIDS – a term that emphasizes small size, “underdeveloped” status, and 
potential geographical isolation – as Large Ocean States (LOS) with significant marine territorial 
endowments and linked by oceanic connectivity. This enactment is consequential in that it 
enables Large Ocean States to reframe and make visible their importance to ocean management 
and conservation, translating it into increased power and influence in international negotiations 
and greater leverage in incorporating their interests into conservation agendas. 
 These papers demonstrate how examining the discourse at large international meetings 
provides a way to track changes in framing environmental governance problems and solutions, 
strategically making meaning and deploying concepts such as “scale,” “region,” and “blue 
economy” towards a range of political objectives. This is particularly useful when studying the 
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oceans context, as the oceans’ materialities (i.e., their opacity, volume, and relative 
inaccessibility) and territorialities (especially areas beyond national jurisdiction) require 
international cooperation in both acquiring and using environmental knowledge and managing 
environmental governance. They also show how these international meetings become sites of 
performance, where frameworks for ocean governance, development, and conservation come 
into being, expand, and cohere. Such meetings take place around many different issues and legal 
frameworks; the CBD, Rio+20, and the Ocean Conference are examples. My approach adds to 
this body of work by studying how discourse situates oceans in the larger project of sustainable 
development by reading marine resource-making through Foucault’s apparatus (dispositif). The 
negotiations at international meetings such as the Ocean Conference put this apparatus and its 
ongoing discursive construction on display. 
Examining the discursive dimensions of resource-making in a sustainable development 
context requires understanding how statements contribute to a discourse that both describes and 
constructs the legitimizing project of sustainable development and places oceans specifically 
therein. Foucault’s concept of the apparatus (dispositif) is a useful tool here, as it joins discursive 
and non-discursive aspects of the exercise of power. Foucault used the concept of the apparatus 
when theorizing relations of power that are relational, networked, and potentially productive in 
multiple ways rather than merely punitive or sovereign (see also Silva-Castañeda and Trussart 
2016). He describes an apparatus as “a thoroughly heterogeneous set consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as 
the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the network that can be 
established between these elements” (Foucault 1980, 194). The apparatus does have agency 
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through its networked co-creation through its elements; i.e., it is created and creates effects (Ziai 
2016, 21). Foucault (1980) adds that an apparatus “has as its major function at a given historical 
moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic 
function” (195). I suggest that sustainable development is an apparatus through in which these 
heterogeneous elements come together to shape relations of power and legitimize a range of 
objectives and projects as beneficial through the three primary lenses of social, environmental, 
and economic gains. It emerged in response to environmental crises, development project 
failures, and loss of legitimacy in development practice (McMichael 2017); these failures 
necessitated a reconfiguration of the apparatus. 
To understand the persistence of the sustainable development apparatus in spite of these 
failures, I turn to Arturo Escobar’s work on the creation of development and underdevelopment.  
Escobar (1988) traces how the exercise of power contributes to the production of development 
knowledge, and how such knowledge shapes and reinforces relations of power in the postwar 
development context (430). He argues that development discourse became a conduit for the 
exercise of power through development’s dual mechanisms of professionalization and 
institutionalization (430-1), and through the creation of a new development economics that 
prescribed a program of economic growth through industrialization (ibid.). This discourse of 
development, connected to institutions, laws, practices, and forms of expertise, described a set of 
norms based on Westernized, industrialized nations and economies. Deviations from this norm 
are a deficiency in need of improvement, and “underdeveloped” areas became nameable and 
describable objects for the first time (Escobar 1988; 1995). The remedy for the deficiency, or the 
means of improvement, is a path of development through modernization and industrialization 
offered by Western experts. Underdeveloped countries, as discursive objects, are “judged not 
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according to what they are but what they are supposed to become one day” according to these 
rules of formation (Ziai 2016, 42). But because, as objects, they are always already defined as the 
“other” that constitutes the norm, their assimilation into the norm must fail by definition (Ziai 
2016, see also Hall 1992). These development failures “give rise to new, modified attempts of 
problem-solving through making visible, incorporating and treating a new aspect of the object” 
(Ziai 2016, 42). By examining these rules of formation of development discourse, Escobar and 
Ziai illuminate a self-perpetuating and self-legitimating cycle: diagnosis of deficiency, expert-
prescribed development initiatives, failure to achieve the development promise, and a re-
formation of the object (under the same rules governing deficiency and improvement) allowing 
for a new diagnosis and a new development cycle (Ziai 2016, 44). The sustainable development 
apparatus perpetuates itself in a similar cycle, one in which the development promise is framed 
around the triple win of achieving mutually reinforcing social, environmental, and economic 
outcomes, especially economic growth. Where the nation-state was the site of development or 
underdevelopment in the postwar development era, the sustainable development apparatus 
expands the potential sites beyond the nation-state to include ecosystems and the biosphere as 
objects of improvement.   
The apparatus has been used to examine emerging forms of environmental governance. 
Laura Silva-Castañeda and Nathalie Trussart (2016) read shifting power relations in the creation 
of sustainability standards and certifications through the dispositif, showing how advocacy 
networks can both disrupt and stabilize the apparatus through creating new lines of power. Bruce 
Braun (2014) applies the concept to urban forms of government, which he interprets as managing 
and administering life in the city, showing through a series of vignettes the multiple forms of 
power that manage urban life and environments. Returning to the oceans context, I read the 
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Ocean Conference discussions around SDG 14 through the sustainable development apparatus, 
examining the discursive mechanisms that de- and re-stabilize this apparatus of heterogeneous 
elements that come together in order to more fully incorporate oceans into its sphere of 
influence.  
Analysis 
How, then, do UN Ocean Conference actors bring ocean resources into being through 
meeting discourse? I argue that these discourses of resource-making contribute to enrolling 
oceans into the sustainable development apparatus. Furthermore, this discursive enrollment of 
oceans also serves to stabilize and reconfigure the apparatus to support sustainable development 
as a dominant paradigm. Sustainable development, when understood as an apparatus that 
emerged in response to a crisis in development legitimacy, is a project of re-legitimation. 
Dimensions of this re-legitimation correspond to the dimensions of the crisis that prompted the 
assemblage of the apparatus: namely, development’s coloniality and its contributions to 
environmental degradation. Sustainable development, like “development” before it, must be 
legitimized as beneficial in ways that address its coloniality and environmental impacts in order 
to reproduce itself going forward through the cycle of development diagnoses and prescriptions. 
I suggest that resource-making discourses at the Ocean Conference contribute to this legitimating 
function, as ocean resources are discursively made – through SDG 14 – in ways that serve to 
stabilize the apparatus and the overall legitimacy of sustainable development as a mode of 
governance. I argue that the oceans and marine resources – as a new object and space of 





1. Performances of solidarity work show how discourse functions to destabilize and restabilize 
the apparatus. 
Understanding how Ocean Conference participants contribute discursively to resource-
making requires attention to the “who” of these processes: Who identifies, develops, and benefits 
from ocean resources? Who benefits and who suffers from existing distributions of 
environmental goods and harms? Who develops and who is developed? Examining Ocean 
Conference statements through this lens shows the different ways that participants conceptualize 
agency and responsibility in sustainable development of the oceans. Such statements can also 
show how different actors frame their relationships to each other and to the oceans.  
 I draw from my review of foundational documents such as UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS), Conference background documents, and Conference statements to theorize 
performances of “solidarity work” that both destabilize and shore up the sustainable development 
apparatus. Like sustainability, solidarity is a malleable term that does different kinds of 
discursive work in the development arena, with real effects. To begin with a basic definition, 
solidarity refers to “unity or agreement of feeling or action, especially among individuals with a 
common interest; mutual support within a group” (“Solidarity” 2020). Here, solidarity is distinct 
from agreement or consensus. A large and diverse range of sustainable development actors may 
produce and utilize forms of solidarity while furthering different agendas. A shared interest in 
sustainable development need not rule out the possibility of conflicting interests in its 
implementation. I argue that performances of “solidarity work” – that is, different mechanisms of 
building unity of feeling or action around and responsibility for the implementation of SDG 14 – 
do two things. First, they expand the set of objects of sustainable development to include the 
ocean and marine resources as in need of improvement. Second, through the mechanism of 
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“partnership” they incorporate difference in ways that strengthen and re-legitimize the 
sustainable development apparatus. However, they also reveal contestation within the apparatus, 
as ocean resources are part of struggles for equity and justice in development. These 
performances of solidarity work demonstrate how resources take shape discursively.  
Solidarity work: origins in UNCLOS and the development goals 
The notion of solidarity work has discursive antecedents in two streams of international 
governance that heavily influence Ocean Conference debates: UNCLOS and sustainable 
development. If the malleability of sustainable development as a concept is in part what gives it 
such appeal and influence, solidarity work, too – as reflected in the common heritage principle 
and in development discourses around the creation and implementation of the SDGs – has a 
malleability of its own, serving different purposes for different actors.  
Relative to other development goals, SDG 14 has a unique legal context. The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 27 is an international treaty that delineates 
and governs maritime activities beyond national jurisdictions (UN 1982). According to the text 
of SDG 14, UNCLOS “provides the legal framework for the conservation and sustainable use of 
ocean resources” and implies that the overarching goals of SDG 14 can be enhanced “by 
implementing international law as reflected in UNCLOS” (target 14C). Countries must work 
through this existing legal framework as they strive to implement SDG 14. This language also 
suggests that UNCLOS is an important enabling mechanism for oceans sustainable development 
and that it provides a framework for striking an appropriate balance between ocean resource 
exploitation and environmental protection, a coveted win-win in sustainable development. 
UNCLOS governs and promotes forms of marine resource exploitation, with the caveat that 
 
27Unless otherwise specified, all mentions of UNCLOS in this chapter refer to UNCLOS III (1982), negotiated 
between 1973 and 1982 and entered into force in 1994. 
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states’ rights to exploit resources are limited by their obligations “to protect and preserve the 
marine environment” (UN 1982, Art. 192-3). Since UNCLOS is the legal regime through which 
SDG 14 implementation must occur, I examine the role of UNCLOS in these two crises of 
development legitimacy.  
The discovery of polymetallic manganese nodules on the deep sea floor in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction provided an impetus to renegotiate the existing UNCLOS (II) treaty: some 
states, such as the USA, sought to legally prevent the rapid territorial enclosure of these seafloor 
resources, while others – both states and private corporations – wanted legal protections for their 
significant prospecting and mining investments (Steinberg 2001, 145-6). In 1967, Arvid Pardo of 
Malta proposed to the UN the creation of an international seabed governance regime that would 
treat seabed resources as “the common heritage of [hu]mankind” (ibid). UNCLOS does not 
specifically define the common heritage of humankind (Article 155, and hereafter referred to as 
the common heritage principle), although there have been many unofficial efforts to elucidate its 
meaning inductively (for examples, see Payoyo 1997, 166). It applies to the Area, or “the seabed 
and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” (UNCLOS Article 
1). The Area excludes resources in states’ exclusive economic zones, legally recognized 
territorial extensions of states’ continental shelves, and water column resources such as fisheries.  
The development of ocean governance institutions that take into account the common 
heritage principle is rooted in struggles over building a more just and equitable global order after 
post-WWII decolonization (McMichael 2017; Payoyo 1997). In 1974, soon after the beginning 
of UNCLOS III negotiations, Third World leaders in the G-77 presented to the UN General 
Assembly the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
(UN 1974), demanding respect for economic sovereignty and reform of a global economic 
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system that unfairly privileged global North states. In both the NIEO and UNCLOS, Third World 
leaders advocated for structures of finance and technological assistance that would facilitate 
development on their terms (McMichael 2017, 112-3).  
In the case of ocean resources, a relative lack of financial and technological resources put 
Third World states at a disadvantage in exploiting deep sea resources. UNCLOS was negotiated 
in the context of developing a regime for facilitating and regulating deep seabed mining, and two 
different conceptions of appropriate international control of the deep seabed emerged, following 
political positions of groups of developing and developed states. Developing states argued that 
the international deep sea mining regime should be more than “rules for an orderly gold rush in 
the frontier” (Payoyo 1997, 366). Drawing on the common heritage principle, they advocated 
social and distributive justice for oceans development in the interests of humanity, understood 
inter-generationally. The role of international institutions in the ocean, then, was to protect and 
preserve this common heritage in ways that especially consider the needs of developing states. In 
contrast, developed states with deep seabed mining interests favored international institutions 
that facilitated and encouraged deep seabed mining. In theory, the common heritage principle 
destabilizes this recalcitrant pattern of colonial relationships in international governance. In 
practice, these debates birthed an International Seabed Authority with a mandate to regulate deep 
sea mining with an eye toward environmental protection and greater distributive justice, but was 
undermined by developed states during the interim reciprocating states regime that eroded the 
force of the common heritage principle during the final spate of UNCLOS negotiations 
(Steinberg 2001, Zalik 2015b).  
The common heritage principle thus reflects mid-twentieth century struggles around 
decolonization and development; namely, that all countries, including developing and landlocked 
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countries, should have access to “frontier resources” in the seas, both in terms of their initial 
production (exploitation) and in the distribution of the profits derived therein. All nations should 
also be active and equal participants in decision-making around ocean floor resources and in 
drafting and creating this new legal regime of the seas (Payoyo 1997, 248). According to Susan 
Buck, the establishment of common heritage as a legal principle was “an assertion of 
[developing countries’] right to participate in exploitation and a moral claim to the development 
assistance needed for participation (Buck 1998, 29, qtd in Hannigan 2016, 66). Concerns over 
resource scarcity also influenced the push for the common heritage legal innovation: spurred by 
evidence of widespread overfishing, proponents of the common heritage principle argued that 
rapidly depleting ocean resources should be protected for future use and to aid in future 
development (Buck 1998 in Hannigan 2016, 66). Incidents of toxic waste dumping on the 
seafloor and ecological impacts of deep-sea mining operations further framed the Area, and the 
common heritage, as an “environment” to be protected (Payoyo 1997, 332).  Many aspects of the 
common heritage principle – its inter-generationality, its attempt to make economic development 
and environmental protection into unlikely bedfellows, and the participation from and influence 
of developing countries in its formulation – are shared with the sustainable development 
apparatus and inform the targets and implementation of SDG 14. Global power relations between 
South and North continue to shape sustainable development negotiation and practice and were a 
core criticism of the outgoing MDG framework.28  
 
28Regarding the negotiations of the Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction (also known as the BBNJ working group), legal scholar Dire Tladi noted a shift away from the common 
heritage principle toward benefit (revenue) sharing; common heritage is invoked in discussions, but does not appear 
in the legal documents themselves (Tladi 2017 in Nordquist et al. 2017; field observation). Sharing the benefits of 
resource exploitation in the Area is a redistributive program that may be seen as a pragmatic solution to 
development inequalities while still allowing for exploitation in spaces designated as common heritage; yet, benefit 
(revenue) sharing fails to capture the philosophical underpinnings of the common heritage principle, which in 
Tladi’s interpretation include solidarity, conservation, and preservation. A resolution to the quandary of “sustainable 
exploitation” is thus to exploit resources while redistributing revenues, a situation that many developing countries 
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 These features of the common heritage principle remain present – if not explicit – in the 
SDGs through the incorporation of UNCLOS into the text of goal 14 itself. Target 14.C, as 
described above, articulates UNCLOS as the mechanism through which to enhance ocean-related 
sustainable development, the metric of success being the “[n]umber of countries making progress 
in ratifying, accepting and implementing through legal, policy and institutional frameworks, 
ocean-related instruments that implement international law, as reflected in [UNCLOS]” (UN 
2017b).  
 The concept of solidarity as expressed in the common heritage principle emerged in the 
context of decolonization and is based on a notion of distributive justice, social equity, 
consideration of the special needs of developing states in both action and decision-making 
regarding the Area, and inter-generational concern. Solidarity took a rather different form in the 
Millennium Development Goals. The Millennium Declaration (UN 2000) identified six values 
necessary to international relations in the new century. Among them is solidarity: “Global 
challenges must be managed in a way that distributes the costs and burdens fairly in accordance 
with basic principles of equity and social justice. Those who suffer or who benefit least deserve 
help from those who benefit most” (ibid.). Here, solidarity is based on the equitable distribution 
of burdens; beneficiaries should extend a helping hand to those with greater burdens, but the 
concept lacks the call for systemic reform evoked in the common heritage principle. The concept 
of solidarity in the MDGs echoes the MDG platform of intervention, with the burden of 
development resting on the shoulders of developing countries with “help” from their more 
developed counterparts. This deepens the coloniality of the existing development project 
 
explicitly sought to avoid (Tladi 2017 in Nordquist et al. 2017). The widespread ratification of UNCLOS III did not 
settle debates over the meaning and implementation of common heritage as it applies to the Area. Instead, questions 
of global solidarity, distributive justice, the special needs of developing countries, and benefit sharing take new 
forms as technologies enable ever greater access to new ocean resources. 
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conception in which the global North offers solutions to the South’s development problems, 
occluding ways that the North itself is a creator of and primary contributor to social and 
environmental problems. 
In contrast, “solidarity” is mentioned three times in “The Future We Want,” the outcome 
document of the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD or Rio 
+20) (UN 2012). In two instances, “The Future We Want” expresses solidarity 
intergenerationally in the context of decision-making – recognizing the views of youth (point 
50), and cultivating intergenerational solidarity in the High-Level Political Forum as a 
mechanism for achieving sustainable development (point 86). In the third, solidary and 
cooperation are expressed in South-South cooperation, based in these countries’ “shared 
experiences and objectives” and fostered in promotion of the special needs of developing states 
(point 260). “The Future We Want” proposes a development agenda in which all countries and 
people are potential agents of development, emphasizing a shared global future. The document 
also encourages sustainable development done by the private sector (point 46) and the formation 
of public-private partnerships in development (point 71), positioning the private sector as a key 
stakeholder in sharing both responsibility and opportunity for the gains of sustainable 
development.  
Solidarity work at the Ocean Conference: constructing a global resource 
During my Ocean Conference observations, I noted a wide range of solidarity 
performances that fell along a spectrum of unity and differentiation. By unity, I mean invoking 
sets of concerns assumed to be globally shared. These might include shared risks of 
environmental harms, shared responsibility for environmental degradation, shared benefits of 
healthy oceans, and shared consideration for the health of future generations. Making such 
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unifying claims allowed actors to position their contributions as having global relevance. At the 
other end of the spectrum are statements that highlight differentiation among actors and 
foreground problems of distributive justice and the lack of equity in sustainable development. 
These include acknowledgements that all people do not bear equal responsibility for 
environmental and oceanic degradation, that the distribution of development’s perceived benefits 
is highly uneven, and that worsening ocean health has disproportionate impacts on developing 
coastal and island states.  
 At one pole of this spectrum, I identified a “spaceship earth” narrative (Boulding 1971). 
This narrative unifies nations and peoples both spatially and generationally. Framed at global 
scale and focused on universally (or at least generally undifferentiated) shared benefits that 
oceans provide, and shared risks or harms of ocean degradation, this narrative suggests that 
oceans are vital for humanity’s collective survival because of all the ecosystem services they 
provide. If the global community allows the degradation of the oceans to continue, it will destroy 
the planet to its collective detriment. This narrative resonates strongly with a sustainable 
development apparatus that stresses global collective engagement and action toward “sustainable 
development” as a way forward to achieve triple win outcomes.  
When analyzing the data, I identified and then tracked different dimensions of the 
spaceship earth narrative with topic coding for: shared benefits of healthy oceans, shared risks 
and harms of ocean degradation, statements expressing universal responsibility for ocean action, 
and narrative devices suggesting a shared situation or fate across spaces and scales. A global 
scalar construction of the ocean contributed to exhortations of shared responsibility for enrolling 
oceans in sustainable development. An emphasis on both shared benefits of healthy oceans and 
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shared harms from ocean degradation prompted a shared need for global action. In other words, 
everyone has a role to play in facilitating ocean integration into the 2030 Agenda.  
 First, an acknowledgement of the shared global benefits of healthy oceans is linked to a 
call to action to enact sustainable development. Nearly every statement in the official 
proceedings – from official government, private sector, and non-governmental organization 
speakers – made some mention of the many benefits that the oceans provide: storing atmospheric 
carbon dioxide that contributes to climate change; a source of oxygen; an important food source, 
especially for coastal communities; a source of livelihoods for millions of people, in areas such 
as fisheries and tourism; a driver of economic growth and development at the local and national 
scales; a source of biodiversity; a surface of connectivity, transportation, and regional 
integration; and a vital cultural heritage.  
Most statements establish the importance of the ocean to life on earth and to the 
achievement of the other sustainable development goals; this framing of shared benefit is an 
exhortation to shared responsibility for enrolling oceans in sustainable development. According 
to a delegate from the Marshall Islands: 
 “The United Nations…remains a primary pathway to forge stronger connections 
between nations, and this is needed to integrate oceans into the wider sustainable 
development framework. The world's oceans are a truly common resource with no 
borders, and individual nations cannot stand divided or alone” (John Silk, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Plenary 3).  
 
This scalar framing prescribes universal enrollment in sustainable development activities. 
Additionally, any particular step toward sustainable development has the potential to benefit the 
whole. As the Palestinian representative stated of SDG 14 implementation:  
“… any progress that we might make would, for one, mean progress for someone else. So 
this will have a positive impact on all SDGs. So this meeting helps us, will help us 
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prevent and reduce the effects and repercussions of negative phenomena on seas and 
oceans (Plenary 6)29.  
 
 This narrative also highlights the shared harms of ocean degradation, from the depletion 
of marine resources and livelihood opportunities to existential threats such as sea level rise. 
Landlocked states shared these concerns. The Kazakh delegation said:  
“Oceans and seas are paramount to human survival and development, being the primary 
regulator of the global climate and an important sink for greenhouse gases. Their 
unsustainable use negatively affects food security, livelihoods and aggravates the impact 
of climate change, including desertification, all over our planet. Achieving SDG 14 is 
therefore vital and the involvement of all stakeholders including landlocked countries in 
its implementation is important” (Yerzhan Ashikbayev, Vice Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Kazakhstan, Plenary 3).  
 
Both benefits and harms are mobilized as a call toward shared responsibility for enrolling oceans 
in sustainable development.  
 Finally, the majority of Ocean Conference participants expressed the spatial and temporal 
solidarity embodied in the common heritage principle, especially in the official fora. In 
particular, my analysis revealed an emphasis on the imperative to act for the sake of future 
generations, echoing both the common heritage principle and the Brundtland definition of 
sustainable development (UN 1987). Such statements position the ocean as an object of 
development and resource-making both now and in the future. Through very broad participation, 
Ocean Conferences participants created a discursive field where environmental risks, benefits, 
and responsibilities are broadly shared, both spatially and temporally. The global ocean emerges 
as an object of concern in need of improvement, through a wide range of prescriptions under the 
sustainable development umbrella. Not only is the ocean a development object, but it becomes 
the means through which to achieve other sustainable development objectives. The ocean, and its 
resources, become visible as development targets through this discursive construction of shared 
 
29The speaker’s name was not announced in session. 
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risk and responsibility. But this sense of shared connection does not indicate consensus in 
development action. In the next section, I show how the performance of partnership, another 
form of solidarity work, functions to smooth differences and incorporate dissent into the 
sustainable development apparatus. 
Solidarity work: Partnership 
Within the sustainable development apparatus, “partnership” has become an important 
development mechanism. As the period of the MDGs neared its end, the UN assembled a High-
Level Panel of Eminent Persons to make recommendations for setting the post-2015 
development agenda. They proposed as a central development tenet to “forge a new global 
partnership” that is based on principles of “universality, equity, sustainability, solidarity, human 
rights, the right to development and responsibilities shared in accordance with capabilities. The 
partnership should capture, and will depend on, a spirit of mutual respect and mutual benefit” 
(UN 2013, 9). The shared benefits, risks, and responsibilities of living together on Earth 
necessitate a partnership-based approach:  
“People and countries understand that their fates are linked together. What happens in 
one part of the world can affect us all. Some issues can only be tackled by acting 
together. Countries have resources, expertise or technology that, if shared, can result in 
mutual benefit. Working together is not just a moral obligation to help those less 
fortunate but is an investment in the long-term prosperity of all” (UN 2013, 10).  
 
Partnership emerges as both a form of solidarity work and as a mechanism for sustainable 
development implementation, codified as SDG 17: “Strengthen the means of implementation and 
revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development” (UN 2015b), with specific targets 
related to development finance, technology, capacity-building, trade, and systemic issues relating 
to policy and institutional coherence.  
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 Partnerships as a UN development strategy between states and with non-state actors 
precede the 2030 Agenda. Global South countries have long criticized the neocolonial structure 
of official development assistance and other forms of development aid, arguing that such aid 
imposes visions and conditions favorable to global North entities and advances the interests of 
developed states and international financial institutions within the global South. By the 1990s, 
two decades of structural adjustment had strangled nationally-led development efforts in 
developing countries, with international financial institutions and donor countries imposing 
lending conditionalities that failed to decrease debt or promote economic growth in recipient 
countries, while mandating austerities that gutted local economic competitiveness and social 
safety nets (McMichael 2017).30  
Reconceptualizing the development aid relationship as one of “partnership” was an 
attempt to shift the power differential between donors and recipients, positioning each as partners 
in a relationship where aid recipients exercise greater determination and “ownership” in 
development strategies and their execution (Abrahamsen 2004, 1453). Donor countries and 
agencies reframed their interventions as partnerships in response both to the lack of effectiveness 
of their existing interventions and to charges of exercising excessive and harmful influence. 
Partnerships, and the promotion of developing country ownership within these partnerships, was 
a strategy “of overcoming the weaknesses of previous development models, while at the same 
time returning power and decision-making to recipient countries” (ibid., 1455). While 
proponents see this as a positive development that promotes greater respect and equity between 
development actors, critics of development partnerships argue that they repackage and obscure 
 
30The oceans context provides an interesting counterpoint, as global South countries mobilized to use the UN 
international governance structure for decolonial aims through UNCLOS III negotiations; namely, the territorial 
expansion of coastal states’ economic sovereignty through the establishment of exclusive economic zones and the 
establishment of the deep sea mining regime under the common heritage principle. 
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power asymmetries without meaningfully addressing them; they are a mere rebranding (ibid. 
1456; also Fowler 2000). In terms of the development discourse discussed above, the failure of 
structural adjustment and loan conditionalities led to the diagnosis of a new deficit and the new 
prescription of promoting development ownership through partnership.  
 These development failures are characteristic of shifts in state-market relations in the era 
of neoliberalism (Harvey 2007), with its focus on service privatization, reduction of trade 
barriers, attracting foreign direct investment, and reliance on “free” market enterprise to promote 
economic growth to the (assumed and eventual) benefit of all (McMichael 2017). In this context, 
integrating private enterprise into development partnerships is a “pragmatic turn” that its 
proponents argue can ameliorate the shortcomings of both the state and the market: promoting 
good governance and corporate social responsibility in a partnership context could correct some 
of the damaging impacts of neoliberalization, while efficient businesses make up for state 
shortfalls in regulating and providing essential services (Utting and Zammit 2009). Secretary-
General Kofi Annan prioritized UN-business partnerships as he guided the organization into the 
twenty-first century, and business partners began collaborating with UN agencies in areas such 
as advocacy support, providing technical know-how, promoting investment in new markets, and 
fundraising for development activities (Ruchat 2000, 2-3). Business partnerships grew in 
prominence through the creation of the UN Fund for International Partnerships, the UNDP's 
Global Sustainable Development Facility, and the UN Global Compact (Park and Jun 2016, 38). 
Utting and Zammit (2009) argue that, in many development circles, partnership is idealized and 
“has become a mobilizing term, implying that all manner of desirable objectives can be achieved 
through collaboration between the UN and the private sector” (40). Viewed from a neo-
Gramscian perspective, public-private partnerships (PPPs) are a strategy for corporations to 
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secure hegemony in global governance by incorporating and accommodating dissenting 
perspectives (Gramsci 1971; Park and Jun 2016; Utting and Zammit 2009). Corporate social 
responsibility and participation are two examples of such accommodations, through which 
businesses solidify both their own legitimacy as development actors and the legitimacy of global 
capitalism as a development mechanism (ibid.).  
The 2030 Agenda continues to prioritize partnerships while expanding the number and 
types of relevant actors to include national governments, local authorities, international 
organizations, civil society, philanthropic organizations, and people, in addition to businesses 
(UN 2013, 10). Creating and renewing sustainable development partnerships was both an Ocean 
Conference theme and a key outcome (UN 2017a). The Conference background note provided 
guidance for participating in partnership dialogues, noting that partnerships should address 
existing SDG 14 targets and indicators and could address global or sector-specific concerns. One 
function of the partnership dialogue process was to identify gaps in partnership coverage: which 
geographical areas, ocean basins, or SDG 14 targets were underrepresented and required 
additional partnerships to achieve greater and more even coverage? The Secretary-General noted, 
for example, that voluntary submissions to the background note included over 70 partnerships 
related to the blue economy and blue growth, and none related to ending harmful fisheries 
subsidies. Partnerships, then, are a mechanism that position oceans as an object of sustainable 
development that all stakeholders must cooperate and work together to actively “cover,” both in 
terms of geography and issue of focus.  
The emphasis on partnerships is reflected in a series of seven partnership dialogues, 
“interactive and multi-stakeholder in nature and [focused] on recommendations to support the 
implementation of Goal 14, including through strengthened cooperation, building on existing 
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successful partnerships and stimulating innovative and concrete new ones” (UN 2016b). 
Secretary-General António Guterres prepared a background note to the conference outlining key 
issues and proposing themes for seven partnership dialogues for consideration at a preparatory 
meeting held February 15-16, 2017, in New York. The Ocean Conference partnership dialogues 
addressed each of the ten SDG 14 targets (UN 2016a) (see Table 1). The background note also 
framed oceans sustainable development around a nexus of science, norms, and institutions that 
must converge to facilitate sustainable development as defined in the goal’s ten development 
targets. 
TABLE 2: Ocean Conference Partnership Dialogues 
UN Ocean Conference 
partnership dialogue 
topics 
Corresponding targets of SDG 14 Examples of proposed 
areas for new 
partnerships31 
1. Addressing marine 
pollution 
14.1: By 2025, prevent and 
significantly reduce marine pollution 
of all kinds, in particular from land-
based activities, including marine 
debris and nutrient pollution  
- PPPs to raise awareness of 
marine pollution to 
industry, consumers, others, 
especially plastics and 
microplastics 
- improving port 
sustainability and 
sustainable marine transport 
2. Managing, 
protecting, conserving 
and restoring marine 
and coastal ecosystems 
14.2: By 2020, sustainably manage 
and protect marine and coastal 
ecosystems to avoid significant 
adverse impacts, including by 
strengthening their resilience, and 
take action for their restoration in 
order to achieve healthy and 
productive oceans  
14.5: By 2020, conserve at least 10 
per cent of coastal and marine areas, 
consistent with national and 
international law and based on the 
best available scientific information  
- capacity building and 
technical assistance to 
support area-based resource 
management 
- coordinating and 
managing different scales of 
projects 
- sustainable financing for 
marine protected areas 
 
31These examples are found in the concept papers developed for each Partnership Dialogue. 
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3. Minimizing and 
addressing ocean 
acidification (OA) 
14.3: Minimize and address the 
impacts of ocean acidification, 
including through enhanced scientific 
cooperation at all levels  
- conduct research on ocean 
acidification that aids 
communities with resilience 
and adaptation 
- strengthen observation, 
monitoring, and data 
sharing related to OA 
- assess social, economic, 
and environmental impacts 
of OA and translate into 
effective programs and 
policymaking 
4. Making fisheries 
sustainable 
14.4: By 2020, effectively regulate 
harvesting and end overfishing, 
illegal, unreported and unregulated 
fishing and destructive fishing 
practices and implement science-
based management plans, in order to 
restore fish stocks in the shortest time 
feasible, at least to levels that can 
produce maximum sustainable yield 
as determined by their biological 
characteristics  
14.6: By 2020, prohibit certain forms 
of fisheries subsidies which 
contribute to overcapacity and 
overfishing, eliminate subsidies that 
contribute to illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing and refrain from 
introducing new such subsidies, 
recognizing that appropriate and 
effective special and differential 
treatment for developing and least 
developed countries should be an 
integral part of the World Trade 
Organization fisheries subsidies 
negotiation . 
- support the capacity of 
fisheries resource users to 
participate in fisheries 
governance 
- achieving certification 
standards 
- gather data on fisheries 
subsidies and generate 
reforms 
5. Increasing 
economic benefits to 
SIDS and LDCs and 
providing access for 
small-scale artisanal 
fishers to marine 
resources and markets 
14.7: By 2030, increase the economic 
benefits to Small Island developing 
States and least developed countries 
from the sustainable use of marine 
resources, including through 
sustainable management of fisheries, 
aquaculture and tourism. 
- coordinating governance 
and policy frameworks on 
small-scale fisheries and 
underwater cultural heritage 
- generate data on SIDS’ 





14.B: Provide access for small-scale 
artisanal fishers to marine resources 
and markets 
- capacity development 
partnerships in fishing 
communities   
6. Increasing scientific 
knowledge and 
developing research 
capacity and transfer 
of marine technology 
14.A: Increase scientific knowledge, 
develop research capacity and 
transfer marine technology, taking 
into account the Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission Criteria 
and Guidelines on the Transfer of 
Marine Technology, in order to 
improve ocean health and to enhance 
the contribution of marine 
biodiversity to the development of 
developing countries, in particular 
small island developing States and 
least developed countries. 
- capacity building in 
marine scientific research 
and technology transfer 
- IOC’s Decade of Ocean 
Science for Sustainable 
Development 
- a Pacific Ocean Research 
Alliance 




international law as 
reflected in UNCLOS 
14.C: Enhance the conservation and 
sustainable use of oceans and their 
resources by implementing 
international law as reflected in 
UNCLOS, which provides the legal 
framework for the conservation and 
sustainable use of oceans and their 
resources, as recalled in paragraph 
158 of The Future We Want. 
- partnerships to raise 
awareness and promote 
implementation and 
enforcement of UNCLOS 
and associated agreements 
- promote regional 
management of oceans and 
resources through regional 
seas organizations 
 
Amidst the prevalence of these unifying messages that urged global sustainable 
development action and responsibility, states and other parties took opportunities to differentiate 
their concerns and raise the shortcomings of development in fostering global equity and 
distributive justice. Debates over the operationalization of the common heritage principle and 
sustainable development continue to reflect political and ideological differences between blocs 
of global South and global North countries, including within the sustainable development 
apparatus. I noticed that longstanding criticisms of coloniality and inequality in development 
carried through into the Ocean Conference. Calls for equity and greater distributive justice 
potentially destabilize this discursive apparatus by questioning development legitimacy, but tend 
to be reincorporated and depoliticized through the mechanism of “partnership,” showing the 
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power of the discursive work of the apparatus. Through partnerships, differentiated claims are 
refolded into the unified, spaceship earth narrative of the apparatus.  
At the Ocean Conference, I observed that many actors stressed structural inequality in 
their statements of solidarity work: although everyone may be connected to and affected by 
oceans in some way, these effects are experienced very differently based on social location and 
historical and contemporary inequalities, furthering a long-standing critique of development 
(McMichael 2017). The SIDS in particular pushed global oceans onto the sustainable 
development agenda, noting the disproportionate impacts that islanders must shoulder despite 
their relatively low contributions to climate change, oceanic pollution, and marine resource 
depletion. For example, the Marshall Islands noted that many Pacific states:  
“struggle with the legacy of historical events which we did not cause. The widespread 
presence of shipwrecks, unexploded ordnance and radioactive contamination from the 
World War II and Cold War eras have polluted our coastal waters and the ability to 
address them fully well outstrips our limited resources and capacity. …A focused and 
outcome-driven international engagement is well overdue” (Mike Halferty, Minister for 
Transport and Communications, Marshall Islands, Dialogue 1).  
 
Representatives of SIDS, LDCs, and LLDCs advocated for their unique concerns in 
ocean conservation and development, e.g., policing and enforcing laws in exclusive economic 
zones, which can be difficult for SIDS to monitor, lack of infrastructure and high costs of project 
implementation, economic dependence on fisheries and tourism sectors, needs for institutional 
capacity building, and barriers to securing finance and to acquiring and implementing new 
technologies that would facilitate SDG 14 implementation. Enthusiasm for the blue economy is 
tempered by wariness:  
“the overriding understanding among the LDCs is that they are being treated rather 
unfairly so long as the question of an equitable world value and market chain is 
concerned.  Also, global investment and trading regimes are still far from being 
conducive for them to embark an ecologically sustainable growth trajectory. We 
apprehend that the Blue Economy would not be very far from this generalization” (Md. 
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Khurshed Alam, Secretary, Maritime Affairs Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Bangladesh, Plenary 4).  
 
Non-governmental organizations and community groups also advocated for the rights of groups 
often marginalized by mainstream governance processes, such as Indigenous peoples, local 
fishing communities, women’s groups, and children and youth.  
 Such statements highlight “that for the last 30 years, it has been the case that every 
measure of equity that has credibility shows the inequitability of the distribution of wealth on the 
planet has increased on global, regional, and sub-regional levels” (Jake Rice, Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada, Dialogue 2). Since the announcement of the NIEO in 1974, “developing” 
countries have used the UN “as a platform to launch demands for redistribution, justice and 
economic intervention in the name of development” (Ziai 2016, 78; emphasis original), rejecting 
the imperialism and trusteeship of international development but maintaining an emphasis on the 
necessity of development itself. The UN system has posited many strategies for creating more 
equitable and self-determining forms of development, including the idea of partnership. 
These different forms of solidarity work motivate calls for partnership and resource 
allocation at different scales and are invoked to justify, motivate, and encourage a range 
partnerships and projects as a way to bridge universalized and differentiated concerns. 
Intergenerational solidarity, one of the most frequently used forms of solidarity work, appeared 
in conjunction with both unifying and differentiating discourses and also speaks to the common 
heritage principle. Common heritage upholds distributive justice for oceans development in the 
interests of humanity, understood inter-generationally. The role of international institutions in the 
ocean, then, was to protect and preserve this common heritage in ways that especially consider 
the needs of developing states like SIDS, LDCs, and LLDCs. The solidarity work performed at 
the UN Ocean Conference is reflected in the heterogeneity of discussions of solidarity and 
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partnership that fluctuate between these two poles: a universal framing of benefits and risks, and 
a differentiated framing of variably distributed benefits and risks.  
In this context, partnerships function to promote win-win outcomes and have the power 
to incorporate dissenting perspectives. Finding the “right” partnerships that adequately cover the 
ocean and its resources is the prescribed means of global ocean improvement. This broad 
application of partnership stretches the range of actors called upon to make such improvements 
and, in keeping with the 2030 Agenda, positions global North actors and states as in need of 
improvement vis a vis the ocean. At the Ocean Conference, a dominant narrative emerged in my 
analysis that the shortcomings of sustainable development – in particular the ongoing power 
differentials between North and South – can be resolved by finding the appropriate kind and 
number of partnerships. Partnership, therefore, is a mechanism for accommodating potentially 
destabilizing ideas that question the legitimacy of the sustainable development apparatus; it has 
an effect of restabilizing and enfolding more actors, sustainable development concerns and 
geographical ocean spaces into the sustainable development purview.  
Solidarity work: Partnerships and the private sector 
One example of this kind of incorporation involves discussions of the role of the private 
sector in sustainable development of the oceans. In the official plenary sessions and partnership 
dialogues, statements from government representatives, intergovernmental organizations, and 
some NGOs largely supported increased private sector involvement for SDG implementation.  
The World Ocean Council, “the global ocean industry leadership alliance” with over 
34,000 stakeholders, noted the UN System’s growing recognition of its activities, reflected 
through an official sustainability partnership with the International Oceanographic Commission. 
Business associations like the WOC have a history of providing private sector actors with access 
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to intergovernmental negotiations (Pulver 2002). The WOC also offered the use of private sector 
marine infrastructure for the collection of oceanic data, serving as a “broker” between 
businesses, scientific institutions, and government agencies to enhance global data collection 
capacities. According to the WOC, this partnership brings twin benefits: increased knowledge to 
better understand global oceanic processes, and economic growth through the blue economy. 
Such a partnership: 
“is also importantly creating business opportunities, driving innovation, and improving 
efficiency of sensors and other technology and instrumentation that contributes to the 
blue economy and employment opportunities for all countries to get involved in this sort 
of partnership” (World Ocean Council, Dialogue 6).  
 
In the SDG 14 implementation, the private sector actors position themselves as a necessary 
bridge between sectors that can facilitate this translation of ocean science into economic growth. 
This narrative also connects to discourses of unification, noting the global benefit of oceanic 
observations and the global opportunities for different governments and actors to take advantage 
of such partnerships. 
I observed that both sector and government participants emphasized different risks and 
opportunities for sustainable development investment in informal side events, repeatedly arguing 
that private finance is vital to the entire UN Agenda 2030:  
“The scale of investment required across the whole 2030 agenda exceeds the capacities of 
any government. It’s all about the private sector. For the first time in UN history, we’ve 
had a recognition of that. …It means when we speak about investment, we are speaking 
about the private sector, and therefore we have to think about what is required for private 
investment” (Capitalizing Investments in SDG14 side event).  
 
These actors argue that implementing SDG 14 requires creating an enabling business 
environment that would encourage private capital investment in marine resource development.  
Financial support must sustain development (and itself) into the medium and long term 
for SDG 14 to be successfully implemented. Private sector actors stressed the different sets of 
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risks involved in oceans investments. Several financiers highlighted the difficulty of mobilizing 
private capital for ocean conservation projects (Financing Ocean Sustainable Development side 
event). In side events on financing sustainable development, private sector participants described 
oceans as both risk and opportunity. First, oceans degradation poses a risk to potential gains 
available through blue economy investment. Environmental degradation, rather than being seen 
as a business externality, is a business risk: “This degradation, therefore, constitutes, at its 
foundation, a business risk, an investment risk. It undermines the very basis for private 
investment in marine ecosystems” (Capitalizing Investments in SDG14 side event). Conservation 
becomes integrated into the sustainable development business model not for its own sake, but for 
the strength and longevity of the business itself. Sustainable development is reconceptualized as 
a business practice: conservation is not one of many activities, or an activity distinct from a 
company’s main operations, but for businesses is “a new way of interacting with the 
environment so the need for conservation decreases over time” (ibid.).  
At side events, I learned that the marine sector is perceived to be a high-risk environment 
for investment; this assessment of financial risk shapes how private sector actors (especially 
investors) participate in the sustainable development apparatus. Participants from the financial 
and business sectors weighed short versus long term investments, emphasizing the importance of 
long term financial returns in sustainable development. In discussions, the potential for long term 
returns seemed more uncertain in the marine sectors. Investments in “sustainable development 
pathways” require attention to environmental pressures that could jeopardize returns. Investors 
framed short term gain as a threat to long term success. (This risk calculus mirrors algae sector 
firms that must internalize the costs of improving environmental measures in production due to 
the firms’ vertically integrated structure.) One financier advocated for a more integrated system 
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to match different marine sustainable development projects with the appropriate financial 
mechanism; appropriateness refers to a match of acceptable risk levels between project and 
investor (Capitalizing Investments in SDG 14 side event). Many private sector actors also view 
private capital as a key instrument to bring about oceans sustainable development in the long 
term, and to leverage the sustainable development platform to drive systemic change. Systemic 
change will come through technological innovation, financed by a range of investors outside of 
large banks who are willing to assume the large risks involved in bringing new marine 
technologies to market. Forming the right partnerships, or matching the right capital to the right 
business, will drive the innovation required for the blue economy, with larger banks moving in to 
scale up proven operations (ibid.). This is a clear example of discursively enrolling oceans into 
the sustainable development apparatus: private sector investments fund capital-intensive projects, 
using a discourse that reinforces an ongoing need for such investments to bring improvement to 
coastal communities and marine spaces by investing in this resource frontier. 
 Sustainability of finance is approached from a number of angles by private sector and 
government actors within various side events. Investors at the Conference consider sustainable 
development to be an emerging investment platform that could capture potential economic value 
in marine resources. Part of this narrative involved a mainstreaming of sustainability into 
business practices, including the suggestion that “conservation” as an activity or project agenda 
is not a separate activity from investment and economic growth, using a conception of 
sustainability that neatly holds these things together. The oxymoron of sustainable development 
– that ongoing (capitalist) economic growth coupled with (or perhaps even through) 
environmental protection presents a contradiction in terms (Redclift 2005) – came under 
challenge at private-sector focused side events. This separation of activities – e.g., conservation 
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as distinct from business development, sustainability as a lower-priority side issue for business 
investors – is a barrier to achieving sustainable development. The economic rationale that 
underpins sustainable development discourse allows business imperatives to merge with 
ecological ones. In addressing a side event on the ocean business community directed at current 
and potential investors, one speaker noted that 20 years ago, sustainability was an afterthought to 
business strategies, whereas now it is being more fully incorporated into business models: 
“More sustainability isn’t something you do for conservation reasons, but for good, solid, 
hard-nosed business reasons. [It has to do with the] ability to generate a profit to preserve 
the reputation of your product, to continue to do what you have been doing. This applies 
to every one of you. We’re not talking about activities aimed at conserving and protecting 
as if they were some kind of different kind of activities. It’s a new way of interacting with 
the environment so the need for conservation decreases over time” (Ocean Business 
Community side event).  
 
Incorporating sustainability is also about sustaining brand reputation and profit-making 
capabilities, implying that joining environmental and business imperatives will contribute to 
longer term financial success. This, however, is not a foregone conclusion. Many investors 
express concern over the challenges of investing in large, capital-intensive projects in the marine 
sectors, even to the point of cautioning that the economic dimensions of sustainable development 
not be underemphasized at the expense of the other two pillars. As one investor noted: “For me, 
it’s about not just sustaining environmental and social initiatives, but making sure the companies 
can sustain themselves. Sustainability means putting together companies that can sustain 
themselves” (Financing Oceans Sustainable Development side event). A common strategy is to 
extend investments into oceans sustainable development based on lessons learned from terrestrial 
project portfolios: setting measurable social and environmental development goals, and 
designing projects that yield economic returns at different phases of the investment cycle. 
Oceans are sold as a unique area of investment, with “inputs subsidized by nature” (Financing 
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Ocean Sustainability side event). Key openings for capital include scaling up smaller 
development projects so that they provide a profitable return and, as the logic goes, scale up the 
development gains.  
These examples of business partnerships demonstrate two things. First, they confirm the 
shift toward neoliberalization as a sustainable development strategy, showing evidence of how 
the sustainable development apparatus successfully responds to critique. Sustainable 
development’s earliest iterations criticized development models that prioritized economic growth 
and industrialization at the expense of ecological and human health. Reid (2013) argues that 
neoliberalism appropriated this original critique and incorporated ecological concern into its 
economic rationale. The result is that economic rationalities now strongly inform environmental 
governance, with economic reason “claiming paradoxically to secure life from economy through 
a promotion of the capacities of life for economy” (108; emphasis added). These partnerships 
“reconceptualize[e] the ecological crises as an opportunity for innovation and reinvention of the 
capitalist system” (Oels 2005, citing Hajer 1995), proposing market-based solutions and using 
economic rationalities to determine an acceptable level of environmental harm according to cost-
benefit analysis (Oels 2005, 201). Second, through the longer history of public-private 
partnerships described above, private sector actors have long joined governments and civil 
society organizations as agents of development and improvement. Now, private sector actors 
frame business enterprise itself as that which must also be sustained through sustainable 
development. In a perverse twist from the concept’s more critical origins, business and capital 






Scientific knowledge and resource-making 
The second discursive dimension is that defining ways of knowing the ocean render it 
legible to resource-making for sustainable development. I begin with a discussion of the 
historical context of science in oceans development, so as to frame how discussions of knowing 
the oceans through science factor into the Ocean Conference. I then discuss how meeting actors 
frame the importance of ocean knowledge relative to the sustainable development apparatus, 
focusing on the relationship between science and policy.  
 I focus on knowing the oceans and its resources through technoscientific practice, the 
predominant form a knowledge in the sustainable development apparatus. In sustainable 
development discourse, modern science is a mechanism for the achievement of the triple win, 
ideas that are rooted in colonial science and pre- and post-WWII ecological thinking and 
practice. Developments in the science of ecology and ideas about environmental conservation  
profoundly influenced the merging of environmental concern with economic development and 
attention to human wellbeing as related programs of action that eventually became sustainable 
development’s three pillars. Ecologists suggested that ecosystems tended toward stable 
equilibrium, able to regain balance after some form of ecological disturbance. Human activity 
could upset this balance, but scientists could utilize their ecological knowledge to restore it. In 
seeing environmental systems as complex machines, Adams (2009) argues that one 
development-related potential of ecology lay in its ability to “generate technocratic recipes for 
managing nature” and “[provide] a powerful script for the emerging dialogue between 
environmental protection and economic development” (42). 
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Ecology and its applications spread to the colonies. Botanical surveys were used to define 
regions for agriculture and forestry (ibid., 44), demonstrating how ecological data became 
valuable for the colonial planning of agricultural production.  After the second world war, 
ecology became “a model for the practice of development itself” (ibid., 45; emphasis original), 
with scientists ever more integral to environmental governance. Development sought to leverage 
ecological knowledge to maintain a balance of nature that would allow for both present and 
future natural resource exploitation (ibid.).  In the post-WWII era, scientific knowledge 
rationalized environmental management in development practice because of the ability to 
leverage science to control the environment (Murphy 1994 in Adams 2009, 46). Conversely, 
scientists were tasked with mobilizing ecological knowledge to stave off the negative 
environmental impacts of an emerging development industry focused on rapid economic growth 
(ibid., 49). By the time of the Brundtland Report (UN 1987), sustainable development emerged 
as a form of technocratic and technoscientific management of the Earth and its systems: 
“Whether it is the Earth as a whole, its industrial or agricultural systems, its climate, water, or 
population, what is at stake for these groups of scientists and businessmen – all of them men – is 
the continuation of the models of growth and development through appropriate management 
strategies” (Escobar 1995, 193).   
This reliance on technology is especially salient in the oceans. The techno-scientific 
knowledge needed for marine development and resource extraction is heavily mediated by 
capital-intensive research processes and advanced technologies (Benson et al. 2004; 
Rozwadowski 2010; Zalik 2018). These technologies and the data-gathering they enable are 
becoming more available to a wider range of actors, but this access is partial and uneven. 
Sustainable development, as articulated in the 2030 Agenda, requires comprehensive data for 
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Sustainable Development Goal measurement and monitoring (Elgert 2009, UN 2015a). The 2030 
Agenda stresses the importance of science in optimizing development to balance environmental, 
social, and economic priorities. Science and technology, therefore, are key tools for the 
reproduction and stabilization of the apparatus. The UNCSD (UN 2012) Secretariat paid 
particular attention to the role of science and technology in promoting and advancing sustainable 
development. These solutions reflect sustainable development narratives that posit technological 
advancements as a means to increase ecosystem (and the Earth’s) carrying capacity (Dryzek 
2013), where greater quantity and quality of knowledge leads to better management and the 
optimization of the triple win.  
More knowledge yields better sustainable development 
Scientific practice also performs a kind of solidarity work, especially when conducted for 
global benefit or when positioned as apolitical. Fostering this global benefit requires more 
knowledge and comprehensive coverage of the oceans and their dynamics. Ocean Conference 
preparatory documents and Conference statements frequently cite that, although the international 
scientific community continues to gain knowledge of ocean processes, gaps in existing 
knowledge gaps remain a barrier to “effective” sustainable development (UN 2017a). In the 
background note for the Ocean Conference, UN Secretary-General António Guterres articulates a 
need to fill knowledge gaps related to each of the SDG 14 targets, with special emphasis on 
knowledge acquisition, distribution, and technology transfer in target 14.A (ibid.). The note 
identifies gaps in capacity to implement new technologies (such as wastewater treatment, waste 
management, and hazardous substance remediation), especially in developing countries that may 
not be able to afford these technologies (target 14.1). In some cases, there is no clear process to 
address knowledge gaps that would yield actionable management advice, revealing a need for 
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more systematic knowledge management (target 14.2). Reducing overfishing and IUU fishing is 
complicated by lack of data collection, monitoring capacity, and insufficient science-based 
management (target 14.4). The note acknowledges that “scientific understanding is essential to 
forecast, mitigate and guide the adaptation of societies to the ways oceans affect human lives and 
infrastructures at different spatial and temporal scales” (ibid., 12). Despite efforts to build the 
infrastructure and institutions necessary for cultivating this understanding, “our understanding of 
the current processes is not keeping up with the pace of changes in the oceans. There is a need to 
better understand ecosystem processes and functions and their implications for ecosystem 
conservation and restoration, ecological limits, tipping points, socio-ecological resilience and 
ecosystem services” (ibid., 12). Here, collective understanding of the cumulative impacts of 
human activity on biodiversity and ocean productivity is insufficient to inform political and 
economic decision-making. According to the background note, significant knowledge gaps exist 
in nearly all areas covered by SDG 14: integrated coastal zone management, marine resource 
diversity, pollution and marine debris, impacts of ocean acidification, the effectiveness of 
conservation measures, and a general lack of knowledge about areas beyond national jurisdiction 
(ABNJ) that affects the ability to predict productivity and environmental impacts of human 
activities in the Area (Target 14.A). 
Field observations showed that all attended official sessions included discussion of the 
need for ongoing data collection on the oceans, demonstrating that Ocean Conference delegates 
widely accepted this need. In the sixth partnership dialogue, “increasing scientific knowledge 
and developing research capacity and transfer of marine technology,” Conference participants 
discussed how much scientific data is required to effectively inform sustainable development 
policies and projects. Many stressed that the current level of knowledge is growing but 
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insufficient and that further scientific research is needed. For example, Héctor Soldi Soldi, Vice 
Minister for Fisheries and Aquaculture of Peru, claimed that more data for decision-making is 
always needed: “the data that is needed to take decisions is never enough. We need more data 
in order to take decisions.” This need for more data to facilitate decision making was expressed 
in all partnership dialogues and regarding all of the SDG 14 targets. Six-hundred thirty-eight 
voluntary commitments address target 14.A on increasing scientific knowledge 
(https://oceanconference.un.org/commitments/, as of August 9, 2020). Many calls for research 
focused on global needs, such as increasing the numbers of ocean observations that would 
benefit all countries, because a more comprehensive dataset of observations would lead to 
better predictions of global oceanic and atmospheric interactions. Here, knowledge of any part 
of the whole benefits the whole, and the challenge is to extend the capacity for ocean 
observation to achieve more global coverage, for presumed global benefit.  
Knowledge production reorients to support the apparatus 
How does this desired increase in marine scientific knowledge become actionable for 
sustainable development, and what actions would facilitate this translation? Some Ocean 
Conference participants, like Professor Patricia Andrea Miloslavich de Klein of Universidad 
Simón Bolívar, stressed that the purpose of marine and climate scientific research is to create an 
“end-to-end product,” a longer process that requires capacity building in analysis and 
communication of findings across sectors to end-users across who may not be scientists. 
Professor Miloslavich de Klein notes: “It’s quite easy to learn and to teach how to take an 
observation with a simple methodology. The complications start when you start having data and 
how to analyze the data and then complete with modeling. So all this needs to be done to have a 
product that can be used end to end by the policy makers” (Dialogue 6). Scientists, especially 
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those participating in the partnership dialogue, made frequent mention of these translation needs 
that would allow data to inform sustainable development. 
 Another interpretation of the translation process required to create an end-to-end 
knowledge product questioned the quest for gathering ever-more data, suggesting that additional 
data gathering would not necessarily lead to a more comprehensive picture of the ocean’s 
complex dynamics or produce more actionable information. Here, the key problem to be 
overcome is one of too much data without the appropriate tools and frameworks to analyze and 
translate it effectively. Data should be collected with a clear policy or development objective; 
without such an objective built into the design, simply collecting more data and observations will 
not necessarily yield actionable knowledge. According to OLSPS company CEO Amos Barkai:  
“…there is some kind of assumption, somewhat maybe naïve assumption, that once you 
collect enough data, we’ll have some sort of a puzzle where all the pieces can come 
together and we can just sort of link them together to some clear story of understanding 
of the environment, the ecosystem, and then of course we’ll be able to devise 
management advice that will sort out everything (Dialogue 6).  
 
These two perspectives – of not enough data and too much – are two sides of the same coin in 
that they both center around eventual development policy “effectiveness.” 
 Some Conference participants addressed the ‘beginning’ of the end-to-end process of 
generating science for policy, by addressing scientific design. Sustainable development creates a 
need for scientific inquiry designed specifically to advance sustainable development goals. 
Oceanographic data provides one example: these data are vital to understanding interactions 
between the oceans and climate, as well as informing disaster and hazards risks assessments. 
Given the growing awareness of the importance of the oceans for the success of the other 
sustainable development goals – e.g. no poverty, zero hunger, climate action, and decent work 
and economic growth – and the vital ecosystem services that oceans provide, scientific inquiry 
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must be designed not only to better know the oceans but to obtain knowledge that contributes 
directly to sustainable development. As Vladimir Ryabinin, the director of the International 
Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, stated, the current threats to the oceans necessitate a 
shift in scientific practice:  
“I would like to state that the complexity and gravity of problems facing the ocean 
actually requires a change in how ocean science observations are made. Previously, 
oceanography was mostly driven by the spirit of discovery, also by the sense of curiosity, 
scientific curiosity of course. But the science now has to be turned into sustainably 
funded, resourceful, science-based information technology that guides crucial decision 
making and also policy making. I would compare this situation with what was happening 
in meteorology at the end of 40s. It was realized then that in order to make weather 
predictions, globally coordinated exchange of standardized meteorological observations 
had to be really an obligation of countries. And it happened. And now we have 
meteorological predictions, weather predictions, and many other meteorological services. 
So our view is that we need to now think about the change in oceanography, turning [it 
into a] global authority of information technology that efficiently supports the sustainable 
use of ocean and protection of its health and resources” (Dialogue 6).  
 
In addition to a spirit of discovery and scientific curiosity, oceanography has also historically 
been driven by geopolitical priorities and making resource claims (e.g., Hamblin 2005; Zalik 
2018). The shift that Ryabinin articulates is for science to support technologies and mechanisms 
that guide sustainable development efforts. His comparison to the development of global 
meteorology echoes the narratives of global responsibility for ocean protection that appeared so 
frequently at the Conference, whereby a coordinated system of efforts can piece together 
observations for global benefit, and a more comprehensive dataset adds to the efficacy of the 
science. Crucially, “science” must be translated into “information technology,” a set of advanced 
tools to facilitate sustainable development as a set of services. Technology and technological 
capacities are framed as necessary givens, with the key barriers being capacity, implementation, 
and funding limitations. This shift in purpose also calls for a shift in financing: the most 
appropriate science for sustainable development thus moves away from “the common problem of 
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project-based funding” and requires more comprehensive funding for a more unified and 
problem-focused agenda  Johan Kuylenstierna, Stockholm Environmental Institute, Dialogue 6). 
IOC-UNESCO proposed a Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development to function as 
a mechanism for sharing and promoting this science, providing a framework for bridging 
observations and activities through building partnerships and disseminating the resulting 
information technologies for use in sustainable development, and the Decade of Ocean Science 
for Sustainable Development beginning in 2021. Building this global authority on ocean science 
requires mainstreaming the information technology so that it is widely used by the 2030s:  
“And the more you use the technology, the more you will be reliant on the technology, 
the more the technology will be verified, become transparent, and this is what we call the 
[scientific] authority” (Ryabinin, Dialogue 6).  
 
This global authoritative guidance to decision makers comes from both repeated use and 
dependence on the requisite information technologies, which are the one of the main goals of 
scientific inquiry oriented toward sustainable development.  
 Scientists frame their own work as crucial to the implementation of agenda 2030, echoing 
points about the importance of partnerships to meeting SDG 14 targets. Partnerships allow a 
bridging of actors in ways that privilege the unification narrative of the conference. As one 
scientist noted in her reflections on the current state of international partnerships, “we’re all 
working for the same aim” (Multilateral Science-Policy Partnerships side event), which is 
“transferring and using existing knowledge” for sustainable development. Several scientists 
identified problems in the science-policy translation process. One wished for “a different kind of 
science,” one in which policymakers advised scientists on what specific scenarios to examine 
(Multilateral Science-Policy Partnerships side event), as a way to bridge a perceived divide 
between practices of scientific research and policymaking. Another described this divide as lack 
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of “alignment between science and policy in general” that a new generation of scientists could 
remedy with their “capacity to communicate the right way with policymakers” (ibid.). This new 
generation of scientists would also rely on a new generation of policymakers capable of 
understanding and incorporating the scientific information. The mechanisms for developing this 
new generation are unclear, but include career training that teaches both sets of actors “how to be 
more relevant.” In addition to better training, scientists might be involved in co-designing 
processes with governments, civil society organizations, to build agendas for scientific research 
and technological innovation and address policy disconnects across sectors (Multilateral Science-
Policy Partnerships side event).  
 A government representative argued that politics and science are two sides of the same 
coin, with politics presenting an impediment to science:  
“The problem is that politics means borders, means specific interests of specific nations, 
means specific economic constraints. Science doesn’t have any, any borders, on the other 
side of the coin, doesn’t have any specific constraints like that of geography, or in terms 
of economy, or in terms of industrial interests, or whatever. So, what I personally found, 
one of the most challenging things to do is to try to overcome doing this kind of process 
like G7, the political limitation. It’s clear that scientists cannot forget politics because 
politics is strongly related to funding, and without any funding, there isn’t any science” 
(Multilateral Science-Policy Partnerships side event).  
 
This perception supports a narrative that science and politics operate in separate spheres, with 
politics and political concerns like borders, territory, political economy, and interest groups 
unrelated to scientific practice, unless they influence what and how science gets funded. Science, 
here, is a unifying mechanism, not bound by the concerns of governance. This view is 
particularly interesting in the oceans context, with its history of advancing scientific knowledge 
through geopolitics (Hamblin 2005). Fostering better translation between science and policy 
would involve not only individual abilities in communication across sectors, but reducing the 
impact of other constraining barriers at national and international scales. As another scientist and 
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business owner remarked, the technology itself is not a limitation to the successful 
implementation of SDG 14. The technology is a given (Barkai, Dialogue 6). More significant 
barriers exist in how access to that technology is organized, and whether it can be successfully 
utilized on the appropriate scales. Partnership is forwarded as the bridging mechanism that will 
help reduce some of these political, economic, and translation barriers in connecting science to 
sustainable development policy implementation. This includes partnership aimed at promoting 
greater equity in access to sustainable development technologies. 
Within a unification narrative that posits a shared future for humanity based on shared 
benefits of oceanic ecosystem services and shared risks and harms of ocean degradation and 
climate change, global- and ocean-scale knowledge and technological needs are required to fill 
the data gaps in understanding the contours of this shared future. Obtaining such knowledge is 
the responsibility of all, even if the capacities to obtain it differ, with each lack becoming an 
opportunity for further development. Data deficiencies are an equity concern and should be 
addressed as a matter of distributive justice. Government representatives from small island 
developing states identified data gaps in the impacts of ocean acidification on sustainable 
development in SIDS, especially its potential impact on livelihoods. Filling these data gaps 
provides the information necessary for risk assessment and climate change adaptation planning. 
Greater scientific knowledge of oceans and oceanic processes makes them legible to 
resource-making and sustainable development processes. Most participants articulated a need to 
gather more and more data to achieve greater “coverage” for development. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that resource-making takes on important discursive 
dimensions, using the case of the UN Ocean Conference for the implementation of SDG 14. The 
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ways that different participants discussed oceans and their resource had the effect of constructing 
the ocean as a global resource in need of care and improvement from a global population. In 
suggesting that the current regime of sustainable development functions as an apparatus, I note 
that partnership is a primary development tool for legitimizing and stabilizing this apparatus, 
even amidst counter-claims that question its legitimacy and effectiveness. These partnerships use 
different forms of solidarity work to expand both the objects of sustainable development and the 
actors responsible for acting on their potential to bring about desired improvements. This 
discourse of improvement premised on the possibility of win-win outcomes approaches oceans 
and their contents in terms of utility: through ecosystem services, blue economy potential, and 
resource utilization. Moves to map, understand, and utilize the ocean for sustainable 
development purposes demonstrate how the process of sustainable development goal 
implementation can make resources discursively, while outlining the dynamics of knowing and 
maximizing them.  
 Framing oceans and their contents in terms of utility shows how actors at international 
meetings can discursively “make” resources in ways that stabilize and shore the apparatus, 
meaning the sustainable development project itself. Resources for sustainable development 
become seen as necessary for collective survival and flourishing, often obscuring the power 
imbalances and neocolonial dynamics within the apparatus. The specific discursive constructions 
of the apparatus, solidary work and partnership in particular, expand the field of action (and 
actors) for sustainable development; performances of solidarity work and the formation of 
partnerships can fold dissenting (i.e., anti-neoliberal and decolonial) perspectives back into the 
apparatus, and give pro-growth actors, such as the business community, new legitimacy as 
partners in sustainable development. The ocean’s global importance to communities, economies, 
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and ecosystems facilitates its enrollment as a multifaceted object of improvement through 
resource-making.  
Given that it is difficult to pin down what sustainable development is, it is tempting to 
dismiss such a malleable term as devoid of meaningful content. As Lélé notes, sustainable 
development is “often used, but little explained” (Lélé 1991, qtd in Zaccai 2012), and can 
describe a range of approaches from “business as usual” to more radical critiques. However, it is 
exactly this void that allows it to operate with such power and opens up questions of the 
relationship between knowledge, power and responsibility, and resource-making in sustainable 
development discussions. Ziai (2016) argues that development, as an empty signifier, can reflect 
political struggle. Drawing from poststructuralist theorist Ernesto Laclau, he notes that the empty 
signifier “‘has no content, because it only exists in the various forms in which it is actually 
realised . . . [it] is present as that which is absent; it becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier 
of that absence. In this sense, various political forces can compete in their efforts to present their 
particular objectives as those which carry out the filling of that lack’ (Laclau 1996: 44)” (Ziai 
2016, 150). This empty signifier does perform a function: “to legitimize certain interventions as 
beneficial” (Ziai 2016, p.150). Through partnership and incorporation into the sustainable 
development apparatus, the Ocean Conference served as a site for the legitimation of various 
marine resource-making agendas and projects. As a project of legitimation, sustainable 






CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, I examined processes of resource-making involving oceans and marine life. 
Specifically, I looked at resources oriented toward sustainable development. Enrolling oceans 
into sustainable development is one way of responding to an ocean in crisis: marine ecosystem 
degradation, marine pollution, sea level rise, ocean acidification, coral bleaching, and the 
endangerment of ocean resources and ecosystem services that support communities and 
livelihoods all demand a response. Mainstream sustainable development peddles rhetorics of 
both progress and reassurance: progress in terms of general social and ecological improvement 
(see Li 2007) and reassurance that “we can have it all,” now and in the future, hopefully without 
the painful changes and reductions in consumption a more catastrophist discourse suggests 
would be necessary to mitigate the problems sustainable development aims to address. This 
assumption that a global “we” can have it all – that “economic growth, environmental protection, 
distributive justice, and long-term sustainability are mutually reinforcing” (Dryzek 2013, 157) – 
is of particular relevance to understanding how these resources are created and maintained.  
In looking at the co-production of resources and “sustainability,” I showed how resource-
making is an ongoing, active process. Rather than gathering pre-existing “natures,” these 
resources come to be as such through scientific expertise, institutional alignment, and ongoing 
discursive construction. First, I traced the transformation of micro algae into “bits of life” that 
circulate and are transformed through a chain of scientific optimization. I followed algal bits of 
life through stages of strain selection, cultivation, harvesting, and conversion into fuel 
precursors. Despite their framing as “efficient biological factories” that could produce greater 
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amounts of energy per acre of cultivation than other crops when properly optimized (Sheehan et 
al. 1998), algae are not efficient factories on their own. The realization of algae as a fuel resource 
requires extensive mobilization of funds, knowledge, and infrastructures. While they are sold 
attractively as future sustainable substitutes for existing fuels, they are designed within the 
constraints of a fuel economy based on conventional petroleum fuels.  
I then explored how public and private actors generate value in the present through the 
making of a promissory resource by shifting focus away from fuels and toward food and feed 
ingredients that have greater profit potential in the short term. I argued that algal resource-
making joins the malleability of the algal organism with the malleable and stretchy framework of 
sustainable development, wherein algae become a flexible tool made to respond to a range of 
sustainability problems and crises. The development of novel products is a spectacular venture, 
requiring financial speculation for small start-up firms to cross the “valley of death” for company 
survival. It also draws upon the spectacular: stories that leverage the promise of future 
“sustainability” and future profitability in order to construct the resource-making structures of 
the present.  I also showed how transforming algae into bits of life provides avenues for the 
multiplication of value from algae, but complicates their classification and regulation as 
consumer products. Algal food and feed ingredients can get lost or misclassified in existing 
regulations, an example of frictions in the resource-making process. 
 The case of the UN Ocean Conference provided a different perspective, showing how 
“oceans” and the resources and services contained therein become a resource for sustainable 
development through different kinds of discursive performance. Here, sustainable development 
emerges as an apparatus, an assemblage of discourses and practices in response to crises of 
environmental degradation and a loss of international development legitimacy. United Nations 
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Ocean Conference participants discursively enroll oceans into this sustainable development 
apparatus in ways that respond to the concerns of the apparatus’s making. By constructing a 
global ocean whose resources and services benefit all, and whose degradation and pollution harm 
all, the Conference creates a unified and urgent need that is difficult to contradict. Calls to 
decolonize development and oceans governance, along with the recognition that ocean 
degradation impacts people and communities very differently, are absorbed into the apparatus 
through the mechanism of partnership. Finding the right partnerships to expand coverage of both 
the global oceans and the Sustainable Development Goal 14 targets becomes the development 
prescription that stabilizes the apparatus. Through these forms of solidarity work, the ocean and 
its contents are framed as a space ripe for “sustainable” resource utilization.  
 The co-production of marine resources and sustainability shows how resources are made 
through an intersection of scientific and institutional processes. “Sustainability” is also being 
continually created through these resource-making processes. In each case, future resources are 
conjured in response to a crisis, with sustainable development prescribed as the remedy to the 
crisis. This sense of futurity necessarily permeates resource-making: through the optimization of 
the resource toward future goals, though financial speculation, through spectacular storytelling, 
and through discursively creating objects to be improved.  
 An unexpected finding of my research relates to abstraction in resource-making. For 
processes that rely so heavily on concrete materialities, I found evidence of abstraction in several 
places. In the case of algae, the transformation from whole organisms into “bits of life,” detached 
from their environments and freed to circulate along with their properties, is a process of 
fragmentation and abstraction that is necessary to the resource-making enterprise. It allows algal 
bits of life to travel and transform from the flask to the farm, slushing around in desert algal 
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ponds or fermentation tanks until its further refinement into its next form. Some of these bits of 
life are purposely reintroduced into the ocean, perhaps as fish feed for salmon bound for the 
stomachs of wealthy consumers. After entering circuits of capital to become a feed product, they 
re-enter the ecosystem and the economy in a completely different form and for a different 
purpose: protecting dwindling fish stocks so that they may sustain human consumption. Many 
other algal bits of life stay on land, becoming machinic fuels, plastic substitutes, or health 
supplements. Perhaps these will also eventually make their way back into the ocean, this time 
recognizable as waste. This fundamental abstraction and separation allows algal bits of life to 
enter, exit, and reenter circuits of capital, helped along the way by significant investment, labor, 
finance, and spectacular sustainability stories. This extraction, abstraction, and transformation 
creates a sustainability story in which marine life must be separated from the ocean in order to 
improve it. 
In the context of the Ocean Conference, not only is the ocean discursively constructed as 
a resource that can be improved through measured use, but sustainability itself also becomes a 
kind of resource that can be leveraged for ongoing development work. Like the production of the 
global ocean with shared and highly differentiated benefits and risks, creating sustainability 
involves a process of abstraction that can stretch to incorporate a range of lived, variable 
experiences of the ocean, while managing to absorb this variation into a shared “we” that 
embraces sustainability as a crisis-averting goal.  
These resources in-the-making speak to ongoing moments of crisis to which they are 
conjured to respond. Sustainable development contains a persistent belief in the power of the 
“technofix” (Dryzek 2013) to stave off ecological disaster while leaving capitalist growth 
unexamined and unchecked. Similarly, the American biotech industry takes on a salvific tone in 
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its ability to engineer medical solutions (Sunder Rajan 2006). This is echoed in the algae sector, 
especially in its spectacular storytelling. The implication of sustainable development as a crisis 
response is that crisis comes to be framed as a condition, which can obscure the mechanisms that 
lead to the crisis moment in the first place. As Janet Roitman (2013) argues, the term “crisis” 
once referred to a critical juncture that required a major decision. Presently, “crisis” more often 
signifies a historical condition. As such, crisis is a deviation from an expected and preferred 
norm or trajectory. Explanations of failed trajectories presume a status quo to which society, 
economy, or environment can return. Instead of asking “what went wrong?” Roitman suggests 
asking “how did these things come to be as they are, and how do they function positively, 
meaning whom do they benefit?” (ibid.). 
This understanding of crisis as a historical condition helps to explain the persistence of 
sustainability and the role of resource-making therein. Kaşdoğan (2017) argues that such a 
conception “creates the conditions that potentiate and legitimize algal biofuels 
projects as ‘sustainable’” (122-3). The futures conjured by sustainable development also conjure 
a set of imagined norms from which a global “we” has deviated and must return. Resource-
making projects attempt to generate value in different crisis dimensions: both as a response to 
persistent crisis conditions – seen in potential uses for algae to mitigate climate change, for 
example – and as a beneficiary of the positive functions of crisis and the value opportunities 
created therein. 
This study also highlights the range and malleability of resource-making and 
sustainability. Scholars have discussed sustainability as a malleable concept. While this can 
make sustainable development seem difficult to pin down or even appear to be an empty 
signifier, this study shows that concrete, intersecting processes reproduce this malleability. Three 
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interwoven processes contribute to this malleability: scientific knowledge renders oceans and 
marine life more legible to resource making; governance institutions and industry interact to 
enroll oceans and marine life in their projects; and the discursive framings of sustainable futures 
that are simultaneously expansive (for what they seek to include) and limiting (for sticking to 
imagined futures based on capitalism). The configurations of these components give 
sustainability its “stretchiness.”  
Such sustainability accounts sell the technofix offered by these resources, while also 
occluding the problematic aspects of their making. Concepts like sustainable development and 
resilience are mechanisms for greenwashing capitalism that take a utilitarian view of nonhuman 
life (Alaimo 2020, 319). This utilitarian focus often presumes sustainability as a universal good, 
neglecting to ask what is being sustained, for whom, and at whose expense? Algae, for example, 
may one day be developed into products that reinforce a racialized global food system, 
reproducing the system’s coloniality by framing algal foods as either “life-saving” or “health-
optimizing,” with both being profitable to the producer.      
Resources are a critical component to the sustainable development paradigm. However, 
resources offer a limited viewpoint in seeing the ocean itself, the marine life contained it is 
waters, and human-ocean relationships. A resources-centered view risks reducing the seas to 
their most useful components, and treating marine life as merely a means to (human) ends. Many 
understandings of ocean futures and the human relationship to the sea far exceed a utilitarian, 
resource-based conception. This dissertation takes resource-making for sustainability as an 
object of study to better understand its contours and persistence as it extends further into the 
oceans. This is not to say that an extractive relationship should be privileged, but to better 




APPENDIX: TABLE OF OCEAN CONFERENCE SIDE EVENTS, 2017 
 
 
The Regular Process: Strengthening the 
Science-Policy Interface 
 
June 5, 1:15-2:30pm (partial) 
Adopting the Blue Economy: A viable path to 
Sustainable Development in Small Island 
Developing States Combined with Promoting 
the transition to Blue Growth and Blue 
Economy in Small Island Developing States 
and least developed countries 
June 5, 1:15-2:30pm (partial) 
Capitalizing Investments in SDG 14: 
Establishment of a Strategic Ocean 
Investment Ecosystem 
 
June 6, 3:00-4:30pm 
Swedish Initiatives for Agenda 2030 June 6, 11am-12:30pm 
 
Capacity for Change: Clusters and the Triple 
Helix  
 
June 6, 1:15-2:30pm 
Ocean business community: partnering for 
implementation of SDG 14. 
 
June 7, 9:00-10:30am 
Co-Designing Game-Changing Ocean 
Solutions for Sustainable Development  
 
June 7, 11:00am-12:30pm 
Blue energy: The Ocean is the Future of 
Renewable Energy 
 
June 7, 1:15-2:30pm 
Multilateral Science-Policy Partnerships: 
Generating the Evidence to Underpin SDG 
Implementation 
June 7, 3:30-5:00pm 
Financing Ocean Sustainable Development: 
The Investment Community and SDG 14 
 
June 8, 9:00-10:30am 
Building ocean knowledge for sustainable 
development: how science will contribute to 
achieving SDG 14 
 
June 8, 1:15-2:30pm 
Blue Biotrade as a Pathway to Sustainability 
 
June 8, 3:00-4:30pm 
Realizing the blue bioeconomy in small island 
states: building on governance and innovation 
 
June 8, 6:15-7:30pm 
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Harnessing resources of international ocean 
science organizations to develop capacity for 
ocean science in SIDS, LDCs and other 
developing countries 
 
June 9, 9:00-10:30am 
Hacking science for Ocean Literacy: What’s 
needed to fully implement SGD14? 
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